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Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, April 1980
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LENINIST METHODOLOGY FOR CLASSIFYING WARS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4 1980 signed to press 24 Mar 80 pp 5-12

[Article, published under the heading "For the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of V. I. Lenin," by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Col T. Kondratkov: "Leninist Methodology for Determining the Social Character of Wars"]

[Text] Enormous credit goes to V. I. Lenin for substantiation of the military program of the proletarian revolution and creation of the teaching on defense of the socialist homeland. An important place in the Lenin military-theory legacy is occupied by ideas and theses pertaining to the social, class-political character of war. They arm our servicemen with correct views on war and its sociopolitical essence and make it possible to form and shape the attitude of the masses toward war, to determine their line of conduct and action, and to elaborate a scientifically substantiated party strategy and tactics in each concrete war. A Leninist understanding of the social, class character of war constitutes at the same time an extremely keen ideological weapon in the struggle against bourgeois, Maoist and revisionist falsifiers of this important problem.

I.

Knowledge of war is not limited to disclosure of its sources and determination of its essence as a continuation of the politics of classes and states by violent means. This knowledge is broadened and enriched by means of analysis of war's social character. The social character of war reflects its class-political nature and reveals the broader spectrum of facets and attributes, diversified links both with the politics of classes and states and with other spheres of societal relations -- moral, legal, ideological, etc, as well as with social progress. It exerts profound influence on the acuteness and intensity of combat, on its entire course and outcome.

World War II persuasively attests to the profound influence of the social factor on the dynamics of military operations. Following Hitler's attack

on Poland, on 3 September 1939 the governments of Great Britain and France declared war on fascist Germany. But they failed to undertake any real steps to assist the victim of aggression. A total of 110 French divisions and a British expeditionary corps (5 divisions), which were faced by only 23 German divisions, stood idle.[1] Ruling circles in Great Britain, France and their supporter, the United States, sought to egg Nazi Germany on against the Soviet Union. Passivity on the fronts was combined with attempts at a secret deal between Great Britain, France and Germany, intensification of reactionary sentiments in Great Britain and especially in France, the government of which was increasingly taking the path of bringing fascism to that country.

As regards the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union -- the most important component part of World War II -- it was fought with extreme savagery from the very outset. This is due primarily to its social, class character. Directly opposed social systems had entered into a fight to the death. On the part of fascist Germany, the war was of an imperialist, predatory nature. The Soviet Union was waging a just struggle against foreign invaders for its freedom and independence, and at the concluding stage for the liberation of other peoples from fascist enslavement as well. The fate of the world's first socialist state and the future of world civilization, progress and democracy was being determined in this war.

The experience of history shows how strong has been the influence of the social, class character of a war on its initiation, course and end results. Leninist methodology demands first and foremost elucidation of the objective conditions and factors which engender a war and which place their imprint on its character. The social character of a war, V. I. Lenin pointed out, is determined not by the good intentions or good will of individuals and groups, even of peoples, but rather by the "real, actual politics,"[2] by an analysis of the "objective status of the commanding classes in all belligerent states"[3] and by the objective conditions and concrete historical situation. As he stated, it is impossible to understand a given war without understanding the era.

Another requirement of the Leninist methodology is the necessity of a profound analysis and a class evaluation of its political content and political goals. In the opinion of V. I. Lenin, the character of a war (be it reactionary or revolutionary) depends on what class is waging it, whose policies it is continuing, and what is the internal system of that country which enters the war and wages it. "The social character of a war, its genuine significance," stated Vladimir Il'ich, "...is determined by what policy the war is continuing...."[4]

Another integral element of the Leninist methodology is a moral and legal evaluation of the political content and goals of a war. Extending to it, just as to other phenomena of societal affairs, are sociopolitical, moral and legal appraisals, which are of a class character and which in their

unity provide an integral and correct picture of its character. A revolutionary war, as V. I. Lenin defined it, "is the only legal, legitimate, just, genuinely great war of all the wars in history."[5]

The sociopolitical character of a war also includes a moral-legal evaluation of the means and methods of achieving political goals, their justification or censure. This applies particularly to the most cruel and barbaric means of waging war, which are in conflict with the juridical conscience of peoples, standards of ethics and law.

Imperialist states violate the generally acknowledged moral-legal standards of utilization of means and modes of waging war and conduct predatory actions, distinguished by monstrous cruelty and barbarousness, which are incompatible with international law and human ethics. In December 1919 V. I. Lenin stated that the imperialist countries "were waging war against Russia with the most brutal means, without the slightest shadow of legality."[6] Military operations by the fascist army in the war against the Soviet Union in 1941-1945 were of an especially savage, predatory, criminal character.

Today as well aggressive imperialist circles, ignoring the will of peace-loving peoples, international legal and moral standards, are working intensively on developing the most lethal means of mass annihilation. In December 1979 the United States forced upon its NATO allies a decision to manufacture and deploy in Europe approximately 600 new nuclear weapons aimed at the USSR and the other European socialist countries. In addition, the Carter Administration has drawn up a long-range program, unprecedented in scale, for the manufacture of all types of modern weapons. The objective of these reckless militaristic measures is to achieve military superiority over the Warsaw Pact nations, to secure the possibility of carrying out foreign policy from "a position of strength" and brazenly meddling in the internal affairs of other nations.

Leninist methodology provides the possibility of correctly evaluating the sociohistorical role of each war and of revealing its relations with historical progress -- does it serve the aim of preserving obsolete societal relations, establishments and systems, or their liquidation. V. I. Lenin wrote that Marxism "requires a historical analysis of each individual war in order to determine whether this war can be considered progress, serving the interests of democracy or the proletariat, in this sense legitimate, just, etc."[8] Of course the degree of justice and progressiveness of wars of different eras varies.

An unjust, illegal war plays a reactionary role, impedes sociohistorical progress and the forward movement of mankind, and causes harm to the progressive development of peoples and countries. "All wars," stated V. I. Lenin, "which are the result of predatory aspirations of czars and capitalists, we consider to be criminal, for they are fatal to the working classes and bear rich fruit for the ruling bourgeoisie."[9] The

war waged by the U.S. imperialists and their accomplices against the peoples of Indochina was precisely such a reactionary, unjust, criminal war.

Consequently the social character of a war is a comprehensive sociopolitical and moral-legal description of that war. The unjust character of a war is determined by a predatory policy of plunder, reactionary political content, and goals, employed barbarous means and methods incompatible with the principles of progressive politics, ethics and law, its sociohistorical significance and negative influence on social progress.

Leninist methodology arms Soviet servicemen with a correct understanding of the social character of wars of the contemporary era, which can be established only from the position of the interests of socialism and communism, the interests of peoples and countries struggling against colonialism and neocolonialism, from the standpoint of the toiler masses, which are waging a struggle against the omnipotence of monopoly capital for social liberation, and from the standpoint of the world socialist community, the international worker class and all revolutionary forces.

The social character of a war cannot be presented as invariable from start to finish. On the contrary, in connection with profound changes in the essence, political content, goals, means and methods of war, as well as the belligerent forces, it undergoes complex evolution and development. A just war can develop into an unjust war, and vice versa. V. I. Lenin wrote: "A national war can be transformed into an imperialist war, and vice versa."[10]

Change in social character can be traced in the example of the wars of the great French Revolution. They began as national wars, in defense of this revolution, against a coalition of counterrevolutionary monarchies. But when Napoleon created the French Empire, enslaving a number of long-established major European national states, they were transformed into imperialist wars, which in turn engendered national liberation wars against the imperialism of Napoleon.[11] The social character of World War II underwent a complex evolution. It was transformed from an imperialist, predatory, unjust war on both sides in the first stage into a just, anti-fascist war of liberation on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition in the second stage.

Bourgeois ideologists attack the Leninist methodology of determining the social character of a war, distort it and advance their own abstract, formalistic criteria, concealing the class essence of a war with political and moral-legal evaluations, ignoring the demands of an objective approach, and imposing subjectivism.

Working in concert with them are the Maoists, who crudely distort this scientific methodology. They attempt to replace it with a primitive Maoist scheme based on a superficial analogy, a scheme according to which

the character of a war is determined by the relations between predator and victim: a war is unjust on the side of the predator and just on the side of the victim. Such a mechanical scheme, carrying over to the world of man relationships which prevail in the animal world, opens up for Peking propaganda broad areas of opportunity for arbitrariness in appraising the social character of contemporary wars.

Basing their arguments on the Maoist scheme, the Peking leaders claim that U.S. imperialism, the NATO countries, racist and reactionary regimes are in the position of "victims" and must "defend themselves" against the "Soviet threat." And if another world war breaks out, the fatal inevitability of which is importunately propagandized by the Peking leaders, on the side of the United States and the other Western European capitalist countries it will be a war against aggression by the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations, that is, "just." These wild fabrications are presented in an article by a team of staff members from the Institute of World History of the PRC Academy of Social Sciences, published in the 18 January 1978 issue of the newspaper RENMIN RIBAO, as well as in other Chinese publications.[12]

The Maoist approach to the social character of war constitutes vile, cynical falsification, presenting in reverse the actual facts, links and relationships. A glaring example of the treacherous policy of Peking, unmasking its brazen concoctions about just war, is the criminal aggression by China against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The theoretical sophisms and constructs of bourgeois and Maoist ideologists specializing in distortion of the Leninist methodology of determining the social character of a war are refuted with genuine facts, by reality. Leninist methodology, which is grounded on a solid scientific foundation, plays an exceptionally important role. It arms one with a correct understanding of the sociopolitical and moral-ethical countenance of past and contemporary wars and serves as a powerful moral weapon of the masses in their struggle for just goals.

II.

A comprehensive analysis of the social character of war as well as its essence and causes enabled V. I. Lenin to create a teaching on just and unjust wars. Numerous wars are subdivided into two types, on the basis of sociopolitical characteristics and sociohistorical role: just, progressive, and unjust, reactionary. V. I. Lenin wrote: "...There are just and unjust wars, progressive and reactionary wars, wars of progressive classes and wars of backward classes, wars promoting consolidation of class oppression, and wars fostering its overthrow...."[13] Lenin's division of wars is genuinely scientific, and retains its significance in the present day as well.

Just, progressive wars of the contemporary era include first and foremost wars in defense of socialist homelands and the socialist community against

imperialist aggression. They contain no elements of seizure and enslavement of other peoples, and therefore they cannot develop into unjust, predatory wars and are of a consistently revolutionary character, are genuinely popular and international. They are directed by Marxist-Leninist parties. These are the most just, legitimate and progressive wars as regards their character and historical role. Their goal is protection of a progressive social and governmental system, freedom and independence of socialist homelands, and aid to peoples in their struggle for freedom, independence, and socialism. The civil war in our country against domestic and foreign counterrevolution and the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against fascist Germany were precisely such wars.

Just, progressive wars of the contemporary era include civil wars of the proletariat and toiler masses against the bourgeoisie, and national liberation wars of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America for their political independence.

V. I. Lenin taught that "socialists should support in the most resolute manner the most revolutionary elements of bourgeois-democratic national liberation movements... help them rise up, and when appropriate assist them in their revolutionary war -- against the imperialist powers oppressing them."[14] Guided by Lenin's instructions, the CPSU and Soviet people consider it their duty to support the sacred struggle of oppressed peoples and their just wars of liberation against imperialism. Such was the case, for example, during the war waged by the U.S. imperialists and their stooges against the Vietnamese people and during the events in Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviet Union responded in this manner in December 1979, when the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan requested assistance in protecting that country from an external threat.

Addressing his constituents on 22 February 1980, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated: "True to Lenin's behests, we always stand on the side of peoples defending their freedom and independence. But we shall never utilize our assistance to apply pressure on those to whom it has been given."[14a]

Unjust imperialist wars engendered by the capitalist system are the direct opposite of just, progressive wars. By their social character these are criminal, predatory wars of plunder, wars to repartition the world and to establish world hegemony. They are profoundly reactionary, hostile to societal progress and are useful only to the monopolists for seizing foreign soil, robbing and enslaving peoples. World War I was such a war from beginning to end. World War II at the first stage and the numerous local wars initiated by the aggressors have also been such wars on the side of the imperialist states.

Lenin's teaching on just and unjust wars is attacked by vicious falsifications on the part of bourgeois and opportunistic ideologists, who attempt to dismiss a class-political and moral-legal appraisal of wars, to conceal the reactionary sociohistorical role of unjust wars, and to rehabilitate

them in the eyes of the masses, to equate criminal aggression with legitimate self-defense.

Toward this end bourgeois ideologists propagate the false theses of the "unscientific nature" of moral and legal categories and assessments. They claim that war, which is a very complex social phenomenon, is neutral in a moral-legal respect and that its appraisal allegedly does not possess objective content. West German sociologist F. Posset states in his book "War and Christianity": "A just war exists only in theory: the concept of 'just war' has become a fiction.... No just war exists, and probably has never existed."[15] U.S. professor H. Ford speaks in the same vein, stating that "traditional arguments in favor of just war have lost their effectiveness."[16] In this manner the theorists of the bourgeoisie seek to undermine the scientific foundations of a sociopolitical, moral and legal appraisal of war and thus to justify amoralism and lawlessness in international relations.

Attempting to discredit the division of wars on the basis of their sociopolitical and moral-legal attributes, militarist ideologists sometimes claim that in war both adversaries may be waging a just struggle to an equal degree. We might cite as an example a book entitled "International Relations" published by a group of Western sociologists in the FRG. "One and the same war," the authors stress, "is frequently viewed as just on both sides."[17]

The justice of a war -- a bilateral process -- cannot apply in equal measure to both warring sides. Both belligerent sides can wage only an unjust war to an equal degree. V. I. Lenin stated that "any war in which both warring sides oppress other countries or nationalities, warring over division of spoils, over the question of 'who will oppress or rob more,' must be called imperialistic."[19] This occurred, for example, throughout World War I. But a just war on both sides simultaneously is impossible. A just war is waged by that side which is struggling for its freedom and independence and is defending a progressive, ascending line of societal development.

While one group of bourgeois theorists rejects the possibility of just wars and justifies arbitrariness in their evaluation, another group, on the contrary, believes that an endeavor over the course of many centuries to humanize war and to limit war's objectives and means has had great moral significance. But a common element with both is a theoretical helplessness in analysis of the social character of war and its disclosure from the position of genuine justice and legitimacy. They utilize arguments of ethics and law to justify unjust wars and to conceal the immoral essence of the policies and strategy of NATO and other imperialist military groupings.

Also extensively propagandized within NATO countries is a religious-Catholic concept of just war, a concept founded by medieval scholastic

Thomas Aquinas. According to this concept, the interests of religion and the church are the sole measuring stick of justice of a war.

One group of supporters of the above concept is attempting to justify morally the necessity of employing nuclear weapons to combat godless communism and atheism. This group makes assurances that a war in which mass destruction weapons will be employed "is not absolutely immoral."[20] In their opinion the Catholic concept of just war remains valid even under the conditions of the nuclear age.

Pacifists deny the correctness of dividing wars into just and unjust wars. West German political scientist (E. O. Chempil') attempts to prove that war is unjust in its very essence. In his opinion any war is "injustice in pure form."[22] Other Western ideologists of a pacifist orientation subscribe to like views. Their theories are in contradiction to a scientific approach to a moral-legal appraisal of war and essentially disarm the masses in their struggle for just goals.

At the same time Western militarist ideologists, especially American, urge rejection of "traditional morality" and acceptance of a "higher morality," which is in conformity with the requirements of the nuclear age. Convinced that any war which the United States wages is just, they intensively disseminate U.S. doctrine, which acknowledges as legitimate not only limited wars but also a nuclear world war for which imperialism is preparing. The misanthropic points of this doctrine cannot be characterized other than as a form of amoralism which is dangerous to all mankind.

The most sophisticated and crude devices are employed by bourgeois ideologists when they come out with direct attacks on Leninist teaching on just and unjust wars. Falsifying the essence and content of a Leninist appraisal of the social character of a war, these people ascribe to it "one-sidedness," "tendentiousness," and other such absurdities. They claim that Leninist teaching allegedly recognizes as just only those wars which "promote the spread of communism." West German Sovietologist I. Bochenski, for example, characterizes Leninist teaching on just and unjust wars in this manner in his phony little book entitled "Marxism-Leninism."[23] It is not difficult to determine who benefits from slanderous fabrications of this kind.

The Leninist methodology of determining the social character of a war is of exceptional importance. The tactics of Marxist-Leninist parties, which recognize and support just, progressive wars and resolutely oppose unjust and reactionary wars, are worked out in conformity with the character of a war. "While condemning predatory imperialist wars, Marxist-Leninists consider just and support wars in defense of the achievements of peoples from imperialist aggression, for national liberation, and wars of revolutionary classes which are repulsing attempts by reactionary forces to retain or reestablish their dominion with the aid of arms."[24]

This methodology helps form and shape the attitude of the masses and armed forces personnel toward a war, gives them a correct orientation, and designates a line of conduct and action in a concrete war. Wars of today are waged by peoples; they involve many millions of persons. The degree of their activeness on the field of battle and on the home front depends on the social, class character of a war. While in predatory wars one cannot count on enthusiasm, in just wars, on the contrary, the will to win and moral steadfastness of the masses are exceptionally strong. V. I. Lenin stated that conviction as to the justice of the war raises the soldiers' spirit. He emphasized that in the civil war "our proletariat, weak in numbers, exhausted by calamity and deprivation, emerged victorious, since it is strong because of its moral force."[25] The proletariat derived its moral strength in the progressive aims of the war. The just character of the Great Patriotic War also served as a powerful source of the invincible moral strength of the USSR.

Disclosure of the social character of wars and their division into just and unjust wars are of particular significance for the study of history, for developing a correct attitude by the toiler masses toward the historical past, for forming and shaping revolutionary, fighting and labor traditions, for the struggle for social progress and justice, freedom and independence of peoples, and for exposing bourgeois, Zionist, Maoist and revisionist falsifiers.

The significance of Lenin's teaching on just and unjust wars for the contemporary era was profoundly revealed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "While pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence," he stated, "the Soviet Union has no intention of permitting the aggressors free rein. Imperialist circles should firmly understand that the Leninist thesis on just and unjust wars is valid today as well, and that the Soviet Union will resolutely oppose any intrigues by the warmongers and will give support to peoples fighting for their freedom and national independence."[26]

The Soviet Union is firmly and consistently pursuing the Leninist foreign policy and the Peace Program drawn up at the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses. This general policy course in international politics combines a consistent love of peace with a firm rebuff to the aggressive intrigues of the imperialists and Maoists.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetskaya Istoricheskaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Historical Encyclopedia], Vol 3, Moscow, Izd-vo Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1963, page 831.

2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 31, page 154.

3. Ibid., Vol 27, page 304.

4. Ibid., Vol 34, page 196.

5. Ibid., Vol 9, page 212.

6. Ibid., Vol 39, page 345.

7. Footnote omitted.

8. Ibid., Vol 30, page 82.

9. Ibid., Vol 37, page 71.

10. Ibid., Vol 30, page 5.

11. Ibid., Vol 30, pp 5-6.

12. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 7, 1979, pp 77, 78.

13. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 38, page 337.

14. Ibid., Vol 27, page 261.

14a. PRAVDA, 23 February 1980.

15. F. Posset, "Krieg und Christentum" [War and Christianity], Freising, 1978, page 415.

16. G. Ford and F. Winters, "Ethics and Nuclear Strategy?" New York, 1977, page 10.

17. "Internationale Beziehungen" [International Relations], Cologne, 1973, page 249.

18. Footnote omitted.

19. See Lenin, op. cit., Vol. 34, page 364.

20. "Abschreckung und Entspannung" [Deterrence and Détente], Berlin, 1977, page 134.

21. Footnote omitted.

22. "Theorie der internationalen Politik" [Theory of International Politics], Hamburg, 1975, page 93.

23. I. Bochenski, "Marxismus-Leninismus" [Marxism-Leninism], Munich-Vienna, 1975, page 70.

24. "50 let Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii. Postanovleniye Plenuma TsK KPSS. Tezisy TsK KPSS" [50th Anniversary of the

Great October Socialist Revolution. CPSU Central Committee Plenum Decree. CPSU Central Committee Theses], Moscow, Politizdat, 1967, pp 62-63.

25. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 23, page 135.

26. L. I. Brezhnev, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [Guarding Peace and Socialism], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, page 134.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: METHODS OF BREACHING MINEFIELDS

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[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences Col A. Soskov: "Development of Means and Methods of Clearing Passages Through Minefields During the War"]

[Text] The experience of the last war demonstrated that successful clearing of lanes through minefields was dependent on the type of mines employed by the enemy, by the features of his minefield layout system, as well as the employed means and methods of breaching employed by the advancing Soviet troops.

Prior to the attack on the USSR and during the first months of the Great Patriotic War, Hitler's military command followed the doctrine that landmines could be utilized only as a means of reinforcing unmined obstacles. In the course of defensive engagements, however, which the adversary was forced to conduct at the end of 1941 and in 1942 on certain strategic axes, the Wehrmacht command took a number of measures aimed at developing new types of mines. Subsequently, when the Soviet Army launched an offensive along the entire Soviet-German front, the enemy proceeded to mass-produce mines and to lay minefields on defensive lines in order to achieve greater stability of defense. By 1943 the German-fascist army had in its arsenal six types of antitank mines (PTM) and three types of antipersonnel mines (PPM). The layout and arrangement of the enemy's system of obstacles was improving, and its structure was becoming more complex. During the first period of the war the density of the enemy's minefields comprised 1-2 mines per linear meter, while this density became significantly increased beginning in 1943. The configuration and depth (up to 100 meters) of antitank and antipersonnel minefields also were changing. They were for the most part of rectangular configuration and would be set up forward of the first, second, and sometimes also forward of the third trenches of the first position in the Germans' main defensive position.[1]

Thus in the first period of the Great Patriotic War the German-fascist army considered landmines to be essentially "second-rate" obstacles; subsequently, taking account of combat experience, including Soviet, landmines began to be utilized in mass quantities. Breaching of an enemy system of obstacles required considerable efforts on the part of the advancing forces, both in an engineer-technical and organizational respect. It was necessary to improve existing means and methods of clearing lanes through minefields and to develop new means and methods maximally meeting the requirements of combat. At the same time more effective working methods were sought for commanders, combined-arms staffs and engineer troop commanders for organizing negotiation of obstacles.

In the prewar years the Soviet Army studied and practically developed means, methods and organization proper of negotiating minefields. Means of reconnoitering and clearing minefields available to engineer troops at the beginning of the war included the VIM-210 mine detector, home-made probes, and various demolition devices. For all practical purposes they employed a manual method of clearing lanes through minefields, utilizing probes, mine detectors, and sometimes explosives as well. Research and experiments were conducted on development of other, more improved methods of breaching minefields: employing artillery fire, roller flails, and treadway bridges.[2] They had not developed sufficiently, however, by the beginning of the war.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Army was compelled to conduct heavy defensive engagements, and therefore the principal attention of scientific thought and efficiency innovators in the engineer troops was concentrated on development and the search for ways to achieve efficient utilization of various obstacles, not negotiation of obstacles. In addition, inadequate development of means and methods of mine clearing was connected with the fact that the enemy made comparatively little use of minefields in the conduct of defensive operations.

In the second period of the war, when our troops began mounting large-scale offensive operations and the enemy was forced to shift to extensive employment of minefields on his defensive lines, breaching minefields became one of the most important tasks of engineer support of penetration and conduct of an offensive operation. By the end of 1943 the engineer troops had been furnished more sophisticated mine detectors (VIM-203, VIM-203M) and began more extensively utilizing the demolition technique of breaching minefields. The PT-3 mine-clearing tank attachment was developed. At the proposal of its designer, Lt Col P. M. Mugalev, an experimental engineer-tank unit was formed for the first time,[3] which was the prototype for subsequent establishment of engineer-tank regiments equipped with mine-clearing tank attachments.

In the final period of the war the engineer troops had at their disposal an entire aggregate of means of reconnoitering and breaching minefields. They began extensively utilizing VIM-625 and VIM-625V mine detectors, the UZ-1 Bangalore torpedo, the PT-3 mine-clearing tank attachment, a set

of attachments and devices for reconnoitering delayed-action mines (MZD), the Vladimirov probe, an instrument for listening to clockwork mechanisms in delayed-action mines, etc. Specially-trained mine-seeking dogs were used to check out areas for mines.

Very substantial changes also occurred in table of organization. The engineer troops now included combat engineer assault brigades and independent engineer-tank regiments, the most important mission of which consisted in breaching minefields and taking part in assault on emplacements involving penetration of enemy defensive lines. For the purpose of clearing mines in liberated areas of our country, five rear services obstacle-clearing brigades were formed in February 1943 on orders from Hq SHC [Headquarters, Supreme High Command], each brigade containing from five to seven engineer battalions, while battalions of mine-sniffing dogs began to be formed in March.[4]

The availability of new mine-clearing equipment and the troops' considerable combat experience in negotiating minefields made it possible to improve the manual method of breaching, to employ and develop in a practical manner demolition and mechanical (sweeping) methods, and to seek other methods of breaching minefields.

The manual technique was utilized most frequently during the war years. Special obstacle clearing teams were formed of combat engineer subunits. Depending on the character of the obstacles and the required lane width (from 5-6 to 10-12 meters for infantry and up to 20-30 meters for tanks), one or two combat engineer sections would be assigned to a team. The teams were equipped almost identically in all operations of 1944-1945. For example, the obstacle clearing teams of the 37th Combat Engineer Brigade of the 69th Army, when penetrating the enemy's defensive line on the Pulawy bridgehead, were equipped with 1-2 mine detectors, 3-4 probes, 1-2 wire cutters (when needed), a set of mine markers, lane marking ribbons (markers), 2-3 lines with grappling hooks for dragging mines, a set of fuze shear pins, and portable intrenching tools.[5] Sometimes 200-gram TNT block demolition charges and safety fuze detonator sets would be supplied.

At the end of the second and in the third period of the war, minefields were most frequently breached with explosives, a technique which was much more advanced and reliable than the manual method. Explosives would be employed to clear lanes in combined minefields when the antitank mines involved antihandling devices and under difficult weather conditions (snow cover, ice, etc). Mine clearing was done with the aid of concentrated pressure charges, suspended and pushed-on concentrated charges, Bangalore torpedoes and even thrown charges. With the demolition method of breaching minefields it was not necessary to determine the location of each mine (except in cases where mines were detonated by pressure charges); it was important only to know the minefield boundaries. Primarily 200-gram TNT block demolition charges were employed as pressure charges, placed on the surface of the soil layer concealing a mine. Sometimes they would be

joined by detonating cord to form a group charge. Concentrated suspended demolition charges, which require less time to clear a lane in friendly minefields, were employed during the war. During breaching of the blockade in January 1943, on the night before the offensive the troops of the Leningrad Front placed more than 1,000 suspension charges above friendly minefields. They were detonated when artillery preparation began. The result was continuous mine clearing.[6]

Experimental activities were conducted on some fronts aimed at improving manual and other techniques, on the Second Belorussian Front at the end of 1944, for example. It was determined here that clearing a lane totaling up to 100 square meters on prior-unreconnoitered terrain required approximately 60-80 kg of demolition charge and 3-4 hours of work by a combat engineer section.[7] Mobile (on single-axle carts) concentrated charges containing 60-80 kg of explosive were employed in the engineer troops of the First Ukrainian Front during the Vistula-Oder Operation. A charge would be advanced 70-80 meters with the aid of a wheel-supported bar. An experiment conducted in the 16th Assault Combat Engineer Brigade showed that detonation of such a charge would clear a minefield lane up to 20-25 meters wide and deep.[8]

As experience showed, however, a better technique was breaching with the aid of linear explosive charges. During the first two periods of the war linear charges were fashioned in the subunits most frequently with utilization of 400-gram TNT charges tied to a pole. The charges ranged in length from 1 meter on up. Initially a lane would be cleared sequentially with linear charges, that is, after one charge was detonated, another would be laid and detonated. In this case the width of a lane cleared through a minefield was about 2 meters.

Later they began employing suspended linear charges on tripods up to 1 meter in height, which made it possible to increase width of the cleared lane to 8 meters.[9] Both methods of linear charge field placement, however, contained drawbacks: it took longer to prepare to detonate, and combat engineer activities were no longer concealed from enemy observation.

At the end of the war, when standard-issue linear charges (UZ-1) became available to the engineer troops, they began moving them to the minefield on carts. It was necessary that the ground surface be relatively smooth and firm. A large lane width was obtained by parallel placement and detonation of several linear charges.

We should note that the principle of utilization of mobile linear charges underwent further development in foreign armies after the war. Charges were developed which were projected onto the minefield by rockets.

Linear charges were employed during the war (pushed by tanks) for widening lanes cleared with the aid of tank-mounted treadway clearing devices. Initial combat experience in clearing lanes in a minefield by tanks employing PT-3 mine-clearing attachments was obtained in the Kiev Operation

in November 1943. As an element of a battle group of the First Ukrainian Front, the 166th Engineer-Tank Regiment, following artillery preparation, proceeded to advance from the line of departure to the enemy's main line of resistance. Line tanks and rifle subunits moved along the marks left by the mine-clearing attachments and tank tracks. Continuous movement by the advancing subunits through the minefields took the enemy entirely by surprise. This experience indicated that the new method could be highly effective if the attacking tanks would move simultaneously through the cleared lanes. Its employment, however, required mass utilization of tanks with mine-clearing attachments. For this reason five such regiments operated simultaneously in the Belorussian Operation in the summer of 1944: the 119th, 253d, 148th, 40th and 166th Engineer-Tank regiments in the breakthrough sectors of the 6th Guards, 5th, 11th Guards, 3d and 28th armies respectively.[10] These units for the most part accomplished the assigned mission, but experience in utilizing them under conditions of marshy woodland terrain revealed a number of deficiencies which diminished the effectiveness of their actions, and which in a number of cases led to combat casualties. This was most frequently observed where tanks with mine-clearing attachments were moving slowly in groups across marshy terrain, without adequate organization of coordinated action with the line combat vehicles. On the other hand, if they were employed in a massed manner and worked in close coordination with the line tanks, artillery and infantry, and moved along roads or across relatively firm ground, success was manifest.

Engineer-tank regiment lane-clearing procedures had for the most part been fully worked out by war's end. Containing three companies (a total of 20 tanks with PT-3 mine-clearing attachments), a regiment would usually operate on a frontage of 2-3 kilometers.[11] A company of mine-clearing tanks with a combat engineer platoon could clear minefield passage for a tank regiment. As the assault phase began, mine clearing tanks would move, most frequently in pairs, along predetermined routes and would clear a strip of ground 4.8 meters in width (four strips of 1.2 meters each from the passage of four roller flail sections). The mine clearing tanks would proceed in echelon formation, following one another at a distance of 15-25 meters. Treadway lanes were also cleared for infantry (one tank with mine-clearing attachment), which subsequently could be widened by combat engineers with the aid of linear charges.

The extent of missions involving clearing lanes in minefields by engineer-tank regiments and securing passage of the line tanks is evident from the following example. At the beginning of the Vistula-Oder Operation of the First Belorussian Front, the 166th Engineer-Tank Regiment cleared four lanes 4.8 meters wide each and six treadway lanes; the 92d Engineer-Tank Regiment Cleared 6 and 4 respectively. Two tank brigades, four heavy tank regiments and three self-propelled gun regiments crossed the minefields through these lanes without casualties or losses.[12]

Thus the new technique of clearing lanes in minefields -- tanks with mine-clearing attachments -- was fairly effective during the war years

and experienced further development after the war. In addition to roller flails, blade mine-clearing devices were developed, and utilized as an individual device by each fighting tank. With this equipment it is possible successfully to accomplish the main task -- ensure massive employment of tanks in penetrating a minefield-saturated defense.

In the course of the war experiments were continuously conducted on utilization of fire to breach minefields. Tests were conducted on different fronts. For example, in the zone of the 2d Guards Army, which was operating in the Crimea in the spring of 1944, fire was delivered from 120 mm mortars onto a minefield (100 PMD-6 antipersonnel mines and 50 T-55 antitank mines). Only seven antitank mines were detonated by the bursts of 128 mortar shells falling within the boundaries of the minefield, while no antipersonnel mines were disabled, although 30 of them were pierced by shell fragments.[13] Many such experiments in 1944 showed the unsuitability of this method of breaching minefields, particularly since following bombardment a field would be chewed up, mines would be buried in dirt, and it was almost impossible to locate them among the shell fragments with a mine detector.

Other methods were also tested, such as the employment of a grid of detonating cord, and treadway bridges for passing infantry. With the further development of landmines and increasing sophistication of the minefield system proper, however, such methods proved ineffective and were therefore abandoned.

Of great importance in organizing negotiation of minefields is joint work by commanders and staffs of combined-arms units and large units, operational formations, and engineer commanders of all echelons. The experience of the Great Patriotic War indicates that commanding generals (combined-arms commanders) were personally involved in choosing methods and determining the required number of lanes and timetable for clearing lanes in breakthrough sectors, the procedure of negotiation of minefields by attacking troops, as well as organization of coordinated action. Proposals by the engineer commander constituted the basis for settling these matters; these proposals were reported during decision elaboration or during reconnaissance conducted by the commanding general. In addition, frequently special directives, orders and instructions to the troops were drawn up. In January 1944, for example, in order to achieve correct organization of penetration of the enemy's defense, a directive bearing the signature of the commanding general, military council member and chief of staff of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, sent to army and corps commanders, contained instructions on the number of lanes through various minefields, their width, and procedure of breaching and maintenance.[14]

In practice lanes through friendly minefields would be cleared between 48 and 72 hours prior to the initiation of an offensive, and lanes through enemy minefields -- clearing would usually begin during the night before the offensive and would end during the period of artillery preparation. Frequently friendly obstacles in breakthrough sectors would

be fully removed, while those which were located deep would be fenced in or also removed, in order to eliminate the possibility of damaging equipment and injuring personnel.

Together with this, the state of all previously-cleared lanes would be checked the night before the attack. The following figures indicate the scale of breaching work performed. In the Vistula-Oder Operation, in the zone of the First Belorussian Front, a total of 1,170 lanes were cleared for infantry and separately for tanks in friendly minefields, and 872 in enemy minefields. A total of 42,407 antitank mines and 17,955 antipersonnel mines were removed in friendly minefields, and 19,483 antitank mines and 14,201 antipersonnel mines in enemy minefields.[15]

Under present-day conditions, note foreign experts studying the experience of local wars, minefields have undergone further evolution and development, and minefield systems have become more complex and effective. Area mining is becoming widespread. And with remote-planted minefields, their successful negotiation will require not only improvement of traditional breaching methods but also a search for new methods which meet today's requirements to a greater degree, as well as more active participation by all arms in accomplishing this task.

FOOTNOTES

1. VOYENNO-INZHENERNYY ZHURNAL, No 4, 1945, pp 37-39, 43.

2. D. M. Karbyshev, "Izbrannyye nauchnyye trudy" [Selected Scientific Writings], Voyenizdat, 1962, pp 70-71.

3. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 December 1967.

4. "Inzhenernyye voyska v boyakh za Sovetskuyu Rodinu" [Engineer Troops in Combat for the Soviet Homeland], Voyenizdat, 1970, page 154.

5. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 69, List 272735, File 21, sheets 182-184.

6. "Inzhenernyye voyska Sovetskoy Armii v vazhneyshikh operatsiyakh Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Engineer Troops of the Soviet Army in the Major Operations of the Great Patriotic War], Voyenizdat, 1958, page 50.

7. "Boyevoy opyt inzhenernykh voysk v Otechestvennoy voyne" [Combat Experience of Engineer Troops in the Patriotic War], Vol 6, Voyenizdat, 1946, page 17.

8. Ibid., pp 17-19.

9. Ibid., pp 24-25.

10. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 233, List 14943, File 18, sheets 28-29.

11. Ibid., Fund 69, List 28975, File 2, Sheet 110.

12. Ibid., List 27735, File 21, sheets 191-195.

13. "Boyevoy opyt...," op. cit., pp 30, 31.

14. "Sbornik boyevykh dokumentov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Collection of Combat Documents of the Great Patriotic War], Issue 18, Voyenizdat, 1953, page 36.

15. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 69, List 272735, File 21, sheets 181-223.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: NIGHT TACTICS OF AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT

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[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Col O. Frantsev: "Some Aspects of the Tactics of Air Defense Fighter Aviation Under Night Conditions"]

[Text] Air defense fighter aviation (IA PVO), thanks to its armament, maneuverability and aggressive actions, constituted the principal striking power of the National Air Defense Forces during the Great Patriotic War. Working in coordination with various arms, it provided cover against air attack to large administrative-political and military-industrial centers, troop reserves, various installations in the immediate rear area, rail lines, and performed a number of other missions as well.

Working jointly with antiaircraft artillery (ZA), searchlight units and barrage balloons (AZ), fighter aviation repulsed enemy air attacks both day and night.

Night conditions prevented both sides from employing close formations. This is why night air engagements were fought as a rule by single aircraft.

During hours of darkness fighter aircraft operated on the far and near approaches to defended installations. Air combat zones were designated for air defense fighters on the near approaches, and roving zones on far approaches.

Night combat zones were established around an installation usually not closer than 20 kilometers from the outer boundary of antiaircraft artillery fire and at a distance of 15-20 km from one another. For example, 16 such zones had been set up within the Moscow air defense system by mid-August 1941. In June 1942 there were four night combat zones on the approaches to Voronezh, 15-20 km from the city. If there were no readily-discernible landmarks, zones would be designated by marker lights (searchlight beams). They would be marked out in such a manner that pilots could spot and down an enemy aircraft prior to entry into an antiaircraft artillery fire zone.

If there were searchlight beam fields (SPP) present, the latter would simultaneously serve as fighter night combat zones. Searchlight support for air defense fighter night combat was provided only in the defense of major centers. A solid ring of searchlight beam fields was established only around Moscow, while in the defense of other cities (Leningrad, Saratov, Gor'kiy, Kiev, Riga, etc), searchlight beam fields were established on individual probable axes of hostile aircraft approach. Typical linear landmarks were considered to be such axes: rail lines and highways, rivers, lake shores, etc. The depth of a searchlight beam field did not exceed 30-40 km (5-6 minutes of flight by an enemy aircraft moving at a speed of 360-400 km/h). If the target was illuminated at the forward edge of the searchlight beam field, friendly fighters would be able to make 2-3 attacks.

One fighter aviation regiment would operate in a searchlight beam field. During the first year of the war there was one fighter loiter zone in each SPP. As a result fewer fighters than needed would take to the air, thus diminishing the combat capabilities of air defense fighter aviation. In the summer of 1941, for example, during enemy air attacks on Moscow there were instances when the number of simultaneously illuminated enemy aircraft in an SPP exceeded the number of air defense fighters, and some of the enemy bombers were able to cross the beam field unchallenged.

Later, in subsequent years, changes occurred in utilization of searchlight beam fields. A number of measures were carried out which were aimed at increasing the effectiveness of mutual actions by searchlight and fighter units. In particular, three loiter zones were established in each SPP in place of one (two by the SPP forward edge, and one in the center). This made it possible to increase the number of fighters simultaneously taking to the air, and the probability of intercepting enemy aircraft increased.

Free roving zones were established for downing enemy bombers on the far approaches to a defended installation (usually at a distance of up to 100 kilometers from it, in the direction of probable enemy aircraft approach). Fighters operated without searchlight suport in these zones.

What were air defense fighter aviation modes of action under night conditions? They included ground alert and airborne alert. The principal mode was ground alert, during which various degrees of combat readiness were established for the fighters.

Usually aircraft would go on night alert status 1 hour before darkness. Continuous alert status 1 was not to exceed two hours, and alert status 2 -- 6 hours (during daylight hours pilots did not remain on alert status 1 longer than 2 hours, and alert status 2 -- the entire period of daylight). The success of fighter missions to intercept air targets from "ground alert" status depended on accurate and prompt warning of fighters and well-organized guidance to the enemy. As the experience of the war indicated, with employment of this method, several times fewer

sorties per downed aircraft were required than with air patrol. But ground alert was effective only when the defended installation was located a substantial difference from the battle line, and visual aircraft-warning posts and radars were able promptly to spot enemy aircraft. Otherwise it was difficult to guarantee intercept of enemy bombers.

Night airborne alert, in contrast to fighter aviation daylight operations, consisted in patrolling fighters in specially-prepared and designated areas (night combat zones, free roving zones), with the objective of intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft.

The number of air-patrolling aircraft depended on the degree of importance of the defended installation, the air situation, distance from the installation to the battle line, as well as availability of crews trained for night combat.

In order to provide reliable air cover of the most important installations, patrolling was conducted at two to three altitude levels (Moscow and Leningrad air defense). The minimum vertical separation between patrols was 500 meters (1,000-1,500 meters during daylight hours).

If the enemy sought to penetrate through to the target only across one (two) zone(s), air defense fighters would be dispatched there from adjacent zones (depending on the number of enemy bombers). The altitudes at which fighters were on airborne alert in that zone to which reinforcements were being sent would be specified.

When searchlight beam fields were being employed in an air defense system, patrol zones would be established at 8-10 kilometers from the forward edge of these fields, which enabled fighters to utilize in combat the entire depth of the searchlight beam field. Fighters would take off for patrol in a searchlight beam field on orders by the aviation regiment (division) commander. Airborne patrol, both at night and during the day, required a considerable expenditure of effort and energy by aircrews and involved considerable fuel consumption and equipment utilization. For this reason, beginning in 1943, as air defense fighter aviation took delivery on increasing numbers of aircraft equipped with more sophisticated radio communications gear, as well as a fair number of detection and guidance radars, defense of installations by air patrol was employed only in those cases when for some reason scrambling of fighters for intercept from a ground alert status failed to ensure timely intercept of the air target (closeness of the battle line, lack of radars, etc).

Night fighter pilots prepared thoroughly for each mission. This preparation consisted in acquiring firm knowledge of the boundaries of one's own and neighboring night combat and free roving zones, loiter zones, as well as antiaircraft artillery fire zones. Each pilot's course into the loiter zone would be plotted out. This zone's entry (exit) point would be determined. Altitude and mode of patrol would be designated, and coordination signals between fighter aviation, antiaircraft artillery and

searchlight units would be studied. Within their own area aircrews had to possess a through familiarity with SPP boundaries, marker lights, antiaircraft battery firing positions, and alternate airfields in case a forced landing became necessary.

Equipment was also readied for night operations. In particular, the aircraft engine would be tuned in advance to maintain exhaust gas glow in flight at the lowest possible level. Aircraft instruments and instrument night illumination, aircraft armament, etc would also be checked. Such preparations were conducted, for example, in the 11th, 16th, 27th, 34th, and other fighter regiments of the VI Air Defense Fighter Corps (Lt Col G. A. Kotrushev, Maj F. M. Prutskov, Lt Col P. K. Demidov, and Maj L. G. Rybkin respectively, commanding).

Air defense fighter tactical operations would be conducted both with and without illumination support. In the first and second periods of the war, when searchlight illumination support was available, air defense fighters operated as follows. Upon spotting searchlight-illuminated air targets, fighters would close and engage. As a rule the pilots would attack from the rear hemisphere (from above or below), depending on their position during closing. They would fire at the closest possible range, without particularly risking being downed first, since the enemy bomber crews would be blinded by the searchlight beams and would not see the attacking fighters.

Let us examine two examples.

During the night of 22 July 1941 German-fascist aircraft mounted the first mass air raid on Moscow, involving 250 bombers.[1] The first groups were spotted by aircraft warning-service posts near Vyaz'ma. This made it possible to ready air defense facilities, including fighter aviation, to repulse the attack. The fascist aircraft were attacked while still on the far approaches to the capital. A total of 170 fighters of the VI Air Defense Fighter Corps (Col I. D. Klimov, commanding) were scrambled to turn back the attack.

Heavy air engagements were initiated in searchlight beam fields on a line running Solnechnogorsk-Golitsyno. One of the first to take to the air was Capt K. N. Titenkov, a squadron commander of the 11th Air Defense Fighter Regiment. He attacked the lead fascist He-111 bomber. First he cut down an aerial gunner, and then, firing at close range, set the enemy aircraft on fire. On the night of 22 July air defense fighters fought 25 air engagements and shot down 12 fascist bombers. The most important result of the action was the fact that, working together with antiaircraft artillery, they thwarted this air attack on the capital. Only isolated aircraft managed to penetrate through to Moscow.

The most successful air engagements at Leningrad were fought by the fighters of the VII Air Defense Fighter Corps (Col S. P. Danilov, commanding) in May-June 1942, when the Germans undertook an operation to mine

the channels around Kotlin Island. Success was achieved thanks to prompt detection of the enemy bombers and radio guidance of the fighters to the searchlight-illuminated air targets, as well as the tactically proficient performance of our pilots, who closed with the adversary while remaining undetected and opened fire at close range, for the most part from the rear upper hemisphere. Only nine enemy aircraft were downed, but the enemy's plan was thwarted.

During the first months of the war some of our aircraft were inferior to the German aircraft in performance characteristics, and Soviet pilots, on exhausting their ammunition, were forced to employ ramming tactics in order to prevent bombing of important installations (Lt P. V. Yeremeyev, Jr Lt V. V. Talalikhin, Lt A. N. Katrich and many others). This tactical device was carefully elaborated and required heroism and skill. Soviet pilots downed enemy aircraft, while frequently preserving their own aircraft for future combat missions. We should note that not a single fascist employed ramming during the entire war. Gradually aerial ramming began to be employed less and less frequently, in connection with quantitative and qualitative growth of fighter aviation, improved armament and acquisition of expert tactical proficiency, and by war's end this device was no longer being employed.

Beginning in the latter half of 1943, as a result of the swift advance by the forces of the Soviet Army, the enemy was no longer able to attack major centers deep in the heartland. For this reason air defense fighters had almost entirely ceased fighting in searchlight beam fields. Searchlight units were now primarily supporting antiaircraft artillery combat actions.

Beginning in 1944 air defense fighters, no longer employing searchlight beam fields, utilized illuminating bombs. The greatest success was achieved by the pilots of the 148th Fighter Division, under the command of Col A. A. Tereshkin. Let us briefly examine a night engagement by this division with employment of illuminating bombs. Aircraft would customarily stack into three levels. At the first level fighters would patrol at the enemy bomber flight level, the second level would be 1,500-2,000 meters higher, and the third -- 500 meters above the second level. Radars and aircraft-warning service posts would spot enemy aircraft. When the enemy aircraft approached the loiter zone, the command post would order a fighter patrolling at the second level to release an illuminating bomb. After this the first-level fighters would search out and attack the illuminated aircraft. The pilot who had released the illuminating bomb would immediately descend, also seek out enemy aircraft and engage. That fighter which was patrolling in the third-level loiter zone would observe. If an enemy aircraft attempted to leave the illuminated zone, it would release an illumination bomb, intensifying the illumination zone, and would then attack the enemy aircraft.

Air defense fighter tactics without illumination support were different.

On a moonlit night fighters on patrol would keep somewhat below the probable altitude of approaching enemy aircraft, in order to be able to see the silhouette of the enemy aircraft against the moon or thin clouds through which the moon would shine. It was noted that when operating above cloud cover it was more advantageous to be above the adversary, in order to spot him against the cloud tops. In some instances an enemy bomber was spotted by the shadow it cast on the clouds below. On the night of 15 June 1942, for example, Capt I. Mol'tenkov, flying a MIG-3, was scrambled to intercept bombers reported by the aircraft-warning service. In the vicinity of Bestroretsk, at an altitude of 2,500 meters, the captain spotted two Ju-88 bombers. Their silhouettes were clearly visible against the light sky. Mol'tenkov swiftly executed a turn, approached the enemy from the rear, and closed to a distance of 20 meters from the right lead Ju-88, holding position just below it. The enemy aircrew was totally unaware of the fighter's approach and maintained course. Captain Mol'tenkov slowed to the bomber's speed and, firing almost point-blank, riddled the enemy with bullets. The Junkers burst into flame, went into an uncontrolled dive, and plunged into the Gulf of Finland. The second aircraft turned sharply toward the dark portion of the horizon and disappeared.

Air defense fighters conducted successful combat engagements on moonlit nights when repulsing attacks on Volkhov, Smolensk, Kiev, and other cities.

It was very difficult to search out enemy aircraft on a moonless night but, as experience showed, it was possible. The fighters would maintain an altitude somewhat below that of the enemy aircraft, the silhouettes of which would become visible only at close range. Often the enemy would also be given away by his exhaust glow. Here is an example. On 27 June 1942 Capt N. Kalyushnyy took off at 2234 hours for his assigned zone in the vicinity of Voronezh. Proceeding at an altitude of 2,000 meters, he spotted an enemy bomber from its exhaust, opened fire at a range of 50 meters and ignited the starboard engine. The aircraft burst into flames, plunged to the ground and exploded.

It was also noted that at dusk and dawn an aircraft stands up well against the light portion of the horizon and can be seen from a considerable distance. Air defense fighters skillfully utilized this for seeking out and attacking enemy bombers in the air defense of Smolensk, Borisov, Kiev, Riga, and other cities.

On white nights pilots operating in the North also achieved success. On the night of 12 June 1942, for example, 1st Sgt M. Grishin, patrolling in a night combat zone over the Gulf of Finland in an I-16 fighter, spotted two He-111 bombers proceeding in the direction of Kronshtadt. The bombers' silhouettes stood out quite clearly against the background of the sky and clouds. Approaching the enemy without being spotted, Grishin attacked the lead aircraft from behind, firing two rockets at a range of

400-500 meters, and then opened fire with all his guns. The aircraft under attack went into a dive and attempted to take cover in clouds, while the other executed a 180 degree turn and proceeded to beat a retreat. 1st Sgt Grishin caught up with the lead bomber in its dive and once again opened fire into its tail, from a range of 150 meters, but again without success. As soon as the He-111 emerged from the upper cloud layer, Grishin attacked it a third time from a range of 50 meters, coming in from the side and above. The bomber, hit, lurched groundward and plunged into the water. In this engagement the Soviet fighter was able to down the enemy only when opening fire at close range and at an advantageous attack angle.

Often fighter pilots would spot enemy bombers from the vapor trail which aircraft leave behind them at high altitudes (in winter at practically all altitudes). On 11 August 1941, for example, Lt A. Katrich, flying a MIG-3, downed a Dornier-217 bomber after spotting it by its vapor trail.[2]

The cited examples show that air defense fighter pilots successfully mastered night fighting techniques both with and without illumination support, displayed persistence, resoluteness, and achieved success. At the same time there were shortcomings as well. They included the following: poor use of radio, inadequate pilot proficiency in estimating distances at night, which resulted in opening fire at considerable range, unskilled use of rockets, which were most frequently fired without aiming and without success, etc. Such shortcomings occurred in the 142nd and 144th Air Defense Fighter Division during repulsion of enemy night raids on Gor'kiy and Saratov in June 1943.

In the course of the war, especially in the second and third periods, air defense fighters were extensively employed to provide air cover for rail centers and main lines in the combat zone. Each fighter regiment was assigned a specific installation or section of rail line.[3] The length of these sections varied both under day and night conditions and depended on the fighting strength of the regiments, importance of the section, and availability of airfields. Fighters were compelled to repulse enemy attacks chiefly at night, without illumination support. In July 1944, for example, 40 of the 54 enemy aircraft destroyed by fighters of the Northern Air Defense Front were downed in night combat. In defending against a raid on the Velikiye Luki rail junction at the end of July 1944, 10 pilots of the 106th Air Defense Fighter Division (Maj Gen Avn P. K. Demidov, commanding), operating skillfully and proficiently outside the zone of the searchlights which were supporting antiaircraft fire, downed 11 enemy bombers.

As was indicated by the experience of the war, coordinated action between fighters and other arms merited particular attention in night air defense fighter operations. Division of engagement zones formed the basis of coordinated action between air defense fighters and antiaircraft artillery, both at night and during the day. Fighters operated on the far approaches

to the defended installation, while antiaircraft artillery provided barrage (supporting) fire on the near approaches to and above the target. In contrast to daylight operations, during hours of darkness searchlight regiments established searchlight beam fields for the fighters, while searchlight battalions established beam zones for antiaircraft artillery fire. Fighters were authorized to enter the beam zone for the purpose of concluding an attack. At this time antiaircraft batteries would cease fire and conduct so-called "dry firing." Upon entering an antiaircraft artillery beam zone, a fighter was to fire a colored flare and also report zone entry by radio on a predetermined coordination frequency.

At the same time, there were serious deficiencies in organization and execution of coordination between fighters, antiaircraft artillery and searchlight units. For example, while repelling air raids on Gor'kiy in June 1943 it was determined that the pilots of the 142d Air Defense Fighter Division (Col V. P. Ivanov, commanding) were not coordinating with adequate precision with antiaircraft artillery. Either fighters would receive antiaircraft battery fire or the batteries would prematurely cease fire to avoid hitting friendly aircraft. Searchlight sweep for targets was often without system; beams would shine in different directions and therefore did not help fighters find targets, while a fighter's flare signal indicating commencement of attack was most of the time poorly visible from the ground, due to the searchlight beams, tracer bullets and shells, while firing a flare would help the enemy spot the Soviet fighter. Altitude separation of night engagement zones also did not prove effective. Subsequently most of these deficiencies were corrected.

During the war air defense fighter aviation, under night conditions, operated in coordination with barrage balloons according to the principle of division of operating zones. Barrage balloons were employed in the defense of major cities (Moscow, Leningrad), and also as detachments and battalions in defending individual installations -- plants, ports, power plants, and major railway bridges. Employment of barrage balloons forced enemy aircraft to fly higher, and therefore aimed bombing results were diminished. In order to avoid colliding with barrage balloon cables, air defense fighters were absolutely forbidden to enter barrage balloon zones. Fighter aviation worked in coordination with aircraft-warning service units and subunits in repulsing night attacks. Upon spotting hostile aircraft, aircraft-warning service posts would immediately communicate by radio (wire communications) information to the main aircraft-warning service post and also to aviation units. Radar stations and some aircraft-warning service posts equipped with radio transceivers not only spotted enemy aircraft but also guided fighters to air targets. Adoption of the plotting-board guidance method merits special attention.[4] Guidance was handled by aviation representatives of fighter units and combined units.

Air defense fighter aviation acquired experience in coordinated operations not only with other arms of the National Air Defense Forces but also with

fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery of the fronts (air defense of Moscow, Leningrad, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Kursk, and other cities). Let us take a look at an example of this. On the night of 3 June 1943 pilots of the 101st Air Defense Fighter Division (Col A. T. Kostenko, commanding), together with the antiaircraft artillery and fighters of the 16th Air Army of the Central Front, repulsed a raid on the Kursk rail yards. Enemy bombers were making bombing runs in groups of 3-5 aircraft and singly, approaching from different directions. A total of 300 aircraft were involved in this night raid.[5] Coordination of forces consisted in distribution of engagement zones. Ground-unit antiaircraft artillery opened fire at enemy aircraft in its own zone, front-controlled fighter aircraft, deployed at forward airfields, attacked enemy aircraft at the battle line, while air defense fighters attacked enemy bombers on the far and near approaches to Kursk, up to the National Air Defense Forces antiaircraft artillery fire zone. This arrangement of forces produced success: the raid was repulsed with heavy enemy losses. The enemy henceforth refrained from massive strikes and shifted to night actions against railway targets by small groups of aircraft.

Coordinated action between air defense fighter aviation and other National Air Defense Forces arms, as well as with the fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery of the fronts, underwent further development. Mutual warning and notification of the air situation, organization of joint defense of the most important targets, and coordination of zones of operations began to be performed with greater precision.

Particular attention was devoted to organization of fighter warning. As a rule all company, battalion and main aircraft-warning service posts of the Western Air Defense Front maintained direct communication with fighter aviation units. Thanks to this warning system, in January-April 1944 there was not a single instance of an enemy night air attack without warning on rail yards and interchanges. During this period there was operating in the southern part of the Left-Bank Ukraine and the Donbass a unified fighter aviation combat operations radar support system. Radar coverage patterns mutually overlapped. Within a vast area a solid, continuous radar detection and fighter guidance field was established.

Coordination between fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery improved significantly through utilization of radio and radar equipment. A good example of this is the repulsing of a 100-bomber raid on the Darnitsa rail yards on the night of 8 April 1944.[6] Aircraft-warning service posts and radar spotted enemy aircraft. Fighters operated chiefly on the far approaches to the city. Antiaircraft artillery projected a curtain of fire on the near approaches and above the city. Some fighters dropped illuminating bombs over phony targets on the route of the enemy aircraft, deluding the adversary. Fighter control and guidance was accomplished with the aid of radio and radar. The enemy raid was repulsed.

As a whole fighter aviation, together with other arms of the National Air Defense Forces, as well as the fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery

of the fronts, vigorously countered enemy air forces in repelling night raids on various targets. In the course of the war air defense fighters downed 301 enemy aircraft in night combat, or 7.6 percent of the total number of aircraft destroyed by them. Such a small percentage is due to a lack of special gear for night combat (airborne radars), as well as inadequate availability of control, guidance and support equipment, which was essential for successful night combat by air defense fighters (high-powered radio equipment, antiaircraft searchlights, radars, etc). Nevertheless it is important to emphasize that the relative effectiveness of fighter combat operations at night was three times that of daylight operations: there 24 sorties for every aircraft downed at night, while the total was 72 for every enemy aircraft downed during daylight hours.

What trends were revealed in the development of night combat tactics of air defense fighters in the course of the war? First of all, fighter disposition in depth and stacking, that is, establishment of a multiple-level and deep-dispositioned defense, with the objective of more reliable intercept of air targets.

Second, more thorough and careful training and preparation of night fighter pilots and equipment, improvement of methods of searching out air targets both within and outside searchlight beam fields, attack with the element of surprise (for the most part from the rear upper or lower hemisphere) and delivery of fire from close range to ensure hitting the air adversary.

Third, in repelling enemy night air raids against major Soviet centers, enlistment of all Air Defense Forces arms (fighter aviation, antiaircraft artillery, barrage balloons, and searchlight units), with the objective of their combined utilization. The practice of division of engagement zones became firmly established in joint actions involving fighters, antiaircraft artillery, and barrage balloons.

Fourth, closer coordination between air defense fighter aviation and the fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery of the fronts.

Fifth, as aviation units received sufficient quantities of radio and radar equipment, fighter guidance to enemy aircraft during hours of darkness began to be performed only with the assistance of this equipment. In the course of the war this method gradually gained recognition and ultimately became the principal method employed.

At the present time, in spite of the fact that National Air Defense Forces fighter aviation is equipped with jet all-weather night fighters carrying airborne radars and potent armament, the experience acquired by Soviet pilots during the years of the Great Patriotic War still retains its significance.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetskiye Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [The Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945], Voyenizdat, 1968, page 54.

2. VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY, No 7, 1959, pp 66-67.

3. For more details see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1977, page 94.

4. For more details see Ibid., No 7, 1975, pp 13-21; No 12, 1976, page 96; No 4, 1977, pp 20-26.

5. "Voyska protivovozdushnoy oborony strany. Istoricheskiy ocherk" [National Air Defense Forces. A Historical Sketch], Voyenizdat, 1968, page 239.

6. Ibid., page 266.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: LOGISTICAL SUPPORT DURING TROOP REGROUPING

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4 1980 signed to press 24 Mar 80 pp 27-34

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Candidate of Military Sciences Col V. Odintsov and Candidate of Military Sciences V. Ovsyannikov: "Logistical Support of Troops During Regrouping"]

[Text] The problem of logistical support of troops during a redeployment involving movement forward from the heartland is becoming increasingly more acute today. This is due particularly to the rapid development of new weapons and their adoption into the arsenals of modern armies.

In the last war troop movements, especially when transporting troops forward toward the front from the heartland, were handled for the most part by rail. This mode of transportation reduced the volume of consumed supplies, particularly fuel. The heaviest consumption items were food, as well as small amounts of antiaircraft ammunition. Various manpower and facilities, determined by the conditions of the redeployment forward toward the fronts, were utilized to provide the supply requirements of the moving units and combined units.

In some instances formations (combined units) would redeploy from one side of a front to the other, within the boundaries of its zone of operations, while in other cases combined-arms armies would be moved up from Hq SHC [Headquarters, Supreme High Command] Reserve and incorporated into active fighting fronts. In still other cases redeployments would be from one front to another. All this, with the availability of functioning railroads, predetermined, under conditions of the prevailing operational and strategic situation, the destination and modes of travel of the troops, and their logistical support. We shall trace this with several examples from the Great Patriotic War.

During preparations for the Tallin Operation, the 2d Assault Army (Col Intend Serv V. A. Timchenko, deputy commander for rear services; Col P. S. Starkov, rear services chief of staff), which consisted of three rifle

corps (CVIII, XXX Guards and VIII Rifle corps) redeployed in the period 3-13 September 1944 within the boundaries of the Leningrad Front. The redeploying army was to proceed from the Narva area, around Lake Peipus and partially around Lake Pskov, traveling by combined-mode transport with the destination in the vicinity of Tartu, a distance of more than 300 kilometers (Diagram 1).[1] As prescribed by the directives issued by the commanding general of the Leningrad Front, received by the army on 3 September, the army's troops[2] were to execute the redeployment as follows. The CVIII Rifle Corps was to march to the new area via Gdov and the crossing at Pnevo. The XXX Guards and VIII Rifle corps were to proceed to Gdov station by rail (61 trains), from which they were to proceed by march to their destination via the crossing at Pnevo. The motor transport of all three corps, in order to disencumber the crossing, was to proceed via Pskov, Irbosk, and Vyru. Tank units, tractor-drawn artillery, rear services units and establishments were to proceed by rail via Luga and Pskov to Pyl'va and Vastse-Kuuste stations (80 trains).



Diagram 1. Organization of Logistical Support of 2d Assault Army During Redeployment (3-13 September 1944)

Key to Diagram 1 on preceding page:

1. Army mobile maintenance shops
2. Refueling points
3. Leningrad Front
4. Third Baltic Front
5. Tartu
6. Narva
7. Pskov
8. Gdov
9. Pnevo
10. Lake Peipus
11. Lake Pskov
12. Gulf of Finland
13. 2d Assault Army

ГСМ -- Fuel and lubricants
УНП -- Forward Army Base Headquarters
АРТ -- Artillery
ПРОД -- Food supplies

Prior to initiation of the redeployment move, the army's combined units were resupplied to normal levels. For example, ration provisions were as follows: in the CVIII Rifle Corps -- 5 days rations; in the XXX Guards and VIII Rifle Corps -- 8 days rations; in units transported by rail -- 15 days rations. Ammunition supply was 0.5 ammunition allotment. Motor transport was supplied with 2.0-2.5 automotive gasoline fills for the journey. The troops drew the requisite supplies from army supply depots in the departure area.

All remaining supplies at army field depots (other than fuel) were placed at the disposal of the front in the departure area together with some rear services units of the 8th Army. Therefore only authorized stores and depot equipment were transported by rail.

Displacement of rear services units and establishments was planned as follows. The rear services control operations group, army field stores sections (provisions, fuel, ammunition), two companies of the 128th Independent Road Construction Battalion (odeb), the 118th Independent Motorized Medical Company (oasr), a mobile field surgical hospital, medical depot stores, mobile field bakery (PAKh) sections 8 and 406, as well as 350 men from an independent labor battalion (orb) and 100 men from an independent service company (oro) were to proceed by motor transport via Pskov. This group was to move out on 3 September. The rear echelon of the army field directorate was to proceed on 9 September by that same route. The remaining units and establishments were to be transported by rail (12 trains).

Preparation of highway and unpaved routes, reinforcement of bridges along these routes, and traffic control service were organized with the manpower and equipment of 10 road battalions (odeb, odsb, onsb) from the front reserve, according to the plan of the front rear services chief. Two odeb companies were dispatched on 3 September to make ready the road network in the new concentration area. The remaining odeb strength and three army odsb were transported by rail to Pyl'va with the first trains.

Front stores depot sections were set up near the Pnevo crossing to replenish supplies consumed during the march: to issue artillery ammunition (1.0 ammunition allotment) and rations (5 days rations). Motor transport convoys were refueled at refueling points set up by the front on the troop routes of movement (Gdov, Pnevo, Pskov).

In order for the army to be able to amass the prescribed stores of supplies (1.5 ammunition allotment and 5 days rations) by the commencement of the operation, the front established ammunition stores in Pskov (1.5 ammunition allotments), as well as provisions, fuel and lubricants. They were conveyed by water transport to the army depot sections set up on 5 September on the west shore of Lake Peipus in Mekhikorma. Three supply railheads were designated in the army's new concentration area (Vastse-Kuuste, Pyl'va, Reola), to which the requisite supplies were transported by rail. A food supply depot (No 925) and an artillery supply depot (No 541) were set up by the Reola railhead; a food supply depot (No 2096) and artillery supply depot (No 537) in Vastse-Kuuste (28 km from the battle line); UPAB and all other army supply depots were located at Pyl'va (43 km).

A totally different arrangement was observed when troops were moved up from Hq SHC Reserve to the active fronts. We shall illustrate this with the example of a redeployment of the 28th Army conducted from 28 May to 13 June 1944.

By a directive from Hq SHC, the 28th Army (Col S. A. Tsybin, deputy commander for rear services; Col P. S. Kozlenko, rear service chief of staff) was to be handed over effective 2400 hours on 27 May to the First Belorussian Front. On 28 May the commanding general of the front assigned the army the mission of moving up a distance of 270 km by night marches (following three routes), to concentrate by the morning of 12 June in an area north of Mozyr'. The XX Rifle Corps took the northern route, the III Guards Rifle Corps and the army's mobile rear services units and establishments took the middle route, and the CXXVIII Rifle Corps took the second route. The bulk of the army rear services units and establishments proceeded by rail (Diagram 3)[3] in 24 trains (1,529 cars). The trains loaded at Novozybkov Station, with offloading at Babichi, Vasilevichi, and Kalinkovichi stations. The combat rear services proceeded with the troops, employing their own transport capabilities.

A portion of the manpower and equipment of the army rear services (KhPPG, motor transport units, road units, etc) were assigned to support movement by the rifle corps along paved and unpaved roads. The troops received supplies from army depots not only in the departure area but also en route. For example, in the course of the march, from 1 through 7 June, army supply depot sections with stores of fuel (0.5 fills) and food supplies (3 days rations) were moved forward by motor transport and deployed in Novo-Belitsa. Supply depot sections with like supplies were deployed in Rechitsa (from 1 through 10 June) and Vasilevichi (from 1 June on),[4] but supplies were transported to these points by rail.



Diagram 2. Organization of Logi..ical Support of the 10th Guar's Army During Redeployment (9-25 December 1943)

Key to Diagram 2 on preceding page:

1. First Baltic Front
2. Second Baltic Front
3. Western Front
4. Velikiye Luki
5. Vitebsk
6. Rear services units and establishments offloading
7. Beginning of march
8. Rifle combined units entrainment station
9. Rear services units and establishments entrainment station
10. Starting point

Dnevka -- Day's halt
Sutodach -- Days rations
ГВ. СК -- Guards rifle corps

For other Cyrillic designations see Key to Diagram 1

To provide the troops with fresh-baked bread en route, mobile bakeries from the army rear services were moved up in advance onto the routes of the combined units: PAKh No 50 in Novo-Belitsa, and PAKh No 588 in Vasilevichi. PAKh No 568 delivered bread to the troops in the Novozybkov area.

The corps began the march with 0.3 ammunition allotment, one fill of fuel and lubricants, and five days rations.

Road support was planned as follows. The 2d Independent Motorized Construction Battalion (omsb) and the 228th Independent Motor Transport Company (oatr) were moved out in advance, prior to initiation of the march, for construction and repair of roads and Dnieper crossings along the route of the XX Rifle Corps. This same mission was performed by the 18th Independent Road Construction Battalion (odsb) on the route of the III Guards Rifle Corps. Traffic control en route was handled by the 93d Independent Road Maintenance Battalion (odeb), which assigned a traffic control company to each of the following route segments: Novozybkov - Gomel', Gomel'-Rechitsa, and Rechitsa-Vasilevichi.

One mobile field surgical hospital was attached to each corps for the duration of the march. During the redeployment, the sick and wounded were evacuated to frontline hospital base (GBF) units and establishments. Medical-epidemiological reconnaissance on the routes of troop movement and in the new concentration area was organized by army manpower and facilities.

Rear services control operations groups and PAB [Forward Army Base], which were located in Novo-Belitsa, Rechitsa, and Vasilevichi, were designated for organizing entraining-detrainment operations, as well as for monitoring troop support activities. The rear services directorate was situated in Zolotukha from 6 June on.

Plans called for establishing the following quantities of supplies at the Vasilevichi railhead by the end of the troop concentration: 1 ammunition allotment, 2 fuel fills, and 10 days rations.



Diagram 3. Organization of Logistical Support of 28th Army During Redeployment (28 May-13 June 1944)

Key:

1. Dnieper
2. Mozyr'
3. Gomel'
4. Army troops concentration area
5. Antiaircraft battery
6. Frontline hospital base

СК — Rifle corps
СД — Rifle division
ГВ — Guards

For other Cyrillic designations see Key to Diagram 1

Thus for the most part army manpower and equipment was utilized for troop supply and support services during the move, with logistical support manpower and facilities deployed in advance in the resupply areas (on the routes of movement).

A like mode of utilization of rear services personnel and facilities of advancing troops is also observed in the redeployment of the 10th Guards Army (Maj Gen I. Ya. Ryvkin, deputy commander for rear services; Lt Col A. A. Nazarov, rear services chief of staff), conducted from 9 through 25 December 1943, involving combined modes of transportation, from the right side of the Western to the Second Baltic Fronts, a distance of 220 km (Diagram 2).[5] Pursuant to the Hq SHC directive, all artillery, mortars and army supplies were to be carried by rail. The guards rifle corps (VII, XV, and XIX) were to move along a single route, in four night marches.

According to the army plan, the following road units were designated for preparing the routes: on the segment Rudnya-Demidov -- the 149th odsb; Demidov-Velish, the 84th omsb; Velino-Rudnya -- the 125th odsb. Subsequently their work was to proceed in leapfrog fashion. The 41st odsb was to set up traffic control along the entire route.

Sick and wounded en route were to be evacuated to hospitals established by the army along the route of movement. Medical-epidemiological reconnaissance groups were sent ahead to determine health and sanitation conditions and to find water sources in the proposed combined units day's halt and rest areas: on 10 December to Demidov, on 13 December to Velish, and on 16 December to Churilovo.

For the entire period of the redeployment move, supplies came to the army from Western Front depots. The front allocated 15 days rations and two fuel fills. Troops transported by rail were supplied with 15 days rations and one fuel fill. Combined units and units proceeding in march formation received five days rations and 1.5 fuel and lubricants fills.

Army field supply depots were deployed to supply the troops in a day's halt area (Demidov, Velish). Hauling of supplies to these facilities was accomplished by Western Front motor transport to the Demidov area (only provisions), and army motor transport from the Velino railhead to the Rudnya, Velish and Churilovo areas, with three army motor transport battalions assigned to this job. In addition to the army field supply depots with fuel supplies, deployed in the day's halt areas, the army rear services chief had a reserve of 90 tons of automotive gasoline in Churilovo.

Thus it is evident from the above examples that in the latter two cases the equipment and facilities of the redeploying armies were also utilized to provide logistical support of the troops during the redeployment move. This cannot be considered expedient under conditions where at the end of a redeployment it will be necessary to engage immediately troops which are inadequately supplied. This can threaten the course of the forthcoming

operation. And yet such instances did occur during the Great Patriotic War. For example, prior to initiation of the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation (4 March-17 April 1944), the combined units and units of the 3d Guards Tank Army were out of fuel as they were about to be engaged, following completion of a 100 kilometer march, since the army rear services had fallen behind. The lack of fuel forced the 70th Mechanized Brigade on the night of 5 March to shift to the defense instead of attacking. A lack of fuel was also the reason for the fact that the artillery fell behind, as a consequence of which army forward combined units and units were fighting without artillery support.[6]

These and other examples graphically confirm that troops should arrive in their destination area on time and in a full state of combat readiness. Therefore during the war Hq SHC, when organizing troop redeployments and movements, did everything possible to relieve army rear services from the duties of logistical support in the course of a redeployment movement. This is graphically evident in the example of redeployment of the 10th Guards Army. As we have already noted, in its directive Hq SHC assigned to the Western Front the task of providing the army with supplies for the entire period of redeployment movement (16 days), with provisions to be hauled into the area of the first day's halt by front transport.

During the war years, however, in connection with limited capabilities of central rear services manpower and equipment, in a number of instances it was necessary, in order to supply redeploying troops, to use their own manpower and equipment. When moving up armies from Hq SHC Reserve, when they would be transferred over to the front prior to the redeployment move, Hq SHC would customarily hand over its functions of logistical support of the armies and assign them to the front rear services, as was the case, for example, with the 28th Army. But at this time the First Belorussian Front did not have any rear services manpower and facilities in the Novozybkov area (the army's concentration area) with the exception of a frontline hospital base. It was patently infeasible to move them deep to the rear, to the army's routes of movement. This was caused in that period by the necessity of providing logistical support on a priority basis to the armies operating in the front's forward echelon. Therefore during the redeployment move the 28th Army was compelled to utilize for logistical support of its troops army supply depots, army supply depot sections, motor transport, refueling facilities, bakeries, and other units and establishments.

Thus the above and other examples from the experience of the Great Patriotic War attest to the advisability of deploying in advance along the routes of troop movement adequate and appropriate rear services manpower and facilities for supplying these troops in a prompt and timely manner. In order to maintain the combat readiness of advancing troops to the time of their engagement, their logistical support was to be organized employing the manpower and facilities of the higher echelon which ordered the redeployment or movement forward.

This trend will apparently retain its significance under present-day conditions, when fuel requirements are increasing substantially in connection with an increase in the quantity of combat and transport vehicles and the depth of redeployment movements. One should approach in an innovative manner, however, experience in logistical support of troops during redeployment. It is essential to take into account the radical changes which have taken place in the organizational structure and technical equipment both of the troops proper and of the subunits and units of all rear services components.

FOOTNOTES

1. This diagram was prepared on the basis of figures from the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 309, List 20139, File 11; List 38662, File 3/6, sheets 87-89; List 38662, File 1/6, Sheet 66.

2. At the beginning of September the 2d Assault Army contained the XXX Guards and CXVII Rifle corps, the 9th and 16th UR [Fortified Area]. By the commencement of redeployment the CXVII Rifle Corps, the 9th and 16th UR had been withdrawn from the army, while additions included the CVIII Rifle Corps from the 8th Army and the VIII Rifle Corps from Leningrad Front reserve. Thus the XXX Guards, CVIII and VIII Rifle corps participated in the army's redeployment. The CXVI and CXVIII Rifle corps from the Third Baltic Front were added to the army upon its arrival in the Tartu area.

3. This diagram was prepared on the basis of figures from the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 382, List 214812, File 1, sheets 2-23.

4. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 382, List 214812, File 1, sheets 2-23.

5. This diagram was prepared on the basis of figures from the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 354, List 71753, File 12, sheets 9-18; List 20583, File 3, sheets 57-59.

6. "Sbornik materialov po izucheniyu opyta voyny" [Collected Materials on Study of the Experience of the War], No 14, Voyenizdat, 1945, page 204.

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TWICE HEROES OF THE SOVIET UNION: COSMONAUT RECIPIENTS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4 1980 signed to press 24 Mar 80 pp 35-38

[Unattributed article, published under the heading "Heroes of the Soviet Union"*: "Twice Heroes of the Soviet Union"]

[Text] Georgiy Mikhaylovich Grechko. Born 1931 in Leningrad. Member of CPSU since 1960. Graduated 1955 with distinction from Leningrad Mechanical Institute and began employment in a design office. While participating in development and testing of new models of space hardware, he showed himself to be a knowledgeable engineer with initiative. Entered cosmonaut training program 1966. Candidate of technical sciences.

G. M. Grechko flew his first space mission on 11 January 1975, as flight engineer on the Soyuz-17 spacecraft (Lt Col A. A. Gubarev, mission commander) and the Salyut-4 orbital station.

In the course of an extended space mission, the cosmonauts performed a group of scientific investigations of the Sun, planets and stars in various bands of the electromagnetic spectrum, continued study of the Earth's surface and atmosphere in the interests of science and the economy, and performed a broad range of medical-biological investigations pertaining to further study of the influence of space flight factors on man's vital activity. The crew returned to Earth at 1403 hours on 9 February 1975, upon completing a 30-day program of research on board the Salyut-4 manned scientific station and the Soyuz-17 transport craft.

For successful accomplishment of the mission on board the Salyut-4 orbital scientific station and the Soyuz-17 transport spacecraft and for courage and heroism displayed during the performance of this mission, Georgiy Mikhaylovich Grechko was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union by Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 12 February 1975.

* Continuation. For previous articles, see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 5, 8, 12, 1975; No 1, 5, 7, 9, 11, 1976; No 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 1977; No 2, 4, 6, 1978; No 3, 1979.

On 10 December 1977 G. M. Grechko was launched on a second manned mission, on the Soyuz-26 spacecraft (Lt Col Yu. V. Romanenko, mission commander). After docking with the Salyut-6 orbital station, the crew proceeded to carry out the scheduled work program on board the scientific research complex.

On 20 December the crew took a space walk, during which they tested the methods and design solutions which permit external inspection and preventive maintenance on the station exterior.

On 11 January 1978 the Soyuz-27 spacecraft docked with the orbital complex, delivering cosmonauts V. A. Dzhanibekov and O. G. Makarov to the station.

On 22 January a new and important stage of the manned mission began. With the aid of the Progress-1 automatic cargo craft, for the first time in the history of space exploration fuel for motors, equipment, apparatus and materials for crew life-support requirements and for the conduct of scientific investigations were delivered to the orbital station.

On 3 March an international crew, consisting of USSR Pilot-Cosmonaut Col A. A. Gubarev and Czechoslovak Cosmonaut V. Remek, was delivered to the orbital complex on board the Soyuz-28 spacecraft. In the course of an extended manned mission on board the Salyut-6 station, Yu. V. Romanenko and G. M. Grechko performed a broad program of important scientific-technical investigations and experiments. A considerable portion of the mission program was devoted to study of national resources and the environment.

The cosmonauts repeatedly photographed the territory of the Soviet Union at the middle and southern latitudes. They obtained new data on the nature of occurrence of various physical processes in near-earth space. An important part of the mission program was the performance of technological experiments under conditions of weightlessness, for the purpose of producing new materials. The technical testing program resulted in successful development of a number of new systems and devices which will find application in future orbital stations and spacecraft.

The results of the scientific-technical and medical-biological research and experiments conducted in the course of the 96-day mission on board the Salyut-6-Soyuz orbital complex, including during the two cosmonaut visits, are being utilized in various fields of science, technology and the economy in the countries of the socialist community.

For successful accomplishment of an extended space mission on board the Salyut-6-Soyuz orbital scientific research complex and courage and heroism displayed during this mission, Georgiy Mikhaylovich Grechko was awarded for a second time the title Hero of the Soviet Union by Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 16 March 1978.

Alekseey Aleksandrovich Gubarev. Born 1931 in the village of Gvardeytsy, Borskiy Rayon, Kuybyshevskaya Oblast. Member of CPSU since 1957. Has served in Soviet Army since 1950. Upon graduation from aviation school in 1952, served in naval aviation units. Graduated in 1961 from the Air Force (now imeni Yu. A. Gagarin) Academy and continued serving in aviation units. Served as squadron and aviation regiment commander. Enrolled in cosmonaut training in 1963. Present rank colonel.

At 0043 hours on 11 January 1975 he was launched into orbit on board the Soyuz-17 spacecraft, as mission commander (G. M. Grechko, flight engineer). The Soyuz-17 orbital mission scheduled the following: conduct of joint experiments with the Salyut-4 orbital scientific station, which had been launched into earth orbit on 26 December 1974; thorough inspection and testing of spacecraft systems in various flight modes, as well as the conduct of scientific research.

In the course of an extended space mission, A. A. Gubarev and G. M. Grechko conducted an extensive program of investigations on celestial bodies, continued study of the Earth's surface and atmosphere in the interests of the economy, as well as space flight factors which affect man's vital activity. At 1403 hours on 9 February 1975, following completion of a 30-day program of research on board the Salyut-4 manned scientific station and the Soyuz-17 transport spacecraft, the cosmonauts returned to Earth.

For successful accomplishment of the mission on board the Salyut-4 orbital scientific station and the Soyuz-17 transport spacecraft, and for courage and heroism displayed during this mission, Alekseey Aleksandrovich Gubarev was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union by Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 12 February 1975.

A. A. Gubarev, receiving training as a member of an international crew in the Interkosmos manned space flight program on board Soyuz spacecraft and the Salyut orbital station, at 1828 hours on 2 March 1978 lifted off on his second manned space mission, as commander of the Soyuz-28 spacecraft (Czechoslovak citizen V. Remek, flight engineer-researcher).

On 3 March the Soyuz-28 spacecraft docked with the Salyut-6-Soyuz-27 orbital scientific complex, on board which they began conducting joint investigations with cosmonauts Yu. V. Romanenko and G. M. Grechko.

Launching of the Soyuz-28 spacecraft began a new stage in exploration of space for peaceful purposes being conducted by the socialist nations pursu[illegible] the Interkosmos program of cooperation.

In the course of a 7-day mission by the international crew of the Salyut-6-Soyuz-27-Soyuz-28 orbital complex, a number of investigations and experiments were conducted. The joint missions by cosmonauts from the

socialist countries have opened up a new page in the development of astronautics. Expanded participation by the socialist countries in space exploration, initiated by the Soviet Union, in the interests of science and the economy, constitutes an example of successful cooperation by the brother peoples in accomplishment of socialist integration and constitutes evidence that they are coming ever closer together.

For successful accomplishment of the manned mission on board the Salyut-6-Soyuz orbital scientific research complex and for courage and heroism displayed during this mission, Aleksey Aleksandrovich Gubarev was awarded for a second time the title Hero of the Soviet Union by Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 16 March 1978.

> Oleg Grigor'yevich Makarov. Born 1933 in the village of Udomlya, Udomel'skiy Rayon, Kalininskaya Oblast. Member of CPSU since 1961. After graduating in 1957 from the Moscow Higher Technical School imeni Bauman, took employment at a design office. Showed himself to be a knowledgeable engineer of initiative and took active part in design and development of spacecraft and orbital stations. Enrolled in the cosmonaut program in 1966.

O. G. Makarov went through the complete course of training for missions on board Soyuz spacecraft and Salyut orbital stations. He took part on several occasions in manned spacecraft and orbital station mission control functions.

He flew his first space mission as flight engineer (Lt Col V. G. Lazarev, mission commander) on the Soyuz-12 spacecraft, which was launched into orbit at 1518 hours on 27 September 1973. The orbital mission, scheduled to last 48 hours, included comprehensive checking and testing improved on-board systems; further refinement of manual and automatic control processes in various flight modes; spectrographic imaging of individual areas of the Earth's surface in order to obtain data for performing tasks connected with the economy. The Soyuz-12 experimental mission was one phase in the further improvement of manned spacecraft.

During the orbital mission the cosmonauts performed the scheduled tasks and checked the improved on-board systems. While performing spacecraft maneuvers, orientation and stabilization, they worked on techniques of manual and automatic control in various flight modes, and they took spectrographic imagery of topographic features in the interests of the economy.

The crew returned to Earth at 1434 hours on 29 September 1973, after completing the Soyuz-12 scheduled mission program.

For successful accomplishment of this orbital mission on board the Soyuz-12 spacecraft, and for courage and heroism displayed during the mission, Oleg Grigor'yevich Makarov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union by Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 2 October 1973.

In accordance with the space research program, the Soyuz-27 manned spacecraft, carrying a crew which included Lt Col V. A. Dzhanibekov, mission commander, and flight engineer O. G. Makarov, was launched into orbit at 1526 hours on 10 January 1978 from a launch site in the Soviet Union. On 11 January the spacecraft docked with the Salyut-6 manned orbital station and, during the next five days, for the first time in history the crews of two spacecraft, Soyuz-26 and Soyuz-27, worked simultaneously on board: cosmonauts Yu. V. Romanenko and G. M. Grechko, V. A. Dzhanibekov and O. G. Makarov. During this time the four cosmonauts performed a great many important scientific-technical and medical-biological investigations and experiments, including the "Taitos" Soviet-French biological experiment. On 16 January 1978 cosmonauts V. A. Dzhanibekov and O. G. Makarov, upon successfully completing their work on board the Salyut-6 station, returned to earth with the Soyuz-26 spacecraft.

For successful accomplishment of a space mission on board the Salyut-6 and Soyuz orbital scientific research complex, and for courage and heroism displayed during said mission, Oleg Grigor'yevich Makarov was awarded for a second time the title Hero of the Soviet Union by Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 16 March 1978.

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CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT, DECEPTION: ORGANIZATION AND EXECUTION

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[Article, published under the heading "From Unpublished Manuscripts," by Lt Gen Ya. Dashevskiy: " Organizing and Executing Operational Camouflage, Concealment and Deception"]

[Text] The place, role and tasks of operational camouflage, concealment and deception in the operation. The ability to delude the adversary and to conceal from him preparations for an operation is achieved by a system of measures which comprise the field of operational camouflage, concealment and deception. Operational camouflage, concealment and deception components of the system of operational support of an operation and constitute an inseparable part of an operation decision and plan.

We should note that preparing for an operation in secrecy and with effective deception presents certain difficulties on the one hand, and on the other requires performance of substantial and very diversified measures.

The fact is that an operation by any one front cannot be considered in isolation from the operations of adjacent fronts. As a rule the front offensive or defensive operation was prepared for and executed on the basis of a Supreme High Command unified plan for the conduct of a strategic operation of a group of fronts.

Usually the offensive operations of three or four fronts of the final period of the Great Patriotic War would be executed in an area extending 950-1,800 km in combat frontage and extending to a depth of 500-600 km. An enormous quantity of manpower and combat equipment would take part in such operations.

It is a highly complicated business but entirely possible secretly to concentrate a large mass of troops in an attack position and without detection to ready them for conduct of defense. This is confirmed by a wealth of examples from the Great Patriotic War.

Operational camouflage, concealment and deception achieved their objectives only when they were planned, prepared and executed on the basis of centralized direction by Headquarters, Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] and proceeding from the plan and operation decision for the given specific operation.

This principle of conduct of operational camouflage, concealment and deception was most important and was observed in all operations and by all military services. Also proceeding from this is the fact that operational camouflage, concealment and deception cannot be carried out on the basis of partial decisions, random or chance preconditions. As is indicated by the experience of the Great Patriotic War, all measures pertaining to operational camouflage, concealment and deception should be rigorously coordinated in advance with measures carried out in execution of the operations plan. Camouflage, concealment and deception measures should be carried out not on a haphazard basis but throughout the extent of the entire period of preparations for and conduct of the operation.

What is the purpose of operational camouflage, concealment and deception?

The principal goal of operational camouflage, concealment and deception is to conceal one's capabilities from the enemy and to delude him regarding the real intentions of the command in the operation. This objective was attained by accomplishment of a number of measures, execution of which was specified in the operational camouflage, concealment and deception plan.

Operational camouflage, concealment and deception was to help protect friendly personnel and weapons from direct action by the ground and air (sea) adversary, as well as to cause him to take advantageous actions which would lead to premature employment of all types of enemy reserves.

In the operations of the Great Patriotic War one can find examples where the specified regulations and procedures pertaining to conduct of operational camouflage, concealment and deception were violated or not observed, which led to negative results for an entire front operation.

For example, in August 1942 the Voronezh Front, under the command of Lt Gen N. F. Vatutin, was instructed to make preparations for an operation to liberate Voronezh. This front offensive operation was to be conducted with the forces of three combined-arms armies, according to the following plan: the main attack was to be mounted by the 60th and 40th armies, with a subsidiary attack to be mounted by the 38th Army. The front had not drawn up a special plan of camouflage, concealment and deception measures; the army commanders were merely ordered to maintain secrecy and concealment in preparing for the operation. The commanding general of the 60th Army, concerned by the possibility that the enemy might first shift to the attack in the direction of Ramon', that is, at the boundary between the 60th and 38th armies, and thwart the 60th Army's offensive, decided to conduct some deception activities in the area between the Don River and Ramon' Station.

Beyond the right flank of the 60th Army they placed several dozen dummy tanks and artillery batteries; a phony troop concentration was also displayed in this area; at night fires were built, stoves were operated during daylight hours, and movement of infantry and supply trains from Ramon' Station to the battle line was displayed. In addition, one heavy gun was positioned, which systematically performed ranging of distant targets.

The enemy, observing the actions of the 60th Army, was deceived into believing that preparations were being made on the army's right flank for an attack in the direction of Ol'khovatka and moved tank and infantry reserves into this area (two tank divisions and one infantry division). These measures by the enemy were not detected either by reconnaissance activities of the 60th and 38th armies or by the front. At the same time front headquarters and 38th Army headquarters were ignorant about the deception maneuver being conducted on the right flank of the 60th Army as well as about the enemy's countermaneuver. As a result, when the offensive began, the troops of the 38th Army, which were mounting the subsidiary attack, were unsuccessful, as a consequence of which the front's main attack also failed. As a result Voronezh remained in enemy hands.

In this example we see how indepedent initiative on the part of the commanding general of the 60th Army, displayed without coordinating deception measures with front headquarters, frustrated the front offensive operation plan. The main reason why the deception measures taken by the 60th Army failed to bring the anticipated results was that the army commanding general's decision to execute a deception maneuver of the army's right flank was not coordinated with the plan of the commanding general of the front and did not proceed from his operation decision.

The experience of the war demonstrated that camouflage, concealment and deception measures should be carried out continuously throughout an entire operation. They should correspond in content and form to the concrete objectives and missions of the troops of the front, as well as to the manpower and equipment taking part in the operation and allocated for executing a camouflage, concealment and deception maneuver.

In order to ensure that operational camouflage, concealment and deception measures not turn out just the opposite and lead to negative results, it is essential that operational camouflage, concealment and deception constitute an inseparable part of the operation decision.

Organization and conduct of operational camouflage, concealment and deception could not be the function of only one field directorate agency of a large strategic formation but were the duty of its commanding general and his staff. In this instance we should note that the reports of some fronts and views held by certain general officers and officers that operational camouflage, concealment and deception should be organized and carried out solely by the chief of engineer troops of the front (army) were totally erroneous, for in matters of executing deception maneuver,

he is only the immediate supervisor of the most technically complex activities. He had at his disposal equipment and specialists for making mockups and dummies, camouflage devices and other means of misleading and deceiving the enemy. The commander of engineer troops performed all his concealment and deception activities only following the front (army) headquarters plan, which had been approved by the commanding general.

Methods of organizing operational camouflage, concealment and deception and forms of deception maneuver. The tasks of operational camouflage, concealment and deception can be accomplished by various methods. They are determined by the content of the deception plan, manpower and equipment enlisted to perform camouflage, concealment and deception measures, and the time allocated for execution of deception maneuver.

In fact, in order to conceal preparations by the troops of a large strategic formation for an offensive, it will be necessary to perform camouflage, concealment and deception measures of various content. In conducting such measures for the purpose of concealing preparations for an offensive operation, it is essential to carry out measures which would not be in contradiction to indications of preparation for and conduct of a defensive battle. It would be totally erroneous to believe, however, that in order to provide concealment and deception for an offensive operation one can employ exclusively the reverse mode of camouflage, concealment and deception actions, as they say. There may also occur instances, especially on the scale of a front operation, where in order to conceal preparations for a front offensive operation it will be necessary at one segment to display preparations for defense, and at another -- preparations for attack or withdrawal.

It follows from the above that in order to determine the modes and forms of conduct of deception maneuver, one took into account the objective of the operation and the nature of the missions performed by the front, the dimensions of the area of the operation which was being prepared for or executed, the nature of the terrain (availability of natural cover and concealment), condition of the road network and communications equipment, troop mobility and, finally, time allocated for preparing for and executing camouflage, concealment and deception measures.

How should we define deception maneuver? Deception maneuver is an aggregate of combat and feigned actions carried out by specially delegated front (army) manpower and equipment in order to compel enemy intelligence effort and command to shift their principal efforts to a sector advantageous for friendly troops.

According to the experience of the war, a deception maneuver was usually simple in conception and was executed swiftly, secretly, and taking the enemy by surprise. The actions of the troops executing such a maneuver did not differ from the tactics and organization of the troops carrying out the missions of the engagement and operation.

In executing a deception maneuver for the purpose of operational support of preparations for an offensive operation it is essential that the concealment and deception measures not reveal to the enemy the actual give-away signs of an imminent operation. And the more fully these signs are concealed on the axis or in the area where the given operation is in fact to be mounted and, on the other hand, the more clearly and convincingly they are displayed to enemy intelligence on a phony axis or in a phony area, the more confident one can be that operational camouflage, concealment and deception will achieve its objective.

Camouflage, concealment and deception measures can be carried out by active and passive means, according to objectives and anticipated results of effect on enemy troops.

Active mode encompasses measures which require of the enemy immediate response and action. During the war years such measures included the following: conduct of reconnaissance in force, combat actions by individual detachments, as well as conduct of a partial operation in one secondary or several sectors of the front (army); simulated redeployment of various arms and headquarters; establishment of phony radio nets and their communications activities; stepped-up air activities and enlargement of dummy airfields; employment of smokes and simulation equipment; change in mode of conduct of troops in a decoy area, etc.

The passive mode usually includes measures which do not evoke immediate response and action by the enemy. In the course of the Great Patriotic War, for example, there occurred the practice of passing phony information through the press, the local populace, defectors, as well as employment of situation disguise.

During the war both these modes supplemented one another and were executed in conformity with the deception maneuver plan. Corresponding to each deception maneuver plan was a form of maneuver characteristic of that plan. It would be absolutely incorrect if the commanding general of a front (army) employed one and the same form, one and the same methods in deception maneuvers which differed in scheme.

Take, for example, operations where the forces of a front mount the main attack with the left side of the front and penetrate the enemy's defense, simultaneously widening the breach in the direction of the right side of the front.

It is obvious that, in the first place, a given operation should be prepared for and executed in operational coordination with the neighboring unit on the right and, in the second place, one should seek to persuade the enemy to place his main forces not against the left side of the front but closer to its right side.

For example, in the Zubtsov offensive operation of the Western and Kalinin fronts in 1942, the operational camouflage, concealment and deception plan was prepared by the commanding generals of both fronts.

The operation plan called for routing the fascist force in the Zubtsov area and to capture this area, and subsequently to push the offensive further and capture Rzhev.

The 20th and 5th armies of the Western and the 31st Army of the Kalinin Front were designated for this operation. The 31st and 20th armies were to advance along converging axes and capture Zubtsov, while the mission of the 5th Army was to secure the left side of the battle group of the Western Front.

The following operational camouflage, concealment and deception measures were to be implemented for operational support of this operation: totally concealed preparations for the offensive by the 31st and 20th armies; conspicuously display preparations for and execute a feint attack by the 5th Army in the direction of Vyaz'ma; simulate preparations for an offensive in the zone of the 43d, 49th and 50th armies.

As a result of these measures enemy intelligence was diverted to the task of discovering a phony force, while the offensive by the 31st and 20th armies took the enemy by surprise.

The above form of deception maneuver was also employed in an offensive operation by the First Baltic Front in September-October 1944 and in the L'vov-Sandomierz Operation of the First Ukrainian Front in July 1944.

The commanding general of the First Baltic Front, Army Gen I. Kh. Bagramyan, was to execute a substantial redeployment of the front's troops (four combined-arms armies and one tank army, two tank and one mechanized corps), in the course of a strategic operation to liberate the Soviet Baltic, from one flank to the other (from the Riga to the Memel' sector), a distance ranging from 80 to 240 km, within a period of six days (from 28 September to 3 October 1944) and under difficult operational situation conditions.

The front headquarters staff, on the basis of the commanding general's decision, elaborated a unified plan for relief of combined units and formations, as well as a detailed concealment and deception measures plan to maintain secrecy about the redeployment and the entire offensive operation.

The concealment and deception plan specified a number of measures to delude the enemy. All documents pertaining to the redeployment and preparations for the offensive were transmitted only by courier. Telephone communications, even in code, were absolutely prohibited. Special monitoring was set up at all telephone communications centers. All commander's reconnaissance activities were conducted by officers and general officers wearing enlisted men's uniforms, in small groups (5-6 persons), at different times and in individual sectors of the front, armies, corps, and divisions. It was absolutely prohibited for vehicles carrying officers to appear in areas exposed to enemy observation. As a rule the local

civilian population would be removed from villages where command echelons were to be located.

Special measures were conducted for the purpose of deluding the enemy, measures aimed at convincing him that preparations were being made for a major offensive operation in the Riga and Tukum sectors. A phony troop concentration was simulated in these sectors, campfires were burned, movement of columns was simulated, preparations for artillery support for an offensive were simulated, phony tank troop concentration areas were set up, phony mine clearing from the minefields was performed, as well as breaching of barbed-wire entanglements, and a phony attack position was readied. A portion of the radio sets of the departed armies were left in their previous areas for a certain period of time and operated on the previously-established pattern, transmitting phony information on preparations for an offensive. At the same time phony defense reinforcement activities were conducted in the Shyaulyay sector.

In order to ensure the strictest and most precise execution of the designated concealment and deception measures, all direction and supervision pertaining to these activities was concentrated in the hands of the front chief of staff, Col Gen V. V. Kurasov, a decision which proved absolutely correct and which immediately had a positive effect on the results of the operation proper.

It was learned from documents captured from the enemy in the first days of October as well as from interrogation of prisoners that right up to the beginning of operation the German-fascist command was unaware that an offensive was being readied on the Shyaulyay-Memel' axis, while in the Riga sector the troops of the First Baltic Front had shifted to the defense. The initiated operation of the First Baltic Front in the Memel' sector proceeded highly successfully as a result of the concealment and deception measures, as well as a thoroughly-prepared operation.

In the L'vov-Sandomierz Operation of the First Ukrainian Front, under the command of Mar SU I. S. Konev, a deception maneuver was also executed proceeding from the following plan: to conceal the preparations for the main attack on the right flank of the front, where the front's main forces were being concentrated, especially its tank troops, and simultaneously to feign preparations for an attack on the left flank. But since the enemy knew that the troops of the First Ukrainian Front were heavily equipped with tanks, it was necessary to display a concentration of large tank forces in the zone of the 1st Guards Army (one tank army and one tank corps) and in the zone of the 18th Army (one tank army), thus creating an impression with the enemy that preparations were being made for an operation in the direction of Stanislav.

Feigned hauling of tanks by rail was performed toward this end, detraining of tank combined units was simulated in areas adjacent to the left side of the front, and a phony march by tank combined units and units from detraining areas to phony tank concentration areas was conspicuously

displayed. In addition, they arranged a phony display of amassing and deployment of other arms in the attack position. Extensive dissemination of false information to the enemy was accomplished with the assistance of the local civilian population. All specified operational concealment and deception measures were elaborated by front headquarters and approved by Hq SHC.

As a result of such organization and conduct of operational camouflage, concealment and deception, the enemy stepped up his intelligence activities in the phony areas, devoting particular attention to search for the 3d Guards and 4th Tank armies. In addition, he stepped up shelling of the dispositions of the 1st Guards and 18th armies. The 7th Infantry and 2d Panzer divisions were additionally brought up from the tactical reserve and deployed against the 18th Army, while two infantry divisions which had been slated for redeployment to another sector were held opposite the 1st Guards Army until 17 August.

Also meriting attention is a deception maneuver in the Crimean Operation of the Fourth Ukrainian Front in 1944. Army Gen F. I. Tolbukhin decided to mount the main attack against the enemy force on the left side of the front in the vicinity of Sapun Mountain and the Balaklava highway. In order to weaken the enemy's resistance in this sector, he decided to effect a deception by shifting to the attack with the right side of the front several days earlier than the main force. This measure was designed to compel the enemy to throw his artillery and reserves against the right-flank 2d Guards army.

In order to execute this plan, the 2d Guards Army initiated a feint attack from the area of the Mekenziyevy Hills on 3 May. For a period of 72 hours the front command closely monitored the enemy's behavior. Early on the morning of 6 May it was established that the enemy had begun redeploying his artillery to the Mekenziyevy Hills, weakening the Balaklava sector of operations, which made it possible to initiate preliminary artillery bombardment and airstrikes at 0500 hours on 8 May and to shift the main forces of the Fourth Ukrainian Front to the offensive.

It is evident from the cited examples that the above-discussed form of deception maneuver was extensively employed in the Great Patriotic War and produced positive results when properly utilized.

Let us take another front offensive operation plan: the plan is to mount a cleaving attack, to split an enemy force into two parts and, working in coordination with the adjacent front, to encircle and destroy the enemy's forces. In order to accomplish this scheme one can prepare and execute a deception maneuver where preparations for an attack in the center of the front are concealed, with deliberate display of attack preparations on both flanks. Measures executed with this form of deception maneuver should be carefully coordinated with the operations of the adjacent front.

One example of such a deception maneuver in the Great Patriotic War is the Iasi-Kishinev Operation of the Second and Third Ukrainian fronts and the Black Sea Fleet in 1944, with the objective of encircling a large enemy force.

What essentially was the deception maneuver plan of the commanding general of the Second Ukrainian Front, Army Gen R. Ya. Malinovskiy? The plan called for concealing attack preparations in the center of the front's zone and deliberately displaying phony attack preparations on both flanks. In conformity with this scheme, the operational concealment and deception plan boiled down to the following: defensive field fortification work was to be stepped up in the zone of the main attack by the 27th and 52d armies; a redeployment was simulated at the point of juncture between the 7th Guards and 40th armies, in the sector of the 7th Guards Army, phony troop concentration and rear service establishments areas were created, and phony preparations were made for an attack in the direction of Roman.

Preparations for an attack on Nisporyany were deliberately displayed in the zone of the 4th Guards Army. Considerable effort was made to conceal a substantial redeployment of troops (LVII, XXVII Rifle corps, 53d Army) from the left side of the front to the main axis of advance.

On the basis of this decision, the front headquarters staff drew up a detailed operational concealment and deception plan. Besides this, a great many additional measures were carried out for the purpose of maintaining military secrecy and deluding the enemy. For example, preparations for the operation began without issuing operation orders or directives. The only ones to have knowledge of the impending operation in the armies were the commanding general, military council member, chief of staff, chief of the operations section, and the artillery commander. The order to the front was signed only four days prior to initiation of the attack, while reconnaissance in force was conducted only on the eve of the operation. Redeployment of troops in the threatened areas was provided heavy cover by antiaircraft artillery and fighter aircraft. All troop movements occurred primarily during hours of darkness.

Front redeployments were carried out over the course of several days, while army redeployments were completed in a single night. Reinforcement artillery and tank units were withdrawn to the new areas in the course of the last two nights before the attack and took their attack positions during the night of 20 August, that is, on the eve of initiation of the offensive. We should note that in spite of the redeployment of 44 out of 51 divisions, the enemy was unable to discover the plan and intentions of the command.

The operational concealment and deception plan of the commanding general of the Third Ukrainian Front, Army Gen F. I. Tolbukhin, consisted in concealing preparations for an attack at the center of the front, in feigning an attack on the right side of the front, that is, in the Kishinev

sector, and in feigning a subsidiary attack in the Akkerman sector. Front headquarters conducted deception measures in connection with it: a phony concentration of a combined-arms army was simulated in the area of Reymarovka, Dubossary, Tashlyk, and Kamanovo; concentration, employment and attack preparations in the main sector by the 57th, 37th and portions of the 46th Army, as well as redeployment of troops within the front were concealed; a feint attack was mounted across the Dniester estuary against Akkerman; field fortification work was stepped up along the entire front, to give the enemy the impression that the front was preparing for a protracted defense.

We must state that in working up the operational concealment and deception plan the headquarters staff of the Third Ukrainian Front had to "reconcile" two mutually-excluding circumstances: on the one hand it was necessary to display preparations for an offensive in the Kishinev sector, while on the other hand it was necessary to prepare almost the entire front for a protracted defense. In case of unsuccessful execution of the operational camouflage, concealment and deception plan, the enemy could easily discover the true intentions of the commanding general of the front or take the thrust on Kishinev to be a partial attack not requiring significant forces for repelling it, while concentrating his main forces in the sector where the main attack was actually to be mounted.

On the whole camouflage, concealment and deception measures by both fronts were a total success. The enemy was deceived and for a period of 48 hours, when the troops of the Second and Third Ukrainian fronts were already penetrating the tactical defense zone, the German command was still waiting for an attack by Soviet forces in the Kishinev sector. This was confirmed by prisoner interrogations.

It is evident from the above examples that the forms and modes of operational camouflage, concealment and deception cannot be constant and identical for all operations. They should conform to the commanding general's plan. In each operation and at all stages of an operation there should be specific modes and methods of operational camouflage, concealment and deception, which can vary in relation to development of the operational-tactical situation.

As is indicated by the experience of the war, one can and should use limited manpower and equipment to execute deception activities. The assigned troops should by their actions convince enemy intelligence that the deception measures they are carrying out are genuine. This can be achieved if enemy intelligence, observing phony troop actions, is able to establish operational-tactical densities, depth of columns, concentration and deployment areas, rates of displacement, etc, which are in conformity with actual standards and the prevailing situation. One can utilize for this purpose both organic and captured equipment (guns, tanks, trucks, tractors, radio sets and other gear).

The experience of the war indicates how large and diversified is the content of operational camouflage, concealment and deception measures and what a serious role it played in the successful execution of operations. This type of operational support has retained its importance in preparing for and executing modern-day operations.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: CAPTURE OF THE REICHSTAG DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4 1980 signed to press 24 Mar 80 pp 53-59

[First part of two-part article, published under the heading "Memoirs," by MSU Col (Ret) F. Zinchenko, first commandant of the Reichstag: "Victory Banner Over the Reichstag"]

[Text] The day of 21 April 1945 was a bright, warm spring day. But for us soldiers of the 756th Rifle Regiment* it was a genuinely hot day. The regiment was advancing at the cost of heavy, bloody engagements, approaching the lair of the fascist beast. By evening we had reached the Berlin suburb of (Karov). The capital of the Third Reich lay before us. We had firmly believed that we would be seeing this sight. But nevertheless our joy was great indeed.

For some time things were silent. Suddenly heavy firing could be heard in the direction where the battalion of Capt I. V. Klimenkov was advancing. We heard guns, mortar and tank fire, the chatter of machineguns and submachine guns, the cracking of rifle fire, and the bursting of hand grenades. I became quite concerned. Could it be a counterattack? I contacted Klimenkov by radio.

"There is no counterattack, Comrade Colonel," replied Ivan Viktorovich. "It is simply that when the men learned that we have reached the edge of Berlin they decided to fire a salute with all their weapons. They want the fascists to know we have arrived."

A salute in honor of a Berlin which had not yet been captured? A bit premature, but one could understand the men: for almost four years now they had been dreaming of this moment; for almost four years they had been fighting their way in this direction, to bring to an end the harsh and bloody war which Hitler had forced upon us. They had trod difficult roads of retreat and advance across rubble, the ashes of their home towns and villages. They had marched on, covered with sweat and blood, leaving on the field of battle the graves of their comrades-in-arms.

* In the period described Col F. Zincheko was in command of the 756th Rifle Regiment of the 150th Rifle Division.

(Karov) fell within the inner defense perimeter of Hitler's capital. There were a total of three defensive perimeters. The first, outer perimeter, 25-40 kilometers from the city center, was behind us. The second, inner perimeter, ran through the outskirts of Berlin, while the third, city perimeter, encompassed Berlin proper, which was divided into nine sectors. The first sector was considered the main one: it contained the governmental administrative-political establishments of the fascist state and city defense headquarters.

The fascists had very thoroughly prepared their capital for defense. Assault guns and tanks had been dug into the ground on the broad streets and intersections, light guns had been placed on the second and third floors of buildings, antitank rocket launchers and snipers were positioned on higher floors, while the enemy's manpower was concentrated in the basements and lower stories. The city contained as many as 400 durable reinforced concrete structures, many of the main traffic arteries were mined, and roadblocks, posts and antitank ditches had been set up. Every building was a strong point, and every block was a center of resistance.

The Berlin garrison totaled more than 200,000 men, and the German High Command had eight divisions in reserve. The fascists had put the entire male population between the ages of 16 and 60 under arms. Volkssturm battalions and tank destroyer detachments had been formed of new conscripts.

Our division had captured the Reinikendorf district by 1200 hours on 24 April. The Soviet advance continued. And now a war plant, which had been transformed into a powerful strong point, was encountered in our regiment's path of advance.

The plant was surrounded by a high, thick reinforced concrete wall, in which the fascist had fashioned firing ports and set up guns and machineguns. The fascists realized that if they lost such an important installation they would subsequently be unable to hold us all the way to the Berlin-Spandau Navigation Canal. And that was several kilometers beyond. We could expect the enemy to hold the plant at all costs.

And such was the case. As soon as our subunits approached the plant, the fascists proceeded to deliver heavy fire from guns and machineguns. Three times Captain Klimenkov's battalion, supported by tanks and artillery, assaulted the plant, and three times they were driven back. It was unwise to send the men on a fourth assault attempt without appropriate preparation. We decided to bring in all the weapons at the regiment's disposal, particularly the heavy guns, and to bombard the plant. In addition, N. N. Kozlov's platoon, armed with antitank rocket launchers, was instructed to fire four salvoes at the wall following the preliminary artillery bombardment, in order to deafen the defending fascists.

brief preparation, and the enemy was hit by a firestorm. Guns of all calibers roared. The antitank rocket salvo had surprising results. It not only deafened the enemy but breached the wall. Klimenkov's battalion immediately rushed into the breach. The artillery shifted fire to the center of the plant. The fighting was intense and savage. It took several hours to break the enemy's resistance.

There was still an exchange of fire in progress in the plant shops when I entered the plant grounds with a command group. My men reported that 300 prisoners had been taken, but all of them were wearing unusual military garb. We subsequently learned that it was the uniform worn by members of the Nazi Party. So these were the plant's defenders! So this was who was fighting with the fanaticism of the doomed! It seems we were fighting a detachment formed of Hitler's "old guard." The Fuehrer himself had sent them into battle, appealing to them to halt the "Bolshevik barbarians."

When all prisoners had assembled and fallen in, I went over to inspect them, accompanied by the regimental deputy commander for political affairs, Ivan Yefimovich Yefimov. We were startled by the scene before us. The majority of these members of "Hitler's guard" were on their knees, begging mercy of the victors. A few minutes previously they had been fighting with frenzy, and now they were a pitiful sight.

As I slowly strode along the row of prisoners, I could hear angry voices behind me: "Give them some hot lead! Think how many people these bastards have murdered!"

I was in total agreement with them, both in mind and spirit, for these people were not among those who had been deceived and intimidated by the Nazi demagoguery, who had out of weakness simply gone along with the current. This was the cream of the Nazi Party, those who had imposed the "new order" with an iron fist, those who, together with the fascist party leaders, should be answerable for all the suffering which fascism had brought the world. And today they had killed many of our people. One could easily understand the men's mood. But we could not yield to it. Who had authorized us to hold court? There are special agencies for that. And it is a cruel act to shoot down unarmed people, even if they are sworn enemies. I gave the order to evacuate the prisoners to the rear.

We did not show cruelty even to our most bitter enemies, the SS, let alone the civilian population. And herein lies the greatness of the Soviet Army. The Germans, frightened to death by Goebbels' propaganda, very soon became convinced of the humanity of our soldiers. The evil deeds perpetrated by the fascists in our country had not made cruel the Soviet soldier, who was indoctrinated by the Communist Party. He remained a Man in an environment of harsh military realities! Frequently risking his life, our fighting man saved the lives of civilians and never raised his weapon on defenseless persons.

There was a trolley carbarn not far from the plant. We were advancing toward it. A large 3-story building stood in the path of the 1st Battalion. There were fascists holed up in it. In order to capture the building it was necessary to cross a square about 400 meters wide. The artillerymen prepared to give the rifleman supporting fire. As the gunners took hold of the firing lanyards and waited for the command to fire, an old man carrying a child climbed out of a crater in the middle of the square and proceeded to run toward the nearest building. Our boys immediately ceased fire. So did the fascists. But before the old man had taken 20 steps, the chatter of a machinegun erupted from the enemy-held building, and he fell to the ground. The little girl climbed to her feet and proceeded to stare at her grandfather in surprise.

Company party organizer Sergeant Lotoshkin approached company commander Lieutenant Grankin. "Comrade Lieutenant, request permission to retrieve the little girl."

The officer did not reply immediately. The square was quite exposed. The Nazis had every square meter in their field of fire.

"It's dangerous, sergeant, you won't make it," replied the lieutenant. "You'll get killed yourself, and you won't save the little girl."

"I realize that it is a big risk. But request permission to try."

"Permission granted!"

Lotoshkin immediately leaped out of the basement window and ran swiftly toward the child, hunching over and darting from one shell hole to another.

The enemy could see that the Soviet soldier was running out to save the German child. But nevertheless they opened fire and poured a hail of rifle and machinegun bullets at him.

"Barbarians!" the men shouted angrily. "That is just what they are."

Indeed, only barbarians could act like that. The fascists certainly fit the definition.

Without waiting for a command, our soldiers proceeded to give their comrade covering fire. Fire from all types of weapons was delivered at the building where the fascists had holed up. Lotoshkin reached the little girl, grabbed her and jumped into the shell crater. Catching his breath for a moment, he then proceeded to run back.

The enemy fired with redoubled fervor. Bullets struck sparks from the paving stones, but not one of them hit the bold soldier -- it was as if he was charmed. Completely out of breath, but pleased and joyful, the sergeant handed the rescued child over to his comrades. She was immediately evacuated to the rear.

A few days later we were advancing on Moabit prison. Through the roar of the battle the soldiers heard cries of women and children coming from one of the buildings which were on fire. Without hesitating, Komsomol member Mariya Diyeva, chief corpsman from the 6th Company, and nurse Valentina Kazarova ran into the burning building. In one of the rooms they found four petrified women and five children. Diyeva and Kazarova worked resolutely. Through a window they first passed out the children and then the women to signalmen Vera Abramova and Mariya Petrenko, who had run up to assist.

More firefights followed and more saving of the lives of Berlin civilians....

Advancing toward downtown Berlin, our battalions came up against a 5-story building which blocked the shortest route to the Moltke Bridge across the Spree River. Beyond the river stood the Reichstag.

I asked the commander of the 2th Battalion: "Why are you stalled?"

"That big building is holding us back, comrade colonel." "What building is it?" "The Ministry of Finance." "Prepare to assault the building. The artillerymen will help you."

"There is no need to do that, comrade colonel. There are many civilians in the building. Neustroyev and I are working out a plan to take it without artillery and without killing civilians."

"Will it work?" "Of course it will work!"

And it worked. The battalions opened fire at the upper floors, where the Nazis were positioned, blinded them, stormed into the building and cut the fascists off from the civilians, who had taken refuge in the basement.

I still recall my battalion commanders with great affection. They were real military experts! They led their subunits into battle with great skill and ability! Real Communists! The men had faith in them, were willing to follow them through fire and water, as they say.

Take Capt Stepan Andreyevich Neustroyev. This lad from the Urals, lean and short of stature, was literally riddled with bullets and shell fragments. He was just 23 years old at that time. But he was unusually bright and courageous.

And what about Capt Ivan Viktorovich Klimenkov? He was also young, a 25-year-old officer from Smolenskaya Oblast. Not of heroic appearance, of medium stature, but solidly built. He was fearless in battle and was always able to find the shortest way to victory over the enemy. Wounded three times, a veteran of the regiment.

Other officers were just as fine, many of whom were Communists. I must say that Communists and Komsomol members gave the commanders great support.

They would be the first into the attack, drawing the other men along, and they firmly held their positions in the defense. They helped the men understand the assigned tasks and displayed a fine example of task execution. The other men emulated and followed them.

One can also scarcely exaggerate the role of party-political work in accomplishment of combat missions. It was conducted in the regiment continuously, concretely and purposefully. Party and Komsomol organizations mobilized personnel for successful execution of commander orders and explained to the men the party's demands pertaining to conduct by Soviet troops abroad.

...On the afternoon of 25 April we commanders of the regiments of the 150th Division were summoned to the command post by the division commander. Gen Vasiliy Mitrofanovich Shatilov was delayed returning from the corps commander, and therefore the conference, if it could be called such, was convened by the division political section chief, Lt Col Mikhail Vasil'yevich Artyukhov.

"The military council of the 3d Assault Army," he stated, "has established nine banners, one for each division. Whichever division is first to take the Reichstag will have the honor of hoisting its banner over the building. Our division has received Banner No 5."

The lieutenant colonel unfastened the case and drew out the banner. We expected to see something unusual: satin or silk, gold embroidered, with velvet tassels. But what we saw before us was a simple piece of red cloth attached to a hastily-fashioned staff. A small star and a large hammer and sickle had been drawn in white oil paint in the upper left corner. On the other side stood the number 5. Later the following inscription was added to the banner: "150 Rifle Order of Kutuzov II Cl Idritsa Division 79 rc. 3 AA 1 BF," that is, 150th Order of Kutuzov, 2d Class, Idritsa Rifle Division, LXXIX Rifle Corps, 3d Assault Army, First Belorussian Front.

At that time none of us had any inkling that this banner was fated to become the Banner of Victory of the Soviet Union in the war against Hitler's Germany and that it would become one of the most sacred relics of our people.

Returning from the corps commander, Gen V. M. Shatilov told us that the banner would be given to that regiment which was first to reach the Reichstag and to report readiness to assault it. Naturally each and every regimental commander immediately decided that his regiment would be first. And in fact, after the banners were instituted, an unspoken fighting competition began: in the army -- between divisions, and in the division -- between regiments, for everybody wanted to hoist the banner above the Reichstag, which symbolized the fascist state.

On 26 April General Shatilov handed the military council banner over to our 756th Rifle Regiment, wishing us luck in justifying the honor bestowed upon us.

Early in the morning of 28 April our regiment went over to the attack, with the objective reaching the Spree River and capturing a bridge across it. We were advancing through the city's Moabit district along its main street -- Alt-Moabit, with the Moltke Bridge our objective, We were not more than 3 kilometers from it. Not far from the Alt-Moabit Street stood a somber building -- the now world-famous Moabit Prison -- place of execution of many well-known fighters against fascism. Initially we were not planning to take it. Battalion commander Klimenkov was ordered to detail a company and seal off this enemy center of resistance. Ustroyev's battalion was instructed to move ahead as swiftly as possible. But a call from the division commander changed our plans.

"Interrogated prisoners have stated that Goebbels is at Moabit Prison," stated General Shatilov. "Therefore I want you to surround and capture the prison immediately. Take Goebbels prisoner and deliver him to division headquarters."

The prison was surrounded by 1200 hours. But it was no easy matter to penetrate into the prison. Protected behind thick brick walls, the fascists felt relatively calm and confident. Even the 122 mm self-propelled guns were unable to pierce the walls.

"That's all right, we'll show them right now!" exploded artillery brigade commander Col N. P. Sazonov. "We'll bring up a 203 mm and give it to them point-blank."

"That would be fine," I agreed. "But how are you going to get such a gun out onto an open square? The towing tractor has no armor protection. It's sure death for the tractor driver."

Sazonov gazed at me silently a few seconds.

"Do your infantrymen have armor protection?" "No." "Do they go into battle?" "Of course they do," I replied. "The tractor drivers will also go into battle," he confidently stated.

A few minutes later he reported that the artillerymen were already pulling the piece into firing position. I glanced out of the window of a church which stood on Alt-Moabit (our command post was located there) and saw that a tractor was slowly advancing toward the square. The gun was to be positioned to the right of the church, in an open area. I estimated that the range from there to the prison was about 400 meters.

As long as the tractor was moving behind the cover of buildings, the fascists were unable to put fire on it. The tractor driver, a quite young lad, was sitting there with tightly compressed lips and gazing intently forward. In another two or three minutes he would be out in the open. Then he would be the target of a hail of lead. The soldier knew this, knew that he would soon be getting it, but he firmly gripped the control levers and tenaciously advanced his vehicle toward the danger ahead.

The tractor entered the open area... 5, 10, 15 seconds -- and the tractor driver, riddled by a machinegun burst, slumped heavily over the levers. Another soldier dashed out from behind the tractor. He gently pushed his dead comrade aside and took over the controls.

The heavy tractor advanced another 15-20 meters, and the heroic driver, struck by a bullet, slumped in his seat. His place was immediately taken by another man. He gave full throttle, then quickly turned the vehicle, and the menacing 203 mm gun pointed its terror-inspiring muzzle toward the prison. The tractor driver hopped off the vehicle and ran for shelter. The gun crew proceeded to swing into action.

Unfortunately I did not take down the names of these fearless fighting tractor drivers, who sacrificed their lives to save the lives of hundreds of comrades. But I shall never forget them. I am sure that these heroes will never be forgotten by anybody who witnessed their deed.

Sighting the gun on target, the crew opened fire. A heavy projectile slammed into the prison wall, demolishing it. A second and third shell followed. The fascist fire immediately abated; they had retreated somewhere deep within the prison. The 2d Battalion took advantage of this. Without delaying, it launched an assault. The first to enter the prison building were rifleman Dmitriy Ivanovich Yeslikov, Komsomol member-machinegunner Vasiliy Gerasimovich Minchikov, and signalmen Ivan Makarovich Khilay and Arkadiy Andreyevich Kocharin. The telephone operators immediately established communications with the regimental command post. Now assistance could be given to the battalion. The fighting in the prison did not last long. Stunned by the bold assault by our troops, the fascists surrendered. Goebbels was not found among them.

"They say Goebbels was here," the prisoners confirmed. "But we don't know where he is now."

It was later learned that Goebbels was responsible for the defense of this sector of Berlin and, on Hitler's orders, was with the troops which were defending the approaches to the Reichstag and the Reichs Chancellory.

Yes, on 28 April Goebbels got away from us. But he was unable to escape his fate. I saw him a few days later or, more precisely, toward evening on 2 May. A small, charred corpse; alongside him lay his wife Magda and their six daughters (Magda Goebbels poisoned her children before taking her own life). Soviet officials were bringing here for body identification fascist prisoners who had until recently held high posts in Hitler's Reich.

"Yes, that is Goebbels, yes, that is Magda Goebbels, yes, those are their children," mumbled yesterday's highly-placed officials, stunned and dispirited by the ignoble end to which their idols had brought their country.

Toward evening on the same day when Moabit Prison was taken we reached the Moltke Bridge across the Spree. This river was the last major water obstacle on the way to downtown Berlin, where the Reichstag stood. The banks of the Spree were lined with granite, and it was no simple matter to cross it with organic equipment or means at hand. Therefore capture of the bridge was particularly important. We were planning to take it without halting our advance, but we were unable to do so.

At 2000 hours, following heavy artillery shelling of enemy positions, the 1st Battalion proceeded with a second assault. Once more it was unsuccessful. The commander of the 1st Company was seriously wounded in this assault. I immediately named company party organizer Sr Sgt Il'ya Yakovlevich S'yanov to take his place. He had long served as a platoon leader and was a seasoned company commander, although he did not have officer rank. I first met Il'ya Yakovlevich in June 1944, when our regiment was defending near the village of Borishovo in Pskovskaya Oblast. I happened to visit the sector of the 1st Rifle Company, in which S'yanov was a platoon leader. At the very outset I took a liking to this calm, even-tempered, businesslike person. Tall, broad-shouldered, with a rugged face and intelligent, sparkling gray eyes, he gave the impression of a fairy-tale hero. We took a tour of inspection of the trenches. They were deep, full-profile, with a fighting bay for each man, and machinegun emplacements. The fire plan was also well organized. The dugout also made a favorable impression: cleanliness and order. There was fresh, fragrant hay on the bunks; the little table was neatly covered with newspapers and on it lay the Party Rules and Program. One could sense that a party organizer resided here.

Il'ya Yakovlevich S'yanov was born in Kazakhstan -- in the village of Semiozerki in Kustanayskaya Oblast. Before the war he had worked in the oblast executive committee. He had been at the front since 1942 and in the regiment since the day it was established. He was one of those veterans who had been fortunate to still be alive after experiencing all the ordeals which had fallen to the regiment's lot. In short, a perfect company commander. And he did not disappoint me.

Let us return, however, to the Moltke Bridge. All of us were racking our brains over how to take it with fewer casualties. Early in the morning of 29 April Captain Novatroyev came to the regimental command post with a rifle platoon leader, Komsomol member Jr Lt Nikolay Vasil'yevich Lebedev, and reported: "Comrade Colonel, Lebedev and his men want to take the bridge."

Before me stood a young lad, not more than 19 years of age, who was waiting calmly for my response.

"How are you going to take the bridge, lieutenant, and with only one platoon?" I asked. "The battalion could not take it yesterday, and you want to do it with one platoon. Have you given serious thought to what you are proposing?"

"Yes, Sir, Comrade Colonel. If you give permission, I shall take it. Only not with one but with two platoons."

And Lebedev proceeded to describe his plan. There was a reinforced concrete wall in front of the bridge. There were post obstacles on the bridge, and at the far end another wall 1 meter thick and a meter and a half high.

"That will give us infantrymen good cover," he stated, convinced. "My platoon, Lieutenant Kozlov's platoon armed with antitank rocket launchers, and four combat engineers can be completely sheltered behind all that."

I did some quick figuring: it would indeed provide adequate cover. Lebedev continued presenting his plan. Artillery, mortars and tanks would open fire on the buildings on the far bank of the Spree, and especially on the building housing the Ministry of Internal Affairs (at the time we called it "Himmler's House"), which occupied a key position in defense of the bridge. A curtain of dust would be thrown up, blinding the Germans. The soldiers would run to the bridge one after another and take cover behind the wall. Kozlov's platoon would reach the wall at the far end of the bridge, take cover behind it, and fire an antitank rocket launcher salvo at the closest building. After which Lebedev's platoon would storm the building under cover of friendly artillery, which would continue to seal off the Ministry of Internal Affairs building. At this time the combat engineers would be cutting the wire running to the demolition charge placed under the bridge.

The plan was simple, although very risky. It could be carried out only by very bold, daring individuals. The men under Lebedev and Kozlov were precisely such individuals. We decided to take the chance. Precisely at 0900 hours the ground proceeded to shudder from artillery salvoes. The guns kept firing without cease, pumping out large volumes of fire. About 10 minutes later "Himmler's House" on the right and the block on the left were enveloped in smoke and dust, and enemy fire began to subside. It was time for Lebedev to swing into action.

The regimental Komsomol organizer, Sr Lt Nikolay Mikhaylovich Belyayev, ran up to me and requested permission to accompany Lebedev in capturing the bridge. I gave permission, and he headed back to the platoon at a run.

Lebedev was not pressured to get moving. He himself decided when to proceed with execution of his plan. A few minutes later the battalion adjutant, Senior Lieutenant Gusev, reported by telephone that Lebedev had moved out. All officers and men peered over to where the junior lieutenant should be appearing with his bold men. Suddenly Lebedev leaped out from behind a disabled vehicle, followed by his men Kildyshev and Garkusha, and my orderly, Komsomol member Sergeant Tarasenko (the latter had requested my permission to take part in combat prior to the time Lebedev's platoon had

been assigned the mission of taking the bridge), plus others. Lieutenant Kozlov's platoon, armed with antitank rocket launchers, then moved out.

Our hearts stopped beating as we watched these heroes. They were 300 meters from the bridge. The distance kept growing shorter second by second. 250, 200, 150, 100 meters.... The Germans opened intensive submachine gun and machinegun fire. They were firing blindly, however, and causing no damage. Artillery pounded the enemy. Several shells burst on the bridge, and fountains of water rose in the Spree, but Lebedev and his men had already reached the first reinforced concrete wall and took cover behind it. The first phase of the plan was completed. Now we had to let the men catch their breath.

Through the binoculars I could clearly see signalmen Bubnov and Khimushkin running toward the bridge with spools of wire and telephone sets, followed by nurse Anya Fefelkina with a medical aid pouch on her side.

Lebedev had remained too long by the wall, and we were concerned. But the men, as if aware of our concern, crawled out from behind the cover and proceeded forward in the Plastun manner, using the post obstacles for cover. Within a few minutes they had reached the wall at the far end of the bridge. The men armed with antitank rocket launchers quickly moved forward behind them to the firing point. They fired three salvoes at the building closest to the bridge. The fascists fell silent for an instant. Lebedev's platoon immediately began the assault, while Kozlov's platoon proceeded to deliver machinegun, submachine gun and rifle fire at the windows.

Performing with resoluteness, Lebedev's platoon swiftly crossed the Kronprinzen Ufer embankment, fought their way into the building, seizing the vehicle entrance, and thus split the garrison which was defending this building. A few minutes later S'yanov and his company rushed to Lebedev's assistance. It completed the job. An important bridge was in our hands and the path to the Reichstag was opened up.

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ROLE OF ARMY IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCUSSED

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[Article, published under the heading "In Foreign Armies," by Candidate of Military Sciences Maj Gen V. Mozolev: "The Role of the Army in the Developing Countries"]

[Text] Characteristic features of contemporary world social development include the rapid upsurge and constantly expanding scale of the national liberation movement, which has become a vigorous force of the antiimperialist front. National liberation revolutions in the majority of developing countries, having resolved the question of political independence, have entered a new stage in their development. In this process, stated L. I. Brezhnev, "it is exceptionally important that many liberated nations are rejecting the capitalist road of development and are setting as their goal the building of a society which is free of exploitation, are setting their sights on socialism."[1] Up to the present time approximately 20 Afro-Asian nations have chosen the socialist road of development. They are marching in the vanguard of the national liberation movement.

Yesterday's colonialists are endeavoring with all means to hold the young liberated nations in their sphere of influence. The imperialists are utilizing for this purpose primarily economic pressure and direct aggressive acts.

Acting in a close alliance with imperialism against the progressive forces in developing countries is domestic reaction, which unites within its ranks the comprador and right wing of the national bourgeoisie, the feudal aristocracy, the clan-tribal nobility, certain other strata of the population, as well as pro-Maoist adventurist groupings. Establishment of the developing countries runs in sharp conflict with them, advancing to the forefront the problem of armed defense of the socioeconomic and other reforms being carried out against encroachment by the imperialists and their accomplices within the country. And this objectively places the armed forces at the epicenter of ever" external and domestic conflict and political crisis encountered by the process of sociopolitical development

in the liberated countries. Armies have become an important factor in the revolutionary movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. And in order correctly to predict the direction of development of young nations, it is necessary carefully to analyze the basic trends of organizational development and improvement of armies and to elucidate their role in the societal affairs of their countries. This article examines several aspects of resolving this problem.

The experience of history indicates that in all eras armed forces were the principal instrument of armed violence by the ruling classes and the implementers of their domestic and foreign policy. "The army," stated V. I. Lenin, "cannot and should not be neutral. Not to draw the army into politics is the slogan of hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie... who in actual fact have always drawn the army into reactionary politics...."[2]

Armies in antagonistic systems as a rule have served as an instrument of reaction and conservatism. Under present-day conditions democratic and patriotic attitudes have become predominant or very perceptible in a great many armies of developing countries. This finds expression in active participation by military personnel in revolutionary actions by the people and in the appearance of new forms of government characterized by leadership participation by the armed forces in running the country. In 1974 there was no political party in Ethiopia, for example, capable of leading the spontaneous rebellion of the people against the monarchic regime. The armed forces constituted the sole organized force, and it was they which assumed leadership of the revolution. But following overthrow of the emperor, the functions of head of state were entrusted to a provisional military administrative council.[3] Similar examples of an active role by the armed forces in the progressive development of their country have occurred in Ghana, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and other nations.

Revolutionary-democratic forces in a number of countries which are becoming liberated from imperialist oppression endeavor at the initial stage of the struggle for social progress to draw the armed forces to their side. And wherever this has succeeded, success of the liberation movement has been assured (Afghanistan). In addition, activities by reactionary military groups, which is manifested in counterrevolutionary military coups, such as in Chile, is not an impossibility but, on the contrary, is becoming increasingly more dangerous.

Such a role by the army is dictated by the fact that due to its principles of cadre organizations, one-man command and centralization of control, rigid military discipline and possession of the authority to employ weapons, in the majority of developing countries it is an isolated and the most powerful and organized force. In a number of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America which have gained their independence by means of arms, formation of a government edifice and ruling party with participation of revolutionary armed forces has taken place practically simultaneously (Burma, Algeria, Nicaragua, etc). Many officers, continuing to

occupy command positions in the armed forces, have been appointed to top-echelon posts in the political, economic and administrative agencies of young nations. In such countries, up to completion of stabilization of a specific political system, the army has frequently functioned not as an agency of the government edifice but as a relatively independent political force.

We should note that although the armies of developing countries possess relative independence, in the final analysis their role in social development depends on who controls them, the will of what class or group of classes they carry out. This substantially affects the content and character of performance by armies of domestic and external functions. The specific differences of the path of development selected by each country and the differing social structure of the motive forces of the revolution and the class composition of the army define the features of the army's performance of its functions.

Suppression of domestic reaction, acting against existing systems, constitutes the internal function of armies. For example, the compradors, feudal and clan-tribal nobility, a large and reactionary segment of the middle national bourgeoisie, individuals and social groupings which have compromised themselves by collaborating with the colonialists, agents of foreign intelligence services and political circles linked to this agent network, and the governmental, military and political bureaucracy which has become bourgeois, oppose the progressive governmental system in the majority of developing countries. Struggle with this counterrevolutionary social grouping comprises the essence of the internal function of the army in the majority of developing nations.

At the same time, in the countries of socialist orientation armed forces place principal emphasis in performance of the internal function on neutralizing the resistance of proimperialist and other social strata, which are endeavoring to turn the country onto a capitalist road of development or to preserve the former feudal-patriarchal socioeconomic structure. Alongside performance of the internal function, the armies of these countries are extensively utilized in productive work connected with accomplishing the tasks of economic and cultural development.

In performance by the army of an internal function in countries which have taken the capitalist road of development one notes an unwarranted liberalism in regard to reactionary elements and repression against the worker class and the laboring peasantry, which has been occurring, for example, in Egypt in recent years.

As we know, the external function of armies of developing countries is protection of their independence and national sovereignty against external attack. One feature of the content of this function in countries of socialist orientation lies in the fact that the armies are defending against the intrigues of imperialism and other aggressive forces a more

progressive revolutionary-democratic societal and governmental system, as well as the right of their peoples to genuinely independent and democratic development. In addition, they give military support and aid to progressive and other national regimes which have been subjected to direct aggression by the forces of imperialism, racism and reaction. Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and the People's Republic of the Congo gave genuine military assistance to Angola in its struggle against external and internal counterrevolution, while the progressive Arab nations have closely coordinated the combat operations of their armies in repelling Israeli aggression.

Alongside this, the armies of the young progressive nations of Africa and Asia are becoming an important component military force capable, working in concert with the military might of world socialism, of thwarting attempts by imperialism and reaction to start military conflicts in various regions. This has been fairly convincingly confirmed in recent years by the actions of the armed forces of the People's Republic of Angola and Ethiopia.

At the same time the armies of a number of countries of procapitalist orientation are taking the path of aggression in performance of their external function (the army of Pakistan) and are performing gendarme functions in the interests of world imperialism (Egypt's armed forces in the Near East).

Performance of their functions by the armies of developing countries is closely linked with the principle of their establishment and specific features of development, which in turn are dictated by the character of the sociopolitical system of the young nations. The following three basic types of armed forces of these countries can be clearly seen in conformity with resolving the question of political hegemony in a national liberation revolution.

The first type is national armies, with the beginning of which as a rule begins construction of a politically independent national state, since the army to one degree or another can be the guarantee of a given country's right to independent development. Creation of a national army is that line from which opens up the prospect of building a contemporary class military organization by the forces which have come into power.

The process of creation of national armies has been carried out in two directions. One of these is seizure of an already existing military organization and its utilization in the interests of accomplishing the tasks of a national liberation or national-democratic movement, which occurred, for example, in Chile and Iran. The other consisted in tearing down the old colonial military edifice and building a new one by changing the organizational structure of the army, its cadre composition and methods of operations, as was the case, for example, in Iraq, Burma, the Congo, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ethiopia, and a number of other countries at initial stages of a national liberation revolution.

The old leadership of the army, police and security agencies were removed and replaced with representatives from the people. In addition, the organizational structure of the armed forces was rearranged.

Almost all classes and social groups of a young state comprise the social foundation of a national army. The experience of history indicates that after a national liberation revolution the influence of reaction in the army may be quite strong, since there remain in the army, especially in the officer corps, many representatives of the exploiter classes, their stooges and imperialist agents. And wherever the struggle to draw the army over to the side of a national liberation revolution is conducted in an inconsistent manner and is not completed with its revolutionary democratization, reaction utilizes the armed forces for its own purposes, to carry out a counterrevolutionary coup (Chile) or to turn the revolution and the direction of a country's development onto the capitalist road (Egypt).

People's revolutionary armies are a second type of armies of developing countries. They are created in the course of an armed antiimperialist struggle and constitute an instrument of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the people. The social base of this type of army comprises bourgeois-democratic strata of the national intelligentsia, the peasantry, petit-bourgeois urban labor strata, and the developing worker class. All these social groups in the army are unified by a temporary agreement between class-heterogeneous motive forces of the democratic movement, and their actions are determined by the goals of the antiimperialist political struggle. People's revolutionary armies stand guard over the revolutionary achievements of the people. This type includes the armies of Guinea-Bissau, Syria, etc. It formerly also included the armies of Angola and Somalia. We should note that this type of army is of a transitional character: they are transformed, as each country selects a specific path of development, either into national (the Somalian army) or into revolutionary-democratic armies (the armed forces of Angola). In the process of transformation of an army from an instrument of the revolutionary dictatorship of the people into an instrument of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, a decisive role is played by progressive parties in the developing countries, which is graphically evident in the example of the MPLA PT in Angola and the United Front of Marxist-Leninist Organizations in Ethiopia.

Revolutionary-democratic armies constitute a third type of army of developing countries. They arise under conditions of combination of an antiimperialist struggle with a civil war, when the toilers establish their own independent military organization, as was the case in Angola, Nicaragua, etc. The worker class, the peasantry and revolutionary intelligentsia comprise the social foundation of such an army. Gradual subordination to this organization, led by a political party occupying a revolutionary-democratic, Marxist position, of the armed struggle of all classes and class groupings participating in the revolution gives the new army a revolutionary-democratic character. Such an army becomes an

instrument of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, which are leading their country along the road of socialist development. "The worker class, in alliance with the peasantry and revolutionary intelligentsia," stated Comrade A. Neto, chairman of the MPLA, "will exercise at this stage a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship directed against domestic and external reaction, creating conditions for establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat at the stage of building socialism."[4]

A revolutionary-democratic army can become transformed into an army of the socialist type only under the condition of transformation of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the leading strata of society and the poorest peasantry into a dictatorship of the proletariat, as a socialist system is formed in the country under the guidance of a Marxist party.

It is quite obvious that the above-defined three basic types of organizational development of the armed forces of developing countries presuppose different paths of their formation in dependence on the establishment and development of the class nature of the given country. A basic feature of these armed forces is the fact that, while they are already essentially class armies, at the same time they are not armies of the victorious bourgeois class or armies of the victorious proletariat. Armies of developing countries comprise a unique arena of a class struggle which is taking place in parallel with the class struggle occurring throughout the society of the given country, the outcome of which should in the final analysis determine the class composition of the regular army. This is traced fairly clearly in the example of the army of Somalia which, following the revolutionary coup of 21 October 1969, defended the interests of the country's laboring population. But in 1978 the leadership of the country and armed forces took the path of an expansionist and nationalist policy, initiating an aggressive war against democratic Ethiopia. Thus the army of Somalia, under the influence of the bourgeois-nationalist ruling clique, became transformed from a revolutionary force into a reactionary force, which predetermined this country's departure from a progressive course of socialist orientation. Consequently an understanding of the specific features of the class nature of the armed forces of developing nations is of particular importance in determining the development prospects of the given country along a socialist or capitalist road.

The historical experience of development of the national liberation revolution in the majority of countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America attests to the fact that on one hand the armies of developing countries play an important political role in their countries due to their high degree of organization and discipline, and on the other hand, there always exists in these armies the possibility of an extremely swift, "explosive" aggravation of social relations between the various personnel categories under conditions of initiation of vigorous combat operations, especially against the "domestic" enemy.

Therefore when analyzing the disposition of political forces in a country, one should not underrate the moral-political potential of enlisted and noncommissioned officer personnel; one should not reduce the term "army" to the term "officer corps." This is confirmed by numerous instances of mass insubordination, conspiracies, mutinies, rebellions, frequently initiated precisely by the enlisted and noncommissioned officer masses. For example, there occurred demonstrations by enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers in the Congo on 5 July 1960, in Togo in 1963, in Tanganyika in 1964, in the Congo (Brazzaville) in July 1966, in Nigeria that same year, and in Sierra Leone in 1968.

In evaluating the political actions of the army in developing countries, one takes into consideration first and foremost precisely the morale-political state of enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers. Under conditions of an objective, logical advancement of armed forces as the main political force of the sociopolitical struggle, there is current significance in V. I. Lenin's statement that "one should view soldiers being marched to the firing squad for 'insubordination' as living persons with independent interests, as a part of the people, as expressers of the urgent needs of certain classes within our society. You will see that soldiers who are closest to the least politically developed peasantry, who are subjected to nothing but abuse, stupefaction, and drill by the authorities... do not want to remain divorced from politics.... Soldiers advance a demand which clearly boils down to destruction of a caste army, an army separated from people, and its replacement by an army of citizens with equal rights."[5]

It is evident, however, that one cannot assume that the processes of class demarcation and class struggle in the armed forces are a mirror reflection or continuation of analogous processes in society. One should bear in mind that the armed forces remain first and foremost a functional organism, in which all combined units, units, subunits and establishments possess centralized subordination, a high degree of discipline, are equipped with means of armed combat and are invested with the authority to employ weapons when commanded to do so. The command edifice in turn is subordinate to the regime in power. Only with such an interrelationship are the armed forces capable of playing the role of instrument of armed coercion within the system of the state. Weakness of any one of the principal links in this chain of interdependence (ruling circles, command-armed forces) contains a natural threat of rupture.

In developing, economically backward countries of capitalist orientation the "ruling circles" do not and cannot comprise, primarily due to economic causes, either a unified or politically strong group. Their very presence in power is entirely dependent on the degree of subordination of the armed forces to them. The second connecting link in the chain of governmental authority acquires particular importance thereby -- the command edifice of the national army, which, representing the armed forces in the government, and the government in the armed forces, is objectively advanced forward to the proscenium of the sociopolitical struggle.

At the same time the military elite of any national army can count in its political actions on unconditional political support only from a certain, socially close segment of the officer corps. And not only the social origin but also the social status of the bulk of the officer corps of a given army of a developing country at a concrete-historical moment should be defined as social proximity.

Since the army of a developing country is a product of a national liberation revolution, while any national movement, stated V. I. Lenin, "can be only bourgeois-democratic, for the majority of the population in backward countries consists of the peasantry, which is a representative of bourgeois-capitalist relations."[6] Therefore it is quite logical that recruitment of personnel of armies as a whole, and particularly the officer corps, involves primarily representation of the bourgeois-democratic elements of society. The predominant role of petit-bourgeois strata in the officer corps of the armed forces of developing countries is graphically reflected in the social programs of the overwhelming majority of "military regimes," which include agrarian reforms and social measures aimed at easing the status of the peasants and urban middle strata, and is also evident in the actions of conservative circles, which endeavor vigorously to oppose an increase in representation of the petite bourgeoisie in the officer corps of the armed forces.

At the same time the petit-bourgeois representation of the bulk of the officer corps is an objective phenomenon, since precisely the petite bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and the urban middle strata are capable of furnishing a contingent of fairly educated young men who can be attracted by military service. In addition, there is observed today a trend toward recruiting for the officer corps of the armies of developing countries representatives of the poor peasantry and worker class.

If the ruling circles of a given country are opposed by a petit-bourgeois, insufficiently organized mass of a nation with mutually intercrossing, sometimes conflicting economic interests with immature "mass" political parties and organizations, the command of a national army, that is, the military-political elite, is opposed by the organized force of this mass in the person of the officer corps, which can be transformed and, as history has shown, frequently is transformed from a functional to a political organization.

The historical experience of the army acting in the arena of political struggle in a number of countries in the Near East, Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America indicates that the armed forces command usually cannot bring itself to carry out a military coup without the support of the bulk of the officers, while those in turn will not join a conspiracy if they are not convinced that its goals will be supported by the soldiers directly subordinate to them.

The political initiative of the army on the whole was limited as a rule to action only against the existing regime. The maximum political product of the armed forces proper was usually advancement from their own milieu of leaders to whom they are willing to submit. Upon coming into power, these leaders subsequently sometimes depart from the political platform chosen in the course of a military coup, motivating this departure with the necessity of accomplishing the most "important" "national" tasks advanced by those social-class forces which are economically the most powerful at the moment, such as was the case in Somalia in 1978.

A military coup is a form of violent overthrow of governmental authority, effected by military manpower and weapons, as a result of which political control passes into the hands of representatives of the armed forces. The character of a military coup and its political thrust depend on who carries it out -- reactionary or progressive forces, the interests of what classes or social groups they express and what policies following the military coup are implemented by the "military regime" established by them.[7]

In the course of a military coup the bulk of the military plays an active role in the country's political affairs, while after a "military regime" comes into power the activeness of the military masses declines substantially and depends on the political orientation of the regime in power.

The character of military coups also usually depends on the social foundation of formation of the armed forces. For example, a petit-bourgeois foundation of an army in developing countries predetermines the probability of its vacillations and manifestation of inconsistency. Therefore at the social level the tasks advanced by a military coup and its results are always limited by that duality which is characteristic of the petite bourgeoisie as a whole.

The events in Ghana (1965), in Mali (1968) and Chile (1973) graphically demonstrated that an army can also overthrow progressive regimes which have taken the path of antiimperialist struggle and extensive social reforms. In assessing the character and probable outcome of each military coup, it is necessary first and foremost to proceed from the actual disposition of social-class forces in a given developing country at a concrete historical stage in its development. One should bear in mind, however, that a military coup frequently leads the armed forces of a developing country to the brink of civil war as a result of a split in the national army, action taken by one segment against the other, and the merging of the class struggle in the armed forces with the class struggle in society, which is graphically confirmed by the history of development of the revolution in Ethiopia.

Analysis of the internal situation in the armed forces of any of the developing countries of capitalist orientation frequently confirms a discrepancy between formal and actual political power. When the army command does not possess reliable political control over subordinate personnel, then their statutory authority is illusory as well.

The impression which is sometimes formed that the position of commander in chief or chief of the general staff in a developing country of nonsocialist orientation automatically presents unlimited possibilities of utilization of the armed forces for political purposes is in actual fact fairly deceptive. This position first of all presents only statutory, formal authority, which is extremely fragile under conditions of political and economic instability in the country. As regards political power, it must be defended and consolidated. The experience of history indicates that the first problem encountered by a military regime in a developing country is that of winning over the country's armed forces, for a decision by a group of initiators of a military coup to take over the reigns of government is inevitably linked with adoption of a certain political platform. This is precisely that boundary which separates any political regime from the armed forces since, remaining itself, that is, a unified functional organism, a national army cannot possess a unified political platform. In other words representatives of the army, coming into power as a result of a military coup, automatically lose political control at least over a portion of the armed forces, and the duration of their governance depends primarily on the extent to which they succeed in reestablishing and consolidating their authority over the army. This is evident in the example of the military coup in Bolivia in November 1979, where Col A. Natusch Busch was able to remain in power only 17 days, since he lacked the requisite support in the armed forces.

Consequently a military coup in developing countries can be considered a political act carried out by the armed forces. At the same time a so-called "military regime" is not a form of army governance, since any "military regime" is compelled to struggle for the national army just as various "civilian" forms of government.

Thus armies in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America have become an important factor in development of national liberation revolutions. They constitute an active, most highly organized and sufficiently powerful political force in settling questions pertaining to social, economic and cultural development of their countries.

The role of the army in a given developing country depends first and foremost on what class groups control the armed forces and to what degree, as well as what path of development a given country is following. Depending on settlement of the question of political hegemony of various classes and social groups in a national liberation revolution in developing countries, armies can be divided into three principal types: national, popular revolutionary, and revolutionary-democratic. All of them, however, comprise intermediate types, which are transformed, with the social development of each young nation, into armies of the socialist or capitalist type, with all consequences proceeding therefrom.

The social and political essence of the armies of developing countries and their role in societal affairs is reflected to the greatest degree in the specific features of their performance of the internal and external functions.

Organization of a combat-efficient regular army in developing countries, especially ones which have taken the road of noncapitalist development, constitutes an objective pattern and is an important factor in accomplishing the tasks of armed defense of revolutionary reforms. "Savage clashes with exploiter elements and their foreign patrons are inevitable," stated L. I. Brezhnev. "Sometimes they lead to zigzags in the policies of young nations and sometimes even cause retrograde movement. But the general direction of development is incontestable."[8] Armed forces are of great importance in correct adherence to this line and securement of the shortest path to achievement of the goal.

The armies of young nations are in a state of continuous development under the influence of the class struggle in their countries, a struggle which is also continuing in the armed forces proper. There is occurring a logical process of democratization and increased activation of personnel. And only on the basis of a profound analysis of the correlation of class forces within the country and army, their disposition, and the level of political awareness of personnel can one correctly predict the direction of social changes in society and the role of the armed forces in this process, and in the final analysis also probable changes in the military-political situation in a given developing country.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following a Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 6, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, page 590.

2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 12, page 113.

3. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 8, 1976, pp 68, 69.

4. PRAVDA, 6 December 1977.

5. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 13, pp 283-284.

6. Ibid., Vol 41, page 243.

7. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 7, Voyenizdat, 1978, page 280.

8. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 6, page 591.

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SYMPOSIUM REPORT: BOLSHEVIK MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS IN 1917

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[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information" by Scientific Secretary of the USSR Historical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Candidate of Historical Sciences L. Gavrilov: "Bolshevik Military Organizations in 1917"]

[Text] The Bolshevik Party, headed by V. I. Lenin, during the period of preparation for the Great October Revolution attached exceptional importance to winning the army over to the side of the revolution, without which, stated our leader, "we could not win."* This problem was discussed at a symposium entitled "Military Organizations of the Bolshevik Party in 1917," held in Kishinev on 4-5 December 1979. It was sponsored by the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council on the Combined Problem "History of the Great October Socialist Revolution" and the Institute of Party History of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party. Approximately 150 scholars and teachers from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kishinev, Baku, Odessa, Sverdlovsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Kazan' and Groznyy took part in the symposium proceedings.

Academician I. I. Mints, Chairman of the Scientific Council, presented a detailed paper on the international significance of the military experience of the Bolshevik Party. He discussed intensification of militarism in the imperialist countries and the steadily increasing role of armies in social and political events in capitalist nations. Holding militarism in check is a most important task of the present day, for militarism promotes the establishment of military-industrial complexes, the growth of the armed forces in imperialist countries. In connection with this, the experience of the Bolsheviks in winning the army over to their side is of great international significance. V. I. Lenin considered revolutionary work in bourgeois armies mandatory for Communists. The speaker emphasized that in those countries where parties do not conduct

* V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 40, page 10.

such work, the army becomes an instrument in the hand of reactionary forces.

Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu. I. Korablev presented an interesting paper, in which he discussed utilization by the international Communist movement of Bolshevik experience in military work, how this work was set up in Comintern, and also demonstrated its antimilitarist activities. Yu. I. Korablev went into particular detail on the campaign by Communist and worker parties to win over the army in the course of popular democratic and socialist revolutions in a number of countries in Southeastern Europe.

An interesting paper on the results of study and tasks of further elaboration of history of the establishment and activities of Bolshevik military organizations in 1917 was presented by Doctor of Historical Sciences P. A. Golub, who noted that during the period of preparation for the Great October Socialist Revolution the Bolshevik Party succeeded in establishing an extensive network of party organizations in the army and navy. This helped the party unite behind the worker class the multi-million soldier masses and to transform the revolutionary movement in the military into one of the decisive factors in victory in the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The papers and reports named many problems which have not yet been adequately studied and which require more thorough elaboration. Doctor of Historical Sciences G. L. Sobolev pointed to the necessity of studying the numerical strength of the Bolsheviks of the Petrograd garrison as well as more thorough investigation of documents dealing with regional military Bolshevik organizations and materials on issue of party cards. Candidate of Historical Sciences V. I. Miller called for a thorough, detailed study of the lists of delegates to the All-Russian Conference of Front and Rear Area Bolshevik Military Organizations. Another speaker, Candidate of Historical Sciences L. G. Protasov, suggested a special discussion of the methodology of determining the numerical strength of Bolsheviks in rear services troops. Candidate of Historical Sciences M. A. Kalinenok reported new data on the quantity and time of establishment of Bolshevik organizations in the units and combined units of the Romanian Front.

There also arose at the symposium the question of the necessity of further study of activities of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (of Bolsheviks) under V. I. Lenin's direction of all party political work. This point was mentioned in many papers. Candidate of Historical Sciences M. A. Molodtsygin, for example, stressed the important role of the Central Committee Military Organization in the post-October period and presented little-known facts on its contribution to training of cadres for the centralized Soviet military edifice and local military command entities. The speakers supported a proposal to produce synthesizing studies on party direction of all military work.

A number of papers noted inadequate study of the activities of general-proletarian Bolshevik organizations pertaining to party guidance of party

collectives in the regular army. Doctor of Historical Sciences N. M. Yakupov, for example, stated that Bolshevik organizations in the combat-zone districts were in contact with party collectives in the field army and noted the special role they played in uniting the Bolsheviks of the front with the general proletarian party organizations of the rear areas. Doctor of Historical Sciences S. S. Khesin described navy military organizations and presented the specific features of their organizational development.

Candidate of Historical Sciences A. S. Smol'nikov discussed the activities of the military organization of the 12th Army, and Junior Scientist S. N. Bazanov -- the 5th Army. Candidate of Historical Sciences B. D. Gal'perina pointed to the necessity of fuller study of the Bolshevik press, which will help researchers more fully reveal party organizational development in the troops of the Northern Front.

A paper by S. Ya. Aftenyuk, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Moldavian SSR, clearly showed the role of the Bolsheviks of the Romanian Front in the struggle by the toilers for Soviet Moldavia. Candidate of Historical Sciences D. I. Antonyuk noted the enormous contribution of the Bolsheviks of the Romanian Front toward development of education and culture in Moldavia during the first months following establishment of Soviet rule there. M. M. Gitsiu described the process of Bolshevization of the front's soldier masses in November-December 1917, while Candidate of Historical Sciences Ya. N. Istrati discussed the campaign of the Bolshevik organizations to achieve an armistice on the Romanian Front. Bolshevik thwarting of attempts by Moldavian bourgeois nationalists to strengthen their influence in the Moldavian national regiments was discussed in detail in a paper by Doctor of Historical Sciences A. S. Yesaulenko, and Bolshevization of the soldier sections of the Soviets of Moldavia -- in a paper by Candidate of Historical Sciences A. T. Roman. L. Ya. Sayet reported on new archival documents of the military organizations of the army in the field.

Many valuable suggestions were made in papers discussing the work of the Bolshevik military organizations of the rear area districts. L. G. Protasov discussed the boundaries of application of the term "military organization of the Bolshevik Party" and on distinguishing between the elements of spontaneity and organization in the soldier movement. Doctor of Historical Sciences A. M. Liseteskiy demonstrated how the Bolsheviks took into consideration in their propaganda and agitation the mood of the soldier masses. Candidate of Historical Sciences O. I. Shchus' focused attention on the struggle by the Bolsheviks against the Ukrainian nationalists and for fraternal unity among soldiers of different nationalities. Doctor of Historical Sciences N. Ye. Rakovskiy showed the significance of the Bolshevik press in the Southern Ukraine, which revolutionized the soldiers of the Odessa Military District and the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet. Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu. M. Gamretskiy discussed Bolshevik activities among Ukrainian prisoners of war

and collapse of plans by bourgeois nationalists to form counterrevolutionary military units with these prisoners. Doctor of Historical Sciences I. M. Ionenko and S. I. Ionenko presented papers dealing with the Bolshevik military organization of the district center in Kazan'. Candidate of Historical Sciences R. S. Teeytlin showed the work of Bolshevik military organizations in the garrisons along the Middle Volga. Military party organizational development in the Urals was the subject of a paper by Candidate of Historical Sciences N. N. Popov. The activities of Bolshevik military organizations in rear-area garrisons on the Don and in the Caucasus were described in papers by Candidates of Historical Sciences Zh. Zh. Gakayev and G. S. Azimov. Doctor of Historical Sciences D. I. Soyfer presented a paper on the Bolshevik military groups in the Turkestan Military District (especially in the Tashkent and Samarkand garrisons). A paper by Doctor of Historical Sciences E. N. Shchagin dealt with a description of the work performed by Bolsheviks in the Far East among the soldier masses of local garrisons and their utilization as transmitters of proletarian influence on the laboring peasantry and Cossacks in Russia's eastern hinterlands.

The symposium adopted a number of recommendations on further elaboration of the problem and on preparation of publications and monographs on little-studied topics. The next scholarly symposium was scheduled for 1981, to deal with the Bolshevik struggle against the influence of nonproletarian parties in the army and navy.

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PACIFIC FLEET: EARLY DEVELOPMENT REVIEWED

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[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information," by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences Capt 1st Rank V. Sologub: "The Communist Party -- Creator of the Pacific Fleet"]

[Text] Following the Civil War and the defeat of the interventionists in the Far East, the young Soviet Republic was essentially without a fleet in the Pacific. When retreating from the Maritime Region, the White Guardists and interventionists took with them 25 combat-fit ships of the Siberian Naval Flotilla and eight vessels of the Volunteer Fleet, and removed armaments from coastal fortifications.[1] Our country's longest sea boundary was unprotected. During those difficult years the Communist Party and Soviet Government were faced with the task of defending our Far Eastern sea boundaries. It was necessary to establish facilities, train personnel, and knit together existing forces. By November 1922, on V. I. Lenin's instructions and pursuant to the resolutions of the 10th and 11th Party congresses, establishment of the Far Eastern Naval Forces (MSDV) began. They included the vessels and shore facilities of the Amur Flotilla and the Vladivostok ship detachment.[2] I. K. Koshanov was appointed commander of the MSDV, E. I. Batis -- deputy commander for political affairs, V. V. Selitrennikov -- chief of staff, I. N. Kolbin -- political section chief, and M. A. Dominikovskiy, staff commissar.

The party mobilized its best manpower to rebuild the fleet. Komsomol, which in 1922 established a patron status over the Red Fleet, was also enlisted to help accomplish this task. Command and engineer cadres came to the Far East from other seas. The toilers of the Maritime Region gave them every assistance. They helped repair and put on-line ships, defensive structures, and gathered supplies for the fleet's needs. Hundreds of Komsomol members came to serve on naval ships and in shore units.

Organization of the MSDV had improved by 1925. The Amur Flotilla, a component element, contained several divisions of gunboats, a minesweeper division, and special services. The Vladivostok ship detachment, a minelayer division, military port shore subunit, communications service,

navigation safety directorate, etc were based at Vladivostok.[3] Coast guard service was handled by the patrol ships "Krasnyy Vympel" and "Vorovskiy," the destroyers "Groznyy" and "Bravyy," and the military transport "Oleg."

Under the conditions of the military reform which was being carried out in the army and navy (1924-1925), reorganization of the MSDV took place in 1925, as a result of which the command, political section and headquarters were abolished. Ships, port structures and shore facilities were transferred over to other agencies. The Amur Flotilla was placed under the Naval Forces Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and was redesignated the Far Eastern Flotilla effective September 1926. It was given new and major-overhauled ships, seaplanes, and antiaircraft armament was appreciably beefed up. Military actions in 1929, provoked by Chinese militarists on the Chinese Eastern Railroad, constituted the first major test of the flotillas's combat efficiency. Together with the troops of the Special Far Eastern Army, naval personnel mounted powerful attacks on the enemy's main forces. They crushed the invading Sungari Flotilla and wiped out a bridgehead for invasion of the USSR. The flotilla and 63 commanders and Red Navymen were awarded the Order of the Red Banner for mass heroism and courage.[4] Thus in the 1920's the men of the Far Eastern Flotilla successfully accomplished their assigned missions and reliably guarded our homeland's borders. Qualitatively new Far Eastern Naval Forces were established in the 193[illegible], equipped with modern surface ships, submarines, coast artillery, and naval aviation.

At the beginning of the 1930's the military-political situation became sharply aggravated in connection with seizure of Manchuria by the Japanese militarists in 1931, by its transformation into a base for invasion of the USSR, and further expansion of aggression against China. Under these conditions the Communist Party and Soviet Government adopted a number of important decisions pertaining to reliable securement of the sea borders of the Far East. Of particular importance were the shipbuilding programs adopted by the Soviet Government for 1926-1932 and 1928-1933, as well as the 15 July 1929 decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) entitled "On the State of Defense of the USSR."[5]

On the instructions of the party Central Committee and Soviet Government, K. Ye. Voroshilov, USSR People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, arrived in the Far East in August 1931. He visited the Red-Banner Amur Flotilla, Sovetskaya Gavan', and Vladivostok. In his report to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) on his tour of the Far East, the People's Commissar pointed to the necessity of accelerated development of a coast defense which would protect not only Vladivostok but also other coastal areas, especially the area from Vladivostok to Nikolayevsk-na-Amure.[6]

Of great importance was a decision calling for construction of 12 medium and 30 small submarines for the Far Eastern Naval Forces.[7] In view of the

sharply-aggravated situation in the Far East, in 1932 the party Central Committee announced a decision to deliver small naval vessels and submarines by rail to the Far East.

"In 1932," stated PRAVDA, "when there was a particularly serious threat of attack on our Far East, the party Central Committee and government were forced to reorganize industry, placing it in the service of national defense. And in a short period of time a powerful military force had been established on our distant Far-Eastern borders. The perspicacity and iron will of the Leninist Central Committee... saved us from intervention."[8]

On 25 February 1932 K. Ye. Voroshilov ratified a plan of organizational measures pertaining to formation of Far Eastern naval forces for 1932-1933. The plan called for establishment of two submarine brigades, two torpedo boat divisions and one detachment, two artillery brigades, five artillery battalions, and three special independent companies, as well as several aviation brigades and squadrons, which would constitute a foundation for further development of naval aviation.[9]

On 23 March 1932 the USSR Revolutionary Military Council and People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs adopted a decision defining the basic tasks pertaining to fleet consolidation and development in the Pacific. The principal tasks were as follows: securement of deployment of units and combined units, construction of coast defense and naval bases, organization of combat and political training of unit and warship personnel and supervision of this training, determination of basing locations for naval forces and facilities, construction of repair and overhaul facilities, etc.

Party and government reinforced their decisions with important organizational measures. Thousands of Communists were mobilized for organizational development of the MSDV. The Red-Banner Baltic and Black Sea fleets sent their best men to the Far East.

Formation of the Far Eastern Naval Forces Headquarters Staff (Chief of Staff O. S. Solomnikov) was completed on 30 March 1932, and on 15 April -- the Political Directorate (A. A. Bulyzhkin, chief). M. V. Viktorov was named Commander of Far Eastern Naval Forces. His first order, dated 21 April, enumerated the combined units, units, ships and establishments of the MSDV. This date is officially recognized as the birthday of the Pacific Fleet.[10] The MSDV included the 4-battalion 9th Artillery Brigade, the 5th Railway Artillery division, the 12th Air Defense Antiaircraft Regiment, a torpedo boat detachment, a minesweeping and minelaying brigade (nine minelayers and sweepers), the escort vesself "Krasnyy Vympel," the 3d Air Squadron, the 19th Air Brigade, the Far Eastern Navigation Safety Directorate (UBYeKO), a naval port, SNIS (Lookout and Communications Service), a hospital, and other subunits.[11]

Establishment of a powerful undersea fleet played an important role in strengthening the MSDV. Establishment of a submarine brigade began in

November 1932. Assembly of the first eight Shch-Class submarines, which had been delivered in disassembled form from plants in the European part of the USSR, was successfully accomplished in 1933-1934.[12] The first Far East Soviet submarine dive took place on 21 June 1933 in Zolotoy Rog Bay (G. N. Kholostyakov, commanding; V. O. Filippov, military commissar).

The MSDV were continuously being delivered new surface units carrying more powerful armament and improved propulsion equipment. Some were built in the Far East, while others came from other fleets and Soviet shipbuilding enterprises.

Party and government measures directed toward establishment of the Northern Sea Route were of exceptional importance for strengthening the MSDV. In 1936 the destroyers "Stalin" and "Voykov" steamed from the Baltic to the Pacific Fleet by the Northern Sea Route, and in 1937 — the submarine Shch-423. A year later submarine chasers and auxiliary vessels joined the fleet. The hydrographic vessels "Polyarnyy" and "Partizan" sailed from Leningrad to Vladivostok via the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, plus two detachments of fast minesweepers in 1939 from Sevastopol' and Kronshtadt.

An important role was played by a decision pertaining to shipbuilding in the Far East. In order to shorten the time required to establish a surface fleet in the Pacific, the decision recognized the necessity of giving priority to construction of destroyers, with several to be commissioned in 1937.

Torpedo boats occupied a significant position in fleet construction. In 1933 18 torpedo boats transferred from the Baltic (12 units) and Black Sea (6 units) were added to the MSDV. That same year the Labor and Defense Council adopted a decision to build 100 torpedo boats for the Far East.

In the plan of establishment of the MSDV, considerable attention was focused on coast defense construction for protecting navy bases against enemy penetration and artillery bombardment from the sea. In October 1933 a government commission headed by P. V. Kuybyshev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and Labor and Defense Council, was working in the Far East. Alongside other matters, the commission studied the status of and progress in MSDV organizational development. They also resolved on the spot many problems pertaining to strengthening the fleet's coast defense. In 1939 coast defense included 86 batteries, totaling 309 guns of various caliber (134 antiaircraft, 16 railway and 159 fixed guns).[13] By March 1941 coast defense was armed with 138 batteries (456 guns).[14]

Naval aviation was evolving and growing stronger along with the other arms. In 1932 it consisted of the 19th Heavy Bomber Brigade (70th, 78th, 105th, 106th, 107th squadrons), the 76th Independent Air Detachment,

the 89th and 48th First Category Air Stations, the 10th Junior Aviation Specialists School, and two independent air reconnaissance squadrons. Subsequently dozens of combat aircraft of new types joined the fleet (TB-3, MBR-2, R-5a, and others). By the end of 1937 naval aviation totaled 550 combat aircraft.[15]

The combat strength of the Red-Banner Amur Flotilla was considerably increased in the mid-1930's.

Alongside improvement in fleet equipment, its organization was improved, and the most efficient and expedient forms of combat and political training were secured. Communists and Komsomol members played a leading role in socialist competition. Meetings of junior command personnel, efficiency innovators and excellent-rated personnel were held. In 1935 the Pacific Fleet led all other Soviet fleets in principal combat and political training indices.

The number of party and Komsomol organizations grew with an increase in the size of fleet forces. In 1932 there were 58 party organizations in the MSDV, while by the end of 1935 there were 173 primary organizations, 471 company party organizations and 80 party groups in the Pacific Fleet.[16] This was achieved due to the fact that in 1934-1935 10,000 Communists and Komsomol members came to the Pacific Fleet. The party and Komsomol emissaries served as an example of performance of military duty. More than half of 1,124 excellent-rated men in combat and political training in 1939 were Communists and Komsomol members.[17]

The events at Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1938-1939 represented a major test of preparedness of the Pacific Fleet to defend the socialist homeland. Between 29 July and 11 August the fleet gave active assistance to the troops of the Far Eastern Front in routing the Japanese invaders. It guarded sea lines of communication and approaches to Peter the Great Bay, transported Red Army units to the combat zone, and evacuated wounded. An antitank artillery battalion, a minesweeper division, the escort ship "Metel'," ships of the 7th Naval Destroyer Brigade and others took part in combat operations repelling Japanese aggression. A total of 74 men of the Pacific Fleet were decorated for exemplary performance of their military duty as well as courage and valor displayed in the performance of duty.

In September 1938 the Pacific Fleet and Red-Banner Amur Flotilla were operationally subordinated to the Independent Red-Banner Far Eastern Army. This proved to be a timely measure in connection with the continuing growth of tension on the Far Eastern borders of the USSR and Mongolian People's Republic and promoted successful accomplishment of missions in 1939 pertaining to defeating the Japanese forces in the Khalkhin Gol River area and thwarting the aggressive aspirations of imperialist Japan.

In April 1939 A. A. Zhdanov, secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and member of the Main Military Council of the Navy, visited the Pacific Fleet. On instructions from the party Central Committee, he received a detailed briefing on life and training in the Pacific Fleet and inspected a number of ships and bases. On 10 April A. A. Zhdanov went to sea on board the destroyer "Voykov," carefully observed the actions of personnel during a drill, noted the high degree of proficiency displayed by the men and thanked the entire ship's company. A. A. Zhdanov appealed to naval personnel and all toilers of the Maritime Region to work persistently to implement the resolutions of the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) pertaining to further development of productive resources and strengthening of the defense capability of the Far East.

Thanks to the unabating concern by party and government, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the Pacific Fleet constituted a powerful force. It totaled approximately 300 ships and boats of various types, including two destroyer leaders, 12 destroyers, 6 escort ships, 91 submarines, 30 minesweepers, 8 surface minelayers, and approximately 200 torpedo boats, patrol boats and other craft. Fleet air forces totaled 764 aircraft. A total of 143,407 enlisted men, petty officers and officers from the Pacific Fleet were assigned to duty on land fronts to fight the German-fascist invaders, while 9,542 were sent from the Red-Banner Amur Flotilla. During the war with imperialist Japan, the Pacific Fleet and Red-Banner Amur Flotilla played an extremely important role in defeating the Kwantung Army.

Thus a powerful Pacific Fleet was established thanks to concern by the Communist Party and Soviet Government. It reliably defended the homeland's maritime border in the Far East and, jointly with ground and border troops, defended the Far-Eastern borders of the Soviet state. Fleet personnel gained unfading glory. Today the Red-Banner Pacific Fleet, together with the other branches of the Soviet Armed Forces, is reliably guarding the Far Eastern boundaries of the great socialist homeland.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsGA VMF [Central State Naval Archives], Fund 417, List 2, File 18, Sheet 1; Fund 1, List 3, File 1389, Sheet 1.

2. Ibid., Fund 2, List 1, File 65, Sheet 10; Fund 417, List 2, File 14, sheets 14, 144.

3. Ibid., Fund 3, List 1, File 2190, Sheet 3.

4. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 1, Voyenizdat, 1976, page 166. The Far Eastern Flotilla was redesignated the Red-Banner Amur Flotilla effective 27 January 1931.

5. See "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums], Vol 4, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, pp 281, 283.

6. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 1, List 78471, File 4, Sheet 54.

7. TsGA VMF, Fund 4, List 1, File 142, Sheet 4.

8. PRAVDA, 23 February 1933.

9. TsGA VMF, Fund 1483, List 3, File 117, sheets 1-3.

10. S. Ye. Zakharov et al. "Krasnoznamennyy Tikhookeanskiy flot" [Red-Banner Pacific Fleet], Voyenizdat, 1973, page 118. On 11 January 1935, by order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense, a party and government decision was announced, redesignating the Far Eastern Naval Forces the Pacific Fleet (Central Naval Archives, Fund 2450, List 4, File 1, Sheet 291).

11. TsGA VMF, Fund 1012, List 3, File 16, sheets 1, 2, 4; File 58, sheets 5-6.

12. TsGA VMF, Fund 1483, List 1, File 282, Sheet 1. The first small-displacement submarines (approximately 160 tons) were transported by rail in 1933. The fleet possessed 28 submarines by March 1934.

13. TsGA VMF, Fund 1483, List 1, File 246, sheets 31-34.

14. Yu. G. Perechnev, "Sovetskaya beregovaya artilleriya" [Soviet Coast Artillery], Moscow, Nauka, 1976, page 53.

15. TsGA VMF, Fund 1090, List 1, File 430, Sheet 3.

16. Ibid., Fund 1012, List 3, File 295, sheets 3, 5, 168.

17. Ibid., Fund 1090, List 1, File 471, Sheet 321.

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HISTORY LESSON OUTLINE: COMBAT ROLE OF ARMED FORCES

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[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information" as "An Aid to Teachers of Military History," by Merited Scientist of the RSFSR, Professor and Doctor of Historical Sciences Maj Gen Tank Trps A. Krupchenko: "Methods of Lecturing on 'Development of the Armament and Tactics of the Military Services and the Combat Arms'"]

[Text] In our opinion the following basic items must be discussed in the second lecture on the topic "Military-Political Results of the Great Patriotic War. Development of the armament and tactics of the military services and combat arms":[1]

development of armament, combat equipemnt and organizational forms of the principal combat arms;

development of tactics;

troop control.

Of course the service school's area of specialization should be taken into account. At the same time in all cases, when discussing general directions and trends in development of armament, combat equipment and organizational forms of any military branch or combat arm, one should reveal and thoroughly analyze the factors which have determined this development. It is especially important to show how, when and in what manner it was possible to achieve military-technical superiority over our adversaries.

In discussing the first item, one should stress that the Ground Forces played a leading role in the war. They were the principal and numerically largest branch of the Armed Forces. They represented from 80 to 87 percent of total manpower.[2] During the war years the Ground Forces included rifle troops, artillery, armored and mechanized troops, cavalry, as well as special troops -- signal, engineer, railway, chemical. Their development contained specific features.

In the course of the war, for example, the numerical strength of the rifle troops more than tripled, and their combat capabilities increased sharply due to acquisition of new combat equipment. Almost half of all the small arms with which the Soviet Army was equipped in 1945 had been designed or initially manufactured during the war years. The general trend of change in organizational forms of rifle troops consisted in a gradual decrease in numerical strength and a steady increase in quantity of weapons and combat equipment. For example, the number of machineguns, artillery pieces and mortars in the rifle division doubled, while the number of submachine guns increased 21-fold.[3]

Significant changes also occurred in artillery, which constituted the principal Ground Forces firepower. Mass employment of tanks caused a rapid development of antitank weapons, especially antitank guns. Rocket artillery, which became a real threat to enemy troops, experienced considerable development in the course of the war. Antitank artillery calibers almost doubled, while the armor-piercing capability of artillery projectiles almost quintupled. The weight of a rifle division artillery salvo doubled, while that of a mortar salvo increased sevenfold.[4]

In analyzing the development of organizational forms of artillery it is important to draw attention to continuous growth in the number of large artillery combined units which comprised the Supreme High Command [SHC] Reserve. As we know, this fact enabled the Soviet command decisively to mass artillery on main axes of advance on an unprecedented scale. As an example we might cite the Berlin Operation, which involved the participation of more than 42,000 guns and mortars.

Major changes were observed in the armament and organizational forms of armored and mechanized troops, which comprised the main striking and maneuver force of the Ground Troops. Not only existing tank models, such as the T-34 and KV, were improved in the course of the war, but several new models were also developed, as well as an entire series of self-propelled guns. Tank and mechanized corps as well as tank armies were formed.

The principal direction of development of engineer equipment consisted in designing and building machinery and equipment providing further mechanization of engineer activities, as well as new river-crossing equipment. Improvement of the organizational forms of engineer troops proceeded chiefly in the direction of increasing the number of SHC Reserve combined units and units, as well as establishment of a number of special-purpose combined-units and units.

The fluid character of combat operations dictated a further increase in the role of signal troops. Their numerical strength quadrupled during the war years. The quantity of radio equipment increased sharply. The troops received new radio sets and improved telephone and telegraph equipment.

There was also an increase in the number of signal subunits and units in the armies, fronts and Headquarters, SHC Reserve.

Discussion of the second topic item should begin with substantiation of the fact that superiority of Soviet art of warfare over that of the German-fascist army constituted one of the most important factors ensuring our victory.

Of course principal attention in the lecture must be focused on development of tactics.

In the area of tactics the instructor should place emphasis on the essence, means and methods of solving the most important problems of organization and conduct of combined-arms combat. We are dealing primarily with such problems as penetration of a deliberate defense and deep exploitation of an offensive operation. As we know, precisely these items were of primary significance during the war years. They also play an important role under present-day conditions.

Analysis of the experience of the war indicates that the principal direction taken in solving the problem of penetration of a deliberate defense was a gradual shift from sequential (methodical) taking of individual positions to continuous penetration of the entire tactical zone of defense. Successful accomplishment of this mission depended to a significant degree on skillful disposition of troops. We know that our prewar regulations prescribed dispositioning in depth advancing troops and dividing them into "attack" and "containment" groups. In the course of the war it became obvious that such a division weakened the force of the initial attack, confused command personnel and led to inactivity of the "containment" group in combat. Under conditions where the enemy's defense was of a focal-area character and shallow, such a dispositioning of troops made it difficult to mount a powerful initial thrust, since it led to limitation of capabilities for maximum employment of weapons to neutralize the enemy's defense and manpower for the assault phase.

The new infantry field manual which came out at the end of 1942 abolished division of the order of battle into "attack" and "containment" groups and establishment of second echelons at the tactical level. Rifle squads, platoons and companies were to be deployed into an extended line for combat. Single-echelon dispositioning and deployment of small subunits into an extended line made it possible simultaneously to engage a maximum quantity of weapons (especially automatic weapons) and personnel and at the same time forced the adversary to disperse his fire frontally. Build-up of efforts was accomplished by engaging battalion, regiment and division reserves, as well as army support echelons. Such an order of battle was retained up to the summer of 1943. By this period there had occurred a substantial increase in the combat might of Soviet troops in connection with the fact that they were being heavily equipped with new types of weapons and combat hardware, change in organization, and growth in the

combat skill of command personnel. Under the effect of steadily increasing offensive pounding by Soviet forces, the enemy shifted from a focal-point defense to a static defense in depth, with a trench system. Under these conditions it was necessary substantially to alter the order of battle, and particularly to shift to disposition of men and weapons in depth at the battalion-division echelon. The combat dispositions of rifle corps and divisions, beginning with the Battle of Kursk, were as a rule arranged in two echelons, while rifle regiments were arranged in from two to three echelons. Single-echelon battle formations [illegible] regiment-division level were employed only during an offensive operation in secondary sectors or where the enemy had an inadequately prepared defense. In addition, the strength of artillery and tank infantry close support groups was substantially increased. Reserves of various function and mobile obstacle detachments (PZO) became indispensable elements of the battle formations of combined-arms large units.

As a whole development of the battle formations of rifle and tank troops was directed toward ensuring capability to engage a maximum quantity of weapons, ease of execution of maneuver in the course of combat, and precision coordination and control of units and subunits.

Massing of men and weapons in breakthrough sectors was of great importance for a successful offensive. This problem was resolved by rejecting uniform distribution of men and weapons parallel with the front, by narrowing the breakthrough sectors, and by increasing density of troops and weapons.

Decisive massing of men and weapons in breakthrough sectors required exceptionally precise organization of coordinated action by all combat arms on the battlefield. The war demonstrated with particular emphasis that the modern engagement is a combined-arms engagement, and that success is achieved only under the condition of reliable and continuous coordination in place, objective and time of the efforts of all personnel and weapons participating in the battle. In view of this, throughout the entire war there was occurring a continuous process of search for the most sophisticated techniques and modes of organizing and maintaining mutual coordination. By the end of 1941 it had become obvious that reliable coordination can be organized only directly in the field, not on a map, as was the case during the first months of combat operations. The war demanded that commanders of all echelons be given the time requisite to organize coordinated action. Of great importance for maintaining coordinated action in the course of combat was personal contact between commanders of cooperating subunits and units and all combat arms. With this objective commanders of tank and artillery units and subunits were located as a rule together with or in the immediate vicinity of the command or observation posts of the commanders of the rifle units and combined units which they were supporting or which were attached to them. For this same reason it was considered advisable to dispatch aviation representatives with communications gear to command posts of combined-arms

large units and to move artillery systems forward directly in the combat formations of advancing troops. Gradually they extensively followed the practice of combined exercises of all combat arms and wrapping up a forthcoming engagement on maps, terrain models and training grounds.

Organization of coordinated action, and consequently solving the problem of penetrating a deliberate defense was promoted by further improvement of modes of employment of combat arms. During the first years of the war, for example, infantry close-support tanks were employed to support only the forward echelons of rifle divisions. Usually some of the tanks of the first echelons would be designated to support division second echelons, which complicated organization of coordinated action and inevitably led to a slower pace of penetration. In connection with this, in the third period of the war, as the tank fleet grew, infantry close-support tank groups would also sometimes be established in division support echelons. This made it possible to build up tank efforts during engagement of support echelons, which substantially increased the effectiveness of their employment and ensured penetration of the enemy's entire tactical defense zone at a rapid pace. After 1943 tank subunits would be assigned to specific rifle regiments and battalions, and sometimes companies as well, to support them to the entire depth of penetration of the enemy's defense. Improvement in the skill of command personnel of rifle units and subunits constituted an important condition for such utilization of tanks.

Successful performance of missions to penetrate a deliberate defense depended in large measure on reliable delivery of effective fire on the enemy. As we know, in the course of the war it was acknowledged essential to shift to artillery support for the attack and offensive air support. Offensive artillery support included the following: preparation for the assault, support of the assault, and close support fire for advancing troops during combat deep in the enemy's defense. As artillery and mortar densities became greater in breakthrough sectors (up to 250-300 guns and mortars), in order to achieve the maximum element of offensive surprise, duration of artillery preparation was reduced, amounting to 20-40 minutes in some operations.

We should emphasize that predictable pattern was not employed in planning artillery preparation. Both the overall duration and sequence (schedule) of conduct of artillery preparation would be determined in each concrete instance in relation to the nature of the defense and enemy force, terrain conditions, and quantity of artillery and ammunition. Of particular importance for reliable artillery support of infantry and tank actions was elimination of the gap between the end of artillery preparation and beginning of the attack. Taking experience into account, the infantry began rising for the assault not at the moment artillery fire was shifted deeper, but rather at the end of the final artillery strike. This technique enabled riflemen to approach closer to the enemy's main line of resistance and to attack his forward positions immediately when fire was shifted deep.

At the beginning of the war support of the attack involved for the most part sequential concentration of fire. In 1943 a single moving barrage began to be employed for this purpose, and beginning in the summer of 1944 a double moving barrage in combination with sequential concentration of fire. The depth of close support of attacking troops with a moving barrage increased steadily, and amounted to 3-4 kilometers by war's end. Support of infantry and tanks during combat deep in the enemy's defenses was conducted chiefly by the rolling barrage method.

Engineer support was of great significance in penetrating a deliberate defense. Over the course of the war the volume of work involved in engineer support of an offensive operation grew to such an extent that performance of this work became impossible solely with the organic engineer equipment of units and combined units. Therefore it was necessary not only substantially to increase engineer personnel and equipment attached to rifle combined units, but also to train nonorganic combat engineers in advance. The war clearly revealed the urgent necessity of further equipping engineer troops with means of mechanized performance of work pertaining to engineer support of combat operations of infantry, tanks, and artillery.

One should also draw the trainees' attention to the fact that Soviet troops have amassed a wealth of experience in the conduct of offensive operations in mountains, forest, and marshy terrain, day and night, and at different times of the year. Night combat actions were of particular significance. Night attacks were mounted not only by separate subunits and units but by entire armies, and sometimes fronts as well. Following were the most typical features of the night attack: thorough preparation during hours of daylight, element of surprise, assignment to subunits and units missions which are limited in depth, rigorous rectilinearity, and decreased spacings and intervals between attacking subunits. The attack would begin silently, and as a rule, without artillery preparation.

In examining modes of organization and conduct of the defensive engagement it is essential to point to the close dialectical link between attack and defense, which in their development exerted considerable influence on one another. For example, in connection with growth in the capabilities of the attacking force, the depth of the defense steadily increased. So did the degree of field fortification and density of personnel and weapons. In the first period of the war the tactical defense zone consisted only of one defensive zone, the depth of which did not exceed 6-8 km, while a second defensive zone appeared in the Battle of Kursk. As a result the total depth of the tactical zone reached 12-15 km.

It is extremely important to note the transition from center-of-resistance defense to trench defense, which first appeared in the battles at Moscow and which experienced fullest development in the Battle of Kursk. Employment of trenches helped reduce casualties and equipment losses from artillery fire and airstrikes and better promoted swift and concealed maneuver of men and weapons.

An important trend in evolution of defense was an increase in defensive areas and densities of personnel and weapons, especially antitank weapons. The experience of the war demonstrated that in addition to establishment of powerful tank-killing areas and antitank strong points, reliability of antitank defense was achieved by the following: organization of an antitank observation and warning system; field fortification not only ahead of the main line of resistance but also deep in the defense; establishment of mobile obstacle detachments, strong antitank artillery and tank reserves capable of swiftly executing adjustment of fire and movement in the course of a defensive engagement. In addition to employing artillery as part of antitank strong points and tank-killing areas, a considerable portion of artillery was employed for delivering direct fire, as well as for organizing mobile defensive fire in the direction of attack by enemy tanks. Artillery and air counterbombardment was a new technique employed by Soviet troops in the defense.

The substantial changes which took place in the course of the Great Patriotic War in the modes of conduct of the combined-arms engagement dictated the necessity of further development and improvement of means and methods of comprehensive combat support and troop control.

When presenting the third training topic item, it is necessary to define the term "troop control" and to emphasize the decisive significance of stable, firm and mobile control for achieving success in combat. Of importance for improving methods of troop control was determination of the commander's location in combat. Order No 308, dated 8 October 1942, specifies that the commander should be at that location from which it was most convenient to control his troops and from where he could observe the battlefield and the actions of his units, at least on the main axis of advance. In conformity with these instructions, in the course of the war commanders of rifle platoons, companies and battalions were located behind the dispositions of their subunits, from where they could see their entire dispositions and observe the enemy. Commanders of tank platoons, companies and battalions exercised control from their tanks, located in the combat formations of their subunits. Commanders of rifle regiments and divisions controlled troops from command and observation posts. Command and observation posts of commanders of tank and artillery combined units and units supporting the infantry advance were also deployed in the immediate vicinity.

Communications was one of the principal means employed in securing troop control. Underrating the importance of radio constituted a serious deficiency in organization of communications at the beginning of the war. Practical experience graphically demonstrated the advantages of radio communications and dictated its further improvement. Radio became the principal means of communication by war's end, not only in the tank troops but also in the rifle troops.

It is advisable at the conclusion of the lecture to emphasize that party-political work was of great importance during the Great Patriotic War in

resolving all problems arising in organization and conduct of combat operations by Soviet troops. The forms and methods of party-political work, just as the modes of conduct of combat operations, were being continuously improved and were distinguished by exceptional diversity. The most characteristic features of party-political work were its purposefulness and close link with concrete troop combat activities. All efforts were directed toward ensuring successful accomplishment of combat missions and indoctrination of Soviet Army personnel in a spirit of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, faith in victory, hatred of the enemy, and willingness to make every effort to achieve victory for a just cause.

Reading List

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [Guarding Peace and Socialism], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979.

2. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Vols 3-10.

3. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediay" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vols 1-7.

4. "Voyennaya istoriya. Uchebnik" [Military History. A Textbook], Voyenizdat, 1971.

5. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1967.

FOOTNOTES

1. For methods advice on the first lecture see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 2, 1980, pp 69-74.

2. "Voyennaya istoriya," page 261.

3. "Istoriya voyn i voyennogo iskusstva" [History of Wars and the Art of Warfare], Voyenizdat, 1970, pp 393-394.

4. "Voyennaya istoriya," op. cit., page 282.

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BOOK REVIEW: LENIN'S LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNTRY'S DEFENSE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4 1980 signed to press 24 Mar 80 pp 83-85

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences Col (Ret) Ye. Tavetayev: "Book on Lenin's Direction of National Defense"]

[Text] The Political Literature Publishing House has released a very important book, written by S. V. Lipitskiy[1] on the basis of archival sources and official documental publications. This volume is distinguished by simplicity of presentation of complex questions pertaining to party direction of defense of the Soviet land, establishment of its Armed Forces, and the edifice of armed forces control and leadership during the civil war and military intervention. The wealth of experience of Lenin's military leadership is essential to all those who today are fighting for national independence and liberation from the yoke of imperialism.

Soviet citizens are accustomed to the precise formula that the problem of our country's defense has always been resolved under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, headed by V. I. Lenin. This formula reflects the principal condition for success of national defense. Behind it lies the diversified and many-faceted innovative work, colossal in volume and depth, by the leader of the party and revolution.

The author reveals the complex environment of the civil war as a continuation of the revolution and shows that victory in armed conflict between revolution and counterrevolution could be achieved only with its conduct not only by the troops at the front but also by all the forces and resources of the nation's revolutionary people. This law and pattern, which was well understood by the Bolsheviks at that time, formed the basis of the decision by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom of 30 November 1918 to establish an agency "of extraordinary military dictatorship"[2] -- the Workers' and Peasants' Defense Council, under the chairmanship of V. I. Lenin. The VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] and Sovnarkom emphasized that the Council "shall be invested with full authority in the area of mobilization of the nation's manpower and resources in the interests of defense. Decrees of the

Defense Council shall be unconditionally binding on all agencies and establishments, central and local, and on all citizens" (page 121). By this time the Soviet land had already been transformed into a unified military camp. All the nation's manpower and resources were fully marshalled to the cause of achieving victory.

This book draws the readers' attention to the scientific character of direction of military organizational development and practical conduct of the war by V. I. Lenin and the Leninist Central Committee (page 46). The level of leadership was unusually high due to innovative application of the revolutionary theory of Marxism and utilization of the political, organizational and purely military experience of preparing for and carrying out the Great October Socialist Revolution. Leninist foresight enabled the party to take the course of establishing a regular Red Army and to ensure its superiority over the enemy from the standpoint of morale, art of warfare, and subsequently in manpower as well. The author does a good job of presenting the struggle by Lenin and the party Central Committee against attempts to deviate from this course.

V. I. Lenin, the Central Committee of the RKP(B) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)], VTsIK, and Sovnarkom firmly and purposefully directed defense of the nation via the Workers' and Peasants' Defense Council. They were supported by a gradually formed and functionally defined military edifice -- the Republic Revolutionary Military Council and the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs -- a collective body which united the administrative and operational functions of control of Armed Forces activities. The Commander in Chief of All Armed Forces of the Republic possessed considerable independence in determining operational-strategic matters of planning and troop control within the limits of directives and instructions of the party Central Committee and other top-level agencies of Soviet authority. Important tasks were handled by Republic Revolutionary Military Council Field Headquarters, which performed operational, recordkeeping and auditing functions, and All-Russian Main Headquarters, which was in charge of military training of the civilian population, mobilization affairs, command personnel, preparation of new field manuals and regulations, as well as other matters.

Of particular importance was establishment of PUR -- the Political Directorate of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council (page 173), which ensured a vanguard role by the Communists in troop combat and political training, and strengthening of discipline in the army, in engagements and battles with the enemies of the revolution.

The Soviet Government could not utilize the General Staff of the Czarist Army. The reason was not only that the former Czarist members of the general staff occupied a hostile class position, but also that the very process of strategic control encompassed, in addition to purely operational matters, political direction of the masses garbed in soldiers' uniforms.

The party Central Committee and Soviet Government were faced with the necessity of establishing the headquarters (including supreme headquarters) requisite for controlling Soviet troops on all fronts of the armed conflict. Selection of headquarters staff personnel, however, should be made proceeding from their loyalty to the revolution and a correct understanding of RKP(B) policy.

V. I. Lenin and the party Central Committee were involved in direct operational-strategic control of the forces in the field, corrected errors made in the course of the struggle against Kolchak and Denikin, assigned and refined the missions of the fronts, urged on the Republic Revolutionary Military Council and the Commander in Chief if they were operating insufficiently vigorously (pp 245-248), helped them correctly plan operations, provide comprehensive support of operations, improve excessively complex control schemes (page 252), and monitored implementation of party decisions on military matters. They acted to cut short any vacillations and differences of opinion hindering execution of an already adopted strategic plan, as was the case on the Southern Front (page 251).

The decisions and documents of V. I. Lenin and the party Central Committee even today are a model in political and military-professional respects. An example of this is the RKP(B) Central Committee Politburo Directive of 15 October 1919, issued in connection with the capture of Orel by Denikin. It formulates with absolute precision and brevity the main, immediate and subsequent tasks of strategic leadership and specifies the procedure and timetable for accomplishing them, the type of actions, character and objectives of redeployments of forces.

The author has devoted considerable attention to methods of Lenin's direction of national defense, which reflect the party's revolutionary policy under conditions of civil war. Excellent results were obtained from employment of the method of direct appeal to the masses at a difficult moment for the Soviet State. Everyone is familiar with the Council of People's Commissars decree-appeal of 21 February 1918 entitled "The Socialist Homeland Is in Danger!" At a difficult time when the enemy was achieving success on the Eastern Front, V. I. Lenin wrote a letter to the Petrograd workers dated 10 April 18, advancing the slogan-appeal "Everything for the Struggle Against Kolchak!" Of enormous importance was the letter-program of struggle in the south, entitled "Everything for the Struggle Against Denikin!" These appeals by our leader activated the profound masses and evoked a new flood of energy by the masses in the struggle against counterrevolution. Also characteristic are such Leninist methods of direction of the armed struggle as explanation to the army and people of the situation at the fronts, determination of concrete military tasks, and revolutionary agitation.

The author demonstrates consistently and in detail a Leninist Party purposefulness, businesslike efficiency, the leader's ability to rely on the masses in accomplishing important political and military tasks, and his innovative approach to things. Monitoring and businesslike assistance

to executors of difficult tasks -- all this was characteristic of V. I. Lenin's work style and is described well and historically correctly by the author.

Unfortunately the book does contain some shortcomings. Not all agencies of supreme direction of national defense are shown in action. The activities of Republic Revolutionary Military Council Field Headquarters, All-Russian Main Headquarters, and certain other establishments were not discussed. The author merely mentions Headquarters, Supreme High Command in passing, although V. I. Lenin and the party Central Committee regularly directed its activities.

The process of elaboration of operational plans pertaining to the struggle against counterrevolution, a process which is also important under present-day conditions, was not entirely disclosed. Absolutely nothing is said about intelligence gathering -- one of the most important functions of top-echelon military control.

On the whole, however, S. V. Lipitskiy's book is a fine contribution to Soviet party-historical and military-historical literature. It has been greeted with great interest not only by Soviet readers but also by readers from the brother socialist nations and has become an important help in the struggle for the triumph of Leninist Communist ideals, as well as in exposing falsifiers of the history of the civil war and the military intervention.

FOOTNOTES

1. S. V. Lipitskiy, "Leninskoye rukovodstvo oboronoy strany. Sozdaniye i deyatel'nost' vysshikh organov rukovodstva oboronoy Sovetskoy Respubliki 1917-1920" [Lenin's Direction of National Defense. Establishment and Activities of Top-Level Agencies of Direction of the Defense of the Soviet Republic, 1917-1920], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, 304 pages.

2. Ya. M. Sverdlov, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Writings], Vol 3, Moscow, Politizdat, 1960, page 70.

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BOOK REVIEW: PARTY-POLITICAL WORK DURING THE CIVIL WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4 1980 signed to press 24 Mar 80 pp 85-86

[Book review by Docent, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col (Ret) F. Danilov: "Party-Political Work During the Civil War Years"]

[Text] Nauka Publishing House has put o.- an interesting new book on party-political work in the Red Army during the civil war years.[1]

The current significance of the topic, the high level of its elaboration, and the newness of the material presented in the book are clearly evident in every chapter. The author gives a concise analysis of previously-published studies on this problem and demonstrates the flimsiness of the fabrications by bourgeois historians and sociologists who distort the leadership role of the Communist Party in the Red Army and the strength of its influence on military personnel during the Civil War. This is the first such historiographic survey of Soviet and bourgeois literature in studies dealing with party-political work.

The author extensively discusses the diversified activities of V. I. Lenin and the RKP(B) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee, headed by him, pertaining to organization of party-political work in the military. The main theoretical questions of party-political work were elaborated under the guidance of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin: on its essence, principles, tasks, main areas, modes of influence on personnel, its forms and methods. He was linked by very close bonds with the revolutionary military councils, political sections and party workers in the line units, and he himself spoke on more than 30 occasions at rallies and meetings of the Red Armymen and workers being sent to the front (pp 129-130); he signed not less than 12 leaflets and appeals to the enemy's officers and enlisted men (page 221).

The Central Committee of the RKP(B) directed political-indoctrination work in the units and combined units via committee members and authorized representatives who would go out to the line units. A system of military-political agencies and party organizations was established at the central level, in the army, formations, combined units, units and subunits.

Problems of party-political work in the Red Army were discussed on more than 40 occasions at RKP(B) Central Committee plenums, Politburo and Orgburo meetings (page 88). Instructions and statutes on the work of revolutionary military councils, political sections and party cells were examined and ratified at these meetings.

On the basis of fundamental party and government documents: The RKP(B) Program, the Constitution of the RSFSR, decrees of the Soviet Government, orders of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council and appeals issued by the political agencies of combined units -- the author examines the principal Leninist theses on a party, class approach to indoctrination of Red Army commanders and men. These documents reveal the policy of the Soviet Government, the character of the civil war, the necessity of a military-political alliance between the worker class and the peasantry, and the problem of indoctrination of Red Armymen and commanders in a spirit of brotherhood and friendship among the peoples of Soviet Russia and proletarian solidarity with the toilers of other countries. Even today they give the direction of the struggle against bourgeois ideology, organization and conduct of Communist propaganda among the enemy's military personnel and among the civilian population in the combat zone. This volume is superior to a number of previously-published studies on the same subject in its detailed substantiation of all aspects of the problem, citing new documentary materials.

The author correctly concludes that "ideological work in the army was of a highly-efficient, effective character" (page 229). This is convincingly confirmed by the materials of the report by the political section of the 1st Army for 1919. This report notes that as a result of the work performed by political agencies and party organizations, "even the external appearance of the Red Army, its staunchness, discipline and clarity of understanding of the missions assigned it attests to the fact that party work was not in vain."[2]

This book contains for the first time a separate chapter which reveals the role of party-political work in strengthening Soviet military discipline and training Red Army personnel. Previous attempts to discuss the organization of military training did not go beyond the framework of discussion of toiler universal military training. The author of this book demonstrates that in the course of combat operations classes were held in military units for combat and political training of Red Armymen. The author correctly stresses the vanguard role of Communists in combat training pertaining to study of machinegun, armored and cavalry activities as well as combat against enemy tanks.

The author examines in detail the development and character of Soviet military discipline, the content, forms and methods of activities of revolutionary military councils, political agencies and party cells pertaining to strengthening discipline, as well as the party's leadership role in organizational and ideological-indoctrination work among army and

navy personnel in the course of combat operations. A Leninist work style, combining a high degree of Communist moral fiber, scientific character and high-principled approach to solving root problems, with a constant sense of the new, a profound analysis of reality, and unity of word and deed was a model and example for all.

Redistribution of Communists to decisive sectors, a personal example by party and Komsomol members in combat, influence on the men by impassioned Bolshevik word and personal example, dissemination of advanced combat know-how and publicity of those who had distinguished themselves in battle, and concern for the men's daily life and needs constituted the basis of party influence on commanders and Red Armymen at the front.

V. G. Kolychev's book makes an important contribution to historiography of the civil war period in the USSR. The author thoroughly investigates problems of party-organizational and political-indoctrination work in the military.

During the civil war years political work was a most important means of implementation of Communist Party policy in the military, increasing military discipline and the combat efficiency of units and combined units, and Communist indoctrination of the fighting men of the world's first worker and peasant army.

This fine book does contain shortcomings, however. Examination of the principles of party-political work at the end of the fifth chapter cannot be considered to be a felicitous decision by the author. It would have been more advisable to include this section in the second chapter, as the most important theoretical question, while it should have been replaced in the fifth chapter by a special section entitled "Party-Political Work to Ensure Accomplishment of Tasks Under Various Combat Situation Conditions."

In the section "Indoctrination Work Aimed at Strengthening the Military-Political Alliance of the Worker Class and Toiling Peasantry" (pp 168-187), principal attention is focused on problems of party-political work among Red Armymen of peasant background and the civilian population in the villages and hamlets in the combat zone. The content of party-political work among Red Armymen of a worker background pertaining to indoctrinating them in a spirit of friendship and alliance with the toiling peasants was not adequately handled.

These deficiencies, however, do not diminish the value of this book. It is useful not only to history research scholars but also to a broader readership of commanders, political workers, army and navy party and Komsomol activists in ideological and political-indoctrination work under present-day conditions.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. G. Kolychev, "Partiyno-politicheskaya rabota v Krasnoy Armii v gody grazhdanskoy voyny, 1918-1920" [Party-Political Work in the Red Army During the Civil War Years, 1918-1920], Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 470 pages.

2. "Partiyno-politicheskaya rabota v Krasnoy Armii (mart 1919-1920 gg). Dokumenty" [Party-Political Work in the Red Army (March 1919-1920). Documents], Voyenizdat, 1964, page 212.

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DECORATIONS: ORDER OF LENIN AND ORDER OF THE RED STAR

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[Article, published under the heading "Military History Dates" by Col V. Lebedev: "For the 50th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Star"]

[Text] In Honor of the Leader of the Revolution

The end of the 1920's and beginning of the 1930's were characterized by an unprecedented scale of building socialism in the USSR and by a shock-work pace of accomplishment of the targets of the First Five-Year Plan. In an atmosphere of nationwide patriotic enthusiasm a new, highest decoration of the USSR -- the Order of Lenin, was established by decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on 6 April 1930[1] -- to honor the first grandiose successes of the five-year plan and under the direct influence of these successes. According to the statute, the Order of Lenin shall be awarded to individual citizens, groups, establishments, enterprises and public organizations of the USSR for particular services in socialist competition and the cause of national defense.[2]

Proposals to establish a special decoration honoring the leader of the socialist revolution and founder of the Soviet State began to be submitted immediately following the death of Il'ich,[3] who was beloved of the entire people, and it is quite logical that the name of Lenin was attached to the most prestigious and honored decoration of the USSR, the homeland's highest award, presented for heroic deeds aimed at implementation of the immortal Leninist ideals.

At the beginning of May 1930 Komsomol organizations at a number of Leningrad plants, taking into consideration the considerable services of KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA in mobilizing the Komsomol masses and worker youth in building socialism and in connection with the fifth anniversary of this, our country's leading youth newspaper, petitioned the government to award it the first Order of Lenin.[4] This initiative was supported by Komsomol members and young people of many other of our country's cities and construction projects. By decree of the Presidium of the USSR Central

Executive Committee, dated 2 May 1930, KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA was awarded the highest honors of the USSR, and an official ceremony was held on 23 June 1931, presenting Order of Lenin No 1 to representatives of this newspaper.[3]

Soon after this, the Azneft' and Grozneft' petroleum associations as well as a group of oil industry workers and employees were awarded the Order of Lenin for ahead-of-schedule fulfillment of the five-year plan. Somewhat later the Presidium of the All-Union Central Executive Committee awarded this decoration to the Stalingrad, Khar'kov and Chelyabinsk Tractor plants, the Moscow and Gor'kiy Automotive plants, and a number of other industrial enterprises and their most active construction workers and outstanding production workers.

The homeland's highest honor was awarded to pioneers of new forms of socialist competition and production innovators: coal miner A. G. Stakhanov, forge shop worker A. Kh. Busygin, loom operators Ye. V. and M. A. Vinogradova, machine operator P. F. Krivonos, and many others.

The first military units to be awarded the Order of Lenin received this honor in connection with their effective direct participation in building socialism. In August 1932 the 73d Red-Banner Rifle Division was awarded the Order of Lenin for active assistance in building the Khar'kov Tractor Plant. In February 1933 the 25th Red-Banner Chapayev Rifle Division was awarded this highest honor for outstanding achievements on the economic front. The 30th Irkutsk Red-Banner, 9th Don, 60th and 11th Chelyabinsk Rifle divisions were awarded the Order of Lenin in 1934 for successes achieved in accomplishing economic tasks in securing a high level of combat and political training.

In the spring of 1933 numerous Basmach bands invaded Soviet territory. For heroism displayed in defeating these bands, the Order of Lenin was awarded to Red Armyman Roman Panchenko of the 11th Khorezm Regiment. This was the first time the decoration had been awarded for combat distinction.

Several years later the Order of Lenin was awarded to a group of Soviet military personnel who had fought as volunteers in Spain against the forces of fascism, on the side of the Republican forces. By ukase of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, dated 25 October 1938, the Order of Lenin was awarded to 93 Red Army fighting men and commanders who had distinguished themselves in battle against the Japanese aggressors at Lake Khasan. The 40th Rifle Division was awarded this nation's highest honor for heroism and courage displayed in these battles. A number of combined units and units, as well as a large number of military personnel, were awarded the Order of Lenin for active participation in defeating the troops of imperialist Japan on the Khalkhin-Gol River (1939) and in battles on the Karelian Isthmus during the Finno-Soviet armed conflict.

More than 6,500 awards of the Order of Lenin were made up to 1941. Recipients included veterans of the revolution, party and government

officials, and prominent Soviet military commanders: V. K. Blyukher, S. M. Budennyy, K. Ye. Voroshilov, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labor.[6]

By the time of the treacherous attack on the USSR by fascist Germany, the Order of Lenin had been awarded to 39 military collectives, including the Air Force Academy imeni N. Ye. Zhukovskiy, Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze, and the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin.

The number of recipients of the Order of Lenin increased sharply during the Great Patriotic War, as the scale of heroic accomplishments of Soviet citizens fighting in defense of the socialist homeland also increased immeasurably. More than 41,000 awards of the Order of Lenin were made during the war years.

More than 36,000 military personnel and partisans were awarded this coveted decoration for unprecedented courage and heroism displayed in battle against the enemy.

The 17th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 17th Tank Division and the 355th Rifle Regiment of the 100th Rifle Division were the first of the military units to receive this decoration, on 31 August 1941, for exemplary performance of assigned missions and for courage and bravery displayed. The 207 military units, combined units and establishments awarded the nation's highest honor during the war included the 8th Guards Rifle Division, which gained fame in the fighting at Moscow, the 295th Rifle Division, which took part in the assault on Berlin, and the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, which traveled the glorious combat road from Moscow to the capital of the fascist Reich.[7]

After the victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War, the Zaporozh'ye construction and metallurgy work forces were among the first to receive the Order of Lenin, in 1947, for rebuilding the demolished economy. "The workers of Zaporozh'ye kept their word, and the nation appropriately honored their deeds...," recalled L. I. Brezhnev. "The Zaporozhstroy Trust and the Zaporozhstal' Plant were awarded the nation's highest decoration -- the Order of Lenin. Many workers, engineers, production commanders and party workers received the Order of Lenin.... My name also appeared on the list. This was a very cherished award -- my first Order of Lenin."[8]

The Order of Lenin is not only the highest award but also the most universal. It honors the services of enlisted men and field marshals, workers and ministers, kolkhoz farmers and cosmonauts, scientists and athletes, work forces of plants and theaters, kolkhozes, military units, etc. Recipients have included outstanding leaders of the international Communist and worker movement G. Dimitrov, M. Cachin, Ho Chi Minh, G. Husak, D. Ibarruri, J. Kadar, W. Ulbricht, and others.

The Order of Lenin graces the banners of all hero-cities and the Brest Fortress-hero, as well as many other Soviet cities, oblasts and autonomous republics. It has been awarded to the Moscow, Leningrad, and Transbaikal military districts. Lenin Komsomol has been awarded the Order of Lenin three times.

All 15 union republics have received the homeland's highest award. As we know, one of the first to be awarded the Order of Lenin in the postwar period was the Kazakh SSR, for successful exploitation of virgin and fallow land. "The virgin lands' hour of triumph sounded in 1956. A giant harvest was produced on the Kazakhstan steppes; the republic gave the nation a billion poods of grain in place of the promised 600 million. And I was genuinely pleased when Kazakhstan was awarded that year the first Order of Lenin for the first billion poods of virgin-land grain."[9]

In the 50 years since its establishment, the Order of Lenin has become not only formally, but also in terms of nationwide acclaim, the acknowledged flagship of the Soviet awards system, rightfully heading up the honored group of decorations established by the homeland to honor its most deserving sons and daughters.

In the Name of the Red Star

The Order of the Red Star, established by decree of the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee on 6 April 1930, owes its name to one of the symbols of the Soviet State -- the badge of its Armed Forces.[10]

The Order of Lenin was born on the crest of successes in building socialism, while the Order of the Red Star was established in the name of securing this building process against the encroachments of external enemies.

The Statute of the Order of the Red Star[11] exacts high demands on military collectives, individual military personnel, as well as other persons nominated for this coveted government decoration. It is awarded for outstanding activity which promotes a major success for our forces in time of war, and is aimed at increasing the combat efficiency of the Soviet Army and strengthening the defense capability of the USSR. Award of the Red Star pledges the recipient to serve for all military personnel as an example of bravery, self-sacrifice and courage in a combat situation and to perform military service in an exemplary manner.

The directives of the 15th Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) pertaining to drafting of the First Five-Year Plan pointed to the steadily increasing danger of a military attack by the capitalist countries on the proletarian state. An act of armed provocation by the Chinese military on the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929 demonstrated that this potential danger was becoming an increasingly genuine threat.

The troops of the Chinese militarists were soundly defeated through the heroic efforts of the fighting men of the Far East. The Soviet Union's peace-seeking policy, friendly to the Chinese people, was victorious, while the policy of the Chinese landlords, generals and their imperialist backers suffered a cruel defeat.

V. K. Blyukher, commander of the Special Red-Banner Far-Eastern Army, who organized the devastating rebuff to the troops of the Chinese militarists, was the first recipient of the Order of the Red Star.[12] The newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was the first among military collectives to receive this award, on 27 December 1933.

In 1938 the Order of the Red Star was awarded to 1,935 commanders and enlisted men who had distinguished themselves in fighting back the Japanese aggressor invasion at Lake Khasan.[13]

Up to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War more than 21,500 awards of the Order of the Red Star had been made, including 17 awarded to military combined units, units, and establishments.

During the Great Patriotic War the Order of the Red Star was one of the most popular decorations. During the course of the war the number of times the "little star," as it is affectionately called by the people, was awarded reached a figure of almost 3 million. More than 1,700 military units, combined units and establishments, including 14 Polish and Czechoslovak units and subunits, were also awarded this decoration.

Today the Order of the Red Star, which is celebrating its 50th anniversary, solidly occupies first place in number of times awarded for deeds performed in the name of the socialist homeland.

Soviet decorations established during the civil war years, during the first five-year plans, during the Great Patriotic War, and during the period of rebuilding and development of the Soviet economy, symbolize the valor and courage of the people of our great homeland and attest to the selfless heroism and glorious labor of all generations of Soviet citizens in the name of the triumph of communism.

FOOTNOTES

1. At the time of establishment of the Order of Lenin there were only two types of national decorations: the Order of the Red Banner and the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. There did not exist a single decoration within the USSR award system which could be awarded for combat, labor and other distinguished services.

2. The Statute of the Order of Lenin was ratified by a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee on 5 May 1930.

3. Originally the future Order of Lenin was to be called the Order of Il'ich. This proposal was officially submitted by the war ministry as early as 1926. Somewhat later the USSR Revolutionary Military Council proposed ratifying another name for this decoration -- "Banner of Lenin" (for more detail see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1971).

4. USSR Central State Archives of the October Revolution, Fund 3316, List 23, File 445, Sheet 9.

5. The external appearance of the first model of the Order of Lenin, employed up to 1934, differed somewhat from the current design. A relief profile of our leader was reproduced among silhouettes of factory chimneys and buildings. The new design of the decoration, ratified in September 1934, comprises a bust portrait-medallion of V. I. Lenin in profile, framed by a gold wreath of ears of wheat and an unfurled Red Banner bearing the inscription "Lenin."

6. According to law the Order of Lenin shall be given to all persons awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of Socialist Labor.

7. The 1st Guards Tank Brigade is the only combined unit which was twice awarded the Order of Lenin during the war.

8. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth], Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, page 38.

9. Brezhnev, "Tselina" [Virgin Land], Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, page 77.

10. In the All-Russian Central Executive Committee pamphlet entitled "Red Star," published in 1918 in connection with establishment of this symbol as the uniform Red Army emblem, we read: "The Red Star is the emblem of the Red Army. It is the star of liberation of all toilers.... It is the star of happiness of all poor people, peasants and workers."

11. The Statute was ratified on 5 May 1930 by the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee.

12. V. K. Blyukher's name also leads the list of persons awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

13. PRAVDA, 26-31 October 1938.
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